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Introduction
“Sir, line your borders with soldiers, arm them with bayonets to keep out all 
the dangerous books which may appear, and these books, excuse the 
expression, will pass between their legs and fly over their heads and reach 
us.”
Denis Diderot
2The Problem of New Spaces
1
The Problem of New Spaces
In June of 2013, Edward Snowden ignited a global debate about the nature of 
government surveillance in the electronic sphere. The government documents 
leaked by the former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor revealed 
mass electronic surveillance by the United States and a number of partner 
governments such as the United Kingdom.1  These leaks raised serious legal, 
political, and ethical questions about the nature of individual privacy in the 
face of secret government surveillance programs.  The dominant narrative of 
the Snowden affair, as it unfolded in the media, was one of expanding 
government power impinging on individual rights in the electronic sphere. 
There was also a counter narrative involved in this incident that exhibits a 
complementary ebbing of the state’s power to control information. 
Perhaps the best illustration of this counter narrative is the farcical vignette 
that takes place in the basement of The Guardian’s building in London. In July 
of 2013, “a senior editor and a Guardian computer expert used angle grinders 
and other tools to pulverize the hard drives and memory chips on which the 
encrypted” leaks from Snowden were stored.2 These two men were overseen 
by note-taking government officials who had ordered the destruction of the 
equipment.3 This scene functions as a tableau that illustrates the core issue 
that Snowden exposed: the increasing dissonance Cyberspace causes in the 
application of state power. In The Guardian’s basement, the state appears in 
physical form and asserts a right to control information based on physical 
realities. It uses legal and physical coercion to destroy a machine that 
contains information.  
1  Greenwald & Ball, “The Top Secret Rules That Allow NSA to Use US Data without a 
Warrant,” (2014); Hopkins & Borger, “Exclusive: NSA Pays £100m in Secret Funding for 
GCHQ,” (2013); and Dorling, “Snowden Reveals Australia’s Links to US Spy Web,” 
(2013).
2  Borger, “NSA Files: Why The Guardian in London Destroyed Hard Drives of Leaked 
Files,” (2014).
3  Id.
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In the pre-digital era, the same tableau might have been one of police 
destroying a printing press; the destruction of a printing press being an 
efficient means of containing information and destroying a message. In the 
digital age, the UK government remained insistent on this same method of 
control.  It physically destroyed the machinery of the newspaper, despite the 
fact “that other copies of the files existed outside the country and that The 
Guardian was neither the sole recipient nor steward of the files leaked by 
Snowden.”4 The effectiveness of the state’s power to coerce is limited within a 
specific space and time, because the object of its control existed outside the 
space of the state. More specifically, not only was this information outside of 
the space of the UK, it existed outside the space of any state. The leaks 
themselves existed in a global space.  In the past, the rationale for destroying 
the printing press was linked to its locality and its central position in the 
distribution network for its messages.  Now, the message is no longer linked 
to the locality of the machine, and in McLuhan’s word “the medium” has been 
transfused with “the message.”5 As a result, the state’s ability to control 
information is bounded, and The Guardian “preferred to destroy [its] copy 
rather than hand it back to them or allow the courts to freeze [its] reporting.”6 
While the individuals using the angle grinders are helpless in the face of the 
state, the state is helpless in the face of technology: reporting on the leaks 
continued. Interestingly, the very leaks being destroyed exposed how states 
are attempting to shift this proposition and reassert power to control 
information. 
New spaces create unique governance issues.  This theme can be traced 
through the historical development of the international system of governance, 
which is tied to the conceptualization and division of space.  From empires to 
Westphalian states to the modern state, the way in which global space is 
conceptualized, divided, and compartmentalized is a critical component in 
understanding the distribution of governance across the globe.  This research 
takes up this thread and argues that Cyberspace creates an alternative 
geography that is facilitating a respatialization of the world. This respatial-
ization, from an international space to a global space, is directly tied to the 
networkization of real space that creates new abutments and intersections 
with Cyberspace.  
Specifically, the argument herein is that Cyberspace recodes international 
borders in such a way that international governance has been unable to 
effectively regulate Cyberspace. The traditional understanding of international 
space is centered on the state-centric system that developed post-
4  Id.
5  Brate, Technomanifestos (2002) 195-200.
6  Borger, “NSA Files” (2014).
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Westphalia, and it entrenches itself in the post-1945 settlement.  International 
space is thus defined by the sovereign equality of nation states that are 
defined by specific territorial borders. The international geography in this 
spatial order is an articulation of national spaces and an expression of 
sovereignty. This geographical shift in borders is not a matter of shifts in 
physical terrain. Instead, this study understands territory as “a political and 
legal concept, and not merely a geographical term.”7 Changes in geography 
require that both the practice and theory of international law and international 
relations be reevaluated in light of the opening up of a global digital 
information space that exists external to international space.
As is evident in the episode in the London basement from above, this project 
does not claim that the state is devoid of power, and certainly not that the 
state is breathing its last gasps.  The state still maintains the primary authority 
and legitimacy to compel the individuals located within its borders to comply 
with regulatory mechanisms, and this power is reified through the system of 
international governance.  Instead, the claim here is that the geography of 
Cyberspace dramatically changes state power in ways that both strengthen 
and weaken the state. In a global geography the state becomes only one 
subject among many in global space. While this bifurcation of the 
international from the global may seem like an exercise in semantics, it 
represents deeper questions about the notion of governance system at a 
world-scale.  The international system is premised on the state as a primary 
actor, but the idea of globality acknowledges other actors and thus other 
participants in the construction of governance mechanisms.  Globality in this 
sense is a spatial geography that encompasses the state system, but is not 
defined in terms of the borders of that system.  It is a geography that serves 
as an alternative to geography defined by the borders of states and the 
political-legal content of those borders.
Technology and the Global
It is no coincidence that “ages” of human time are often named after the 
dominant technology: stone age, iron age, bronze age, machine age, atomic 
age, space age.  These references to technology carry the implication that the 
named technology was instrumental in shifting social relations and power 
structures in human society within the span of a temporal bracket.  The 
contemporary Information Age is no different.  The Information Age moniker 
suggests that world power structures are being shaped by Information 
Communication Technologies (ICT).  As such, it is a natural place for inquiry 
into how governance systems that operate globally are being reshaped by 
digitized information.
7  Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963) 262.
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This brings us to the central problem taken up by this research.  International 
law has historically been capable of governing technologies that have 
transnational effects.8 The primary example being the law of the sea, which 
since the historic debate between mare liberum  and mare clausum in the 
1600s, has been able to adapt to changes in technology that have increased 
the state’s ability to extend claims over the sea abutting their borders.9 This 
trend can be traced throughout the history of international law: the telegraph 
emerged in the 1830s and in 1865 the International Telegraph Union was 
formed to govern transnational telegraphy and it absorbed telephone and 
broadcast technologies in due course;10 Little Boy was dropped on Hiroshima 
in 1945 and the Partial Test Ban Treaty entered into force in 1963 followed by 
the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970; and Sputnik was launched in 1957 
and the Outer Space Treaty entered into force in 1967.  
The first Internet connection was established in 1968, and the network quickly 
grew after that with a successful public demonstration in 1972.11 Today, it 
goes without saying that Cyberspace has become ubiquitous in everyday life 
and that it facilitates new types of transnational exchanges. Unlike past 
transnational technologies, though, international law has been slow to react to 
Cyberspace. To date only one multilateral treaty dealing directly with 
Cyberspace has been negotiated. The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime 
was promulgated though the Council of Europe and has few state parties 
from outside of Europe. 12  Additionally, the Treaty’s requirements are limited 
to creating regulatory harmony on Cybercrime, and it vests this power into the 
states themselves in the form of obligations for state parties to adopt 
legislation.  Indeed, much of the problem behind negotiating a treaty is that 
states are skeptical about trade-offs, meaning that topics such as cyberwar, 
cyber intelligence gathering, content restrictions, privacy and other human 
rights, and national security are likely to be excluded from any international 
agreement on Cyberspace.13
International law scholars have struggled with this exact issue, and the 
scholarship is marked by attempts to identify international norms that govern 
Cyberspace. Power and Tobin argue for “soft law” principles to govern the 
Internet in the face of the dearth of international law, and the soft law sources 
8  See generally Lyall, “Reaction of International Law to Technical Developments” 
(2018). 
9  Shaw, International Law (1997) 390–392. 
10  Codding Jr, “The International Telecommunications Union” (1994) 502.
11  Leiner et al., “A Brief History of the Internet” (2012).
12  Convention on Cybercrime (2004).
13  Sofaer, Clark & Diffie, “Cyber Security and International Agreements” (2010) 191. 
See also Dunlap, “Perspectives for Cyberstrategists on Cyberlaw for Cyberwar” (2013) 
273.
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they identify are often external to international governance meaning that they 
have to argue for a new understanding of international legal processes.14 
Similarly, Zalnieriute argues for the existence of  a customary international 
norm on data privacy, but she has to advocate for a “modernist” 
understanding of customary international law, a formulation likely to be found 
unacceptable by a majority of states.15 A final example is Kulesza’s volume 
titled International Internet Law, which argues that some international 
mechanisms can be extended into Cyberspace, but spends substantial time 
discussing other systems of regulation including an entire chapter on 
domestic law.16
The question of why international governance has been unable to extend its 
reach effectively to Cyberspace as a technology, despite its ability to regulate 
other transnational technologies, is the primary jumping off point for this 
research. This broad question has several specific questions that must be 
answered in order to draw conclusions. The first of these questions is 
fundamental in international law: where is Cyberspace? In the territorial 
oriented body of international governance, the location of actions and actors 
is a threshold question for determining applicable law.  Next, we must ask 
whether the location that is identified for Cyberspace fits into any of the 
categories understood by international law.  If so, then baseline international 
norms can be established for Cyberspace.  If it does not, then we must ask 
how this new category of Cyberspace interacts with international space. 
Such interactions will reveal the specific sites at which international 
governance runs out and is unable to extend its reach.   
Similar questions have been addressed in the literature on globalization, 
which at its core is about the changing of the spatial terms of the world.17 
This research, though closely connected, does not intend to situate itself 
within this body of scholarship. Globalization is often conceived of as a 
“respatialization” that “has geographical scope, volume, and density of 
transactions.”18 Some theorists view globalization as a process, while others 
consider the term to indicate a theory, and still others use it to indicate a 
14  Power & Tobin, “Soft Law for the Internet, Lessons from International Law” (2011) 
39–44.
15  Zalnieriute, “An International Constitutional Moment for Data Privacy in the Times of 
Mass-Surveillance” (2015) 99–133.
16  Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013).
17  Cooper, “What Is the Concept of Globalization Good For?” (2001) 196; Jayakar, 
“Globalization and the Legitimacy of International Telecommunications Standard-Setting 
Organizations” (1998) 713; Goodhart, “Human Rights and Global Democracy” (2008) 
396–97.
18  Ferguson & Mansbach, Globalization (2012) 41–42.
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specific temporal era.19 Others reject it as a “fad.”20 The literature on the 
whole, though, places into question the “constellation” of international 
space.21 Reference to ICT is almost obligatory in these works as it is 
associated with shortening space and time and facilitating global flows, but 
globalization theory has “economic roots.”22  In this context, technology is not 
ignored, but it often is given a supporting role in the shaping of world-scale 
governance,23 thereby pushing technology to the edges of the inquiry.24  For 
instance, Jayakar analyzes globalization in terms of commercial interests in 
ICT standard setting bodies, but never addresses how the technology itself is 
shaping the space in which those decisions unfold.25 Thus, despite 
globalization literature’s preoccupation with flows and interconnections of all 
types, there is little scholarship that tries to understand how technology itself 
serves as an endogenous factor that shapes the space in which flows and 
interconnections unfold.26  The scholarship most often presents technology as 
an external factor best understood in terms of disciplinarily accepted points of 
inquiry such as conflict or the global political economy. While globalization 
implies “expanding integration, and integration on a planetary scale,” global 
space itself has been ill-defined.27 Indeed, one of the deep problems with the 
definition of global space is that it is often presented as a counterfactual to 
international space, and not as an independent spatial structure existing 
autonomously from international space.28 
To some extent this makes sense. International governance scholarship has 
often addressed technology as an externality because it was controlled by the 
state and therefore a function of blood and treasure. The state was the arbiter 
of technology both through law and policy, and as a result, systems of 
governance that were established to stabilize states were well suited to 
establishing frameworks for governing those technologies at the world scale. 
19  Id. See also Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (2001) 65 and Geyer & 
Bright, “World History in a Global Age” (1995) 1034–60.
20  Cooper, “What is the Concept of Globalization Good For?” (2001) 189–190. 
21  Habermas, Postnational Constellation (2001) 60.
22  Jayakar, “Globalization and the Legitimacy” (1998) 714; Cooper, “What is the 
Concept of Globalization Good For?” (2001) 196; Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights 
(2006) 168; and Featherstone & Venn, “Problematizing Global Knowledge and the New 
Encyclopaedia Project” (2006) 1.
23  The concept of “world scale” is borrowed from Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights 
(2006) 14. 
24  But see Sy, “Global Communications for a More Equitable World” (1999) 333.
25  Jayakar, “Globalization and the Legitimacy” (1998) 711–38.
26  Fritsch, “Technology and Global Affairs” (2011) 28. See also Brate, 
Technomanifestos (2002) 195–200.
27  Cooper, “What is the Concept of Globalization Good For?” (2001) 196, 200–201.
28  For example, see, Jayakar, “Globalization and the Legitimacy” (1998) 737 and Betz 
& Stevens, Cyberspace and the State (2011) 55–56. 
8The Problem of New Spaces
This is why the International Telegraph Union was established in 1865 and 
continues to govern international telecommunications as the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU).29  When the state is addressed as the sole 
arbiter of power, it means that international understandings are applied, which 
place the state at the center of the inquiry.  Such a perspective is functional 
when the state controls technologies of power.  For instance, during the Cold 
War nuclear weapons were controlled by states, and nuclear politics and 
power unfolded within the context of the state.  Cyberspace is different. The 
state does not control this technology absolutely, despite the fact that state 
power often unfolds within the space of Cyberspace. This indicates that 
Cyberspace has a different scope and meaning than previous technologies 
that function at a global scale, such as nuclear and space technologies. This 
leaves theory somewhat in the lurch, as a transnational phenomenon 
seemingly without international control maintains and propagates itself 
throughout society worldwide.   
Instead of a state-oriented perspective, this research investigates Cyber-
space as an “endogenous and political factor deeply embedded in the global 
system.”30  Where earlier technologies existed as the subject of state power, 
state power is often addressed here as a subject of Cyberspace. This 
distinction is important, because it indicates that Cyberspace shapes the 
space in which governance at all scales unfolds.  That is not to say that the 
state does not shape the space in which Cyberspace unfolds, quite the 
contrary, states still hold significant power over parts of Cyberspace and 
social life in general.31  This is the problem with addressing global space as a 
counterfactual to the international: it presupposes a zero-sum relationship 
best understood in terms of either/or.  Cyberspace, instead, presents a global 
space best understood as a co-factual to the national and international.  It is a 
new space that is emerging in addition to international space, and its 
emergence is central to contemporary structuring of world-scale governance. 
It is not necessarily a space that is always in a contestation with the national 
as states maintain interests in Cyberspace and often pursue their interests 
through Cyberspace.  The dynamic interaction at the border of the state and 
Cyberspace is the focal point of this research, because it is in this dynamic 
that the reprogramming of international space into global space can be 
observed.  
This research asserts that the key to understanding the unfolding of law and 
politics at the world scale is through an understanding of how Cyberspace 
shapes social experience of world space through a key value of 
29  See generally Codding, “The International Telecommunications Union” (1994) 501.
30  Fritsch, “Technology and Global Affairs” (2011) 28.
31  Donnelly, “Human Rights” (1998) 16.
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interoperability. Interoperability is the core organizing logic for Cyberspace 
and it has strong sway over the social construction of Cyberspace as a global 
space.  This value puts a primary focus on facilitating cross-platform, cross-
network communications. This study’s focus is on the technological 
landscape of communication flows and how the medium structures and 
facilitates transnational and global information exchange. This cyber-
landscape – addressed below in terms of spatial, legal, and political 
geography – creates a global space that pushes against international borders 
challenging the concept of the international.  This research asserts that 
Cyberspace imposes an alternate geography that results in redistribution of 
governance capabilities from international space to global space. It will trace 
this redistribution through the examination of interactions often used as focal 
points in international studies as a way to illustrate how key assumptions 
based on the territory of the state are being challenged within a new 
geography. 
Layers of Geography
The core goal of this research is to articulate a coherent understanding of 
whether, how, and why Cyberspace changes international governance space. 
To do this, it must evaluate the three sub questions identified in the preceding 
section, namely: where is Cyberspace, does it fit into an existing international 
spatial category, and finally, how does Cyberspace interact with the 
international system.  In order to accomplish this, this research adopts a two-
step analytic methodology. In Part I, it articulates a geography of Cyberspace, 
and in Part II, it layers cyber-geography onto international geography in order 
to observe how the two spaces interact.     
The first task will be to articulate a holistic geography of Cyberspace in both 
practical and theoretical terms. Using geography as an heuristic for 
understanding Cyberspace necessitates an interdisciplinary approach, since 
scholarship on Cyberspace is dispersed across a number of disciplines. A 
primary focus will be on works that directly address legal and political theory, 
but themes from sociology, history, and computer science will be evident in 
the description of the complex interconnections between technical and social 
processes.  This interdisciplinary approach will be used to conceptualize a 
geography of Cyberspace by describing its borders and boundaries through 
its spatial, legal, and political characteristics.  
This alternate geography will then be used to facilitate observation of points 
at which Cyberspace interacts with international geography. These two 
geographies will be layered in order to observe points of interaction and 
analyze the content of those interactions in terms of spheres of governance. 
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This analysis will be executed using terms of international governance, which 
is understood to contain both international law and international relations. 
Despite the disciplinary divide between international law and politics, they are 
clearly entangled. Thus, they are presented here as integrated parts of the 
international governance system.  For ease of application the international will 
be understood to consist of the system in which the traditional state is the 
primary subject and object of governance. 
It will be argued that cybergeography changes the nature of international 
geography by giving new meaning to state borders. This argument will 
employ prominently the work of Carl Schmitt and Saskia Sassen.  These two, 
very different, theorists both work with ideas on how governance systems are 
deployed across space. In his Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt argues that 
international law springs directly from shifting notions of how political 
legitimacy is tied to geography. Similarly, in Territory, Authority, Rights, 
Sassen argues that world-scale governance systems are the result of 
different assemblages of territory, authority, and rights.  The posited 
cybergeography of the first section of this book is argued to cause shifts in 
our understanding of geography and as a result challenge the assemblage of 
territory, authority, and rights currently deployed by the international system.
This argument will be supported by thematically grouped case studies that 
exhibit interactions of Cyberspace with international space, or, in other words, 
where Cyberspace borders international space. To accomplish this 
conceptual layering of geographies, a hermeneutic approach that seeks to 
construct meaning through analysis of media narratives and primary legal and 
political documents will be used.  The methodology will be somewhat similar 
to Reisman’s international incident approach.  This approach argues that the 
epistemic unit in international law is the international incident, which is 
marked by a conflict among states that leads to clarifications in the content 
and meaning of international law through the negotiated resolution of 
incidents.32  Similarly, the case studies will investigate transnational incidents 
that would traditionally fall within the realm of international governance and 
examine how Cyberspace changes the content and meaning of those 
incidents.  The cases chosen are grouped thematically, and these themes 
have been selected for their salience in revealing the shifting nature of the 
international.  Specifically, the themes are built around the territorial, legal, 
and political geography of international space in order to match the 
geography adopted in the first part of the research. This will allow the 
identification and analysis of encounters where cyber and international 
geographies come into proximity.  As a result these themes reach directly to 
32  See generally Reisman, “International Incidents” (1984) 1 and Blount, “Renovating 
Space” (2012) 515–686.  
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critical issues addressed by the international system: the nature and limitation 
of interstate conflict; the state’s central position in the making of international 
governance; and the nature and limits of individual human rights.  The 
selected cases or incidents themselves are archetypical of types often 
examined in international studies, but the specific incidents should not be 
taken as archetypical of the interactions they represent.  Instead, they are 
intended to show trends, as more research would be required to chart these 
trends across a diverse range of interactions. 
The examples used in this research were chosen to reveal a common 
narrative of governance redistribution. While individual cases may have 
alternative readings in light of traditional international relations or international 
law theory, it is submitted that if these theories are maintained across the 
narrative as a whole, then they become dissonant.  Nor is this research an 
attempt to disprove more traditional theories. Instead, the goal is to illustrate 
the multidimensional nature of global space and show the limits of such 
theories in light of the complex nature of networked world of Cyberspace. 
Just as this research argues that Cyberspace is separate from international 
space, so too do traditional theories run separately from the alternative 
geography presented herein.  
This study will limit its scope to understanding how spatial redistribution 
occurs and how this changes power structures at the world-scale. It will not 
seek to normalize or naturalize these processes. Though the conclusion will 
argue that cyber-technologies can act as a facilitator of developing govern-
ance at the global level, it does not embrace technological determinism. 
Indeed, it is well documented that technology is dual use and can be turned 
from liberation to oppression with ease.33 Technology itself has no ethical 
content until it is transfused with the politics of human interaction. It is this 
political content that will be investigated in this research and not necessarily 
the virtue or vice of that content.
Definitional Issues
In order to avoid confusion, the usage of a number of terms should be 
clarified at the outset.  First, Cyberspace should be defined.  Unfortunately, 
this is trickier than it seems.  Indeed, Chapters 2–4 attempt to give a long-
form definition of Cyberspace.  Herein, Cyberspace is understood to be a 
combination of communications technology, specifically the Internet, and the 
social sphere that has developed within the communicative space created by 
these technologies.  
33  Morozov, “Political Repression 2.0” (2011).
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Additionally, there are a number of spatial terms that are adopted in this 
research and the author has attempted to be consistent in their usage 
throughout.  ‘Space’ is used to designate an area or region in both a physical 
sense (i.e. the space of a room) and a metaphorical sense (i.e. a safe space 
for discussion). Implicit in the idea of space is that it has contours, 
boundaries, and borders that demarcate the extent and nature of that space. 
This means that the term ‘space’ is often used with qualifiers that designate 
the limits of a space: physical space, digital space, legal space, political 
space.  Of note are two spaces that are central to the analysis: ‘international 
space’ and ‘global space.’  ‘International space’ designates a space that is 
demarcated by borders that construct sovereign territorial states and thus is 
constituted by the national borders deployed by international governance 
mechanisms. It should be noted that in this conception, though highly 
entangled ‘national space’ constitutes a separate category from ‘international 
space.’ ‘International space’ is a construct of international governance, and 
the condition of ‘international governance’ and ‘international space’ is often 
referred to in short hand as ‘the international.’ ‘Global space,’ on the other 
hand, designates a space of world-scale that is not marked by national 
borders.  This type of space exists independent of the state system.  It should 
be noted that while, for the purposes of simplifying this analysis, these two 
spaces are juxtaposed, they are not always easily severable.  Central to this 
argument is that these spaces overlap and intersect, and that global space, 
and specifically Cyberspace, is often marked by the borders of international 
space and vice versa.  It is this interaction that is at issue, and juxtaposition 
serves as a useful tool for examining the interaction between the two spaces.
The idea that spaces have boundaries that demarcate them means that 
spaces, both physical and metaphorical, can be said to have ‘geography.’ 
‘Geography’ is used herein as a heuristic to describe the particular structure 
of a space.  In real space, this means a description of the physical attributes 
of that space. In metaphorical spaces, this means a description of the various 
limitations that mark the contours of that space. For instance, below ‘legal 
geography’ is deployed as a way of understanding jurisdiction, which 
demarcates the limits of the law’s application. The term ‘alternative 
geography’ is used to designate the new understanding of geography that 
Cyberspace creates by juxtaposing it to the accepted geography of the 
international.
In addition to the spatial terminology, there are a variety of governance terms 
in use that should be clarified.  The core concern of this research is that of 
governance at the world-scale – and ‘governance’ is used to designate the 
network of mechanisms that distribute rights, obligations, and limitations 
within a society, whether legal, political, economic, or of another nature. In 
this research, ‘law’ is most often used to designate formal legal systems 
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exercised by organized government; however, law is occasionally used to 
designate less formal systems that have high regulatory ability, such as in the 
‘code is law’ principle found in Chapter 3.  ‘Regulation’ on the other hand is 
used in a very broad sense to designate a variety of mechanisms that serve 
to exert control over actors in a given system.  Regulatory processes, in this 
sense, do not need to flow from formal processes of law, and may come from 
informal or non-binding processes external to government action.  ‘Politics’ is 
part of ‘governance,’ since politics helps to define the content of law and 
regulation giving further contours to the space that regulatory mechanisms 
inhabit.   
A Reprogrammed World
The world is being reprogrammed.  This statement might seem like a quippy 
metaphor, but this research argues that it means something much more 
concrete.  The central claim of this book is that digital technologies are 
rewiring the way that society understands and thinks about global order as 
Cyberspace changes the content of international borders.
Specifically, this work claims that the techno-social assemblage of 
Cyberspace is creating new connections across the world, and that these 
connections are difficult to characterize as purely ‘transnational’ in scope. 
This research investigates how these changes are literally affecting 
geography as understood in the modern international governance system. 
Cyberspace is argued to present an alternative geography that comes into 
proximity with international borders. These proximities present instances 
where we can observe a shift in the landscape in which global affairs unfold.
The idea of a reprogrammed world, then, is one that does double duty.  First, 
it performs a metaphorical function and maps the language of computer 
science and technology onto the system of global order.  Throughout this 
work, the reader will find the use of these metaphors as a way to explain how 
digital technologies affect governance.  Second, it describes a real and actual 
process that requires evaluation of the design of the international governance 
system. While international governance has never been a static process, the 
reprogramming being described herein is extraordinarily different from 
previous shifts in international governance.  It is not the result of a war or of a 
contingent of sovereigns negotiating rules; it is a technologically driven 
process that redistributes power within that system and challenges the core 
concept of territorial sovereignty.
Understanding the importance of this is as easy as turning on the news, or 
more accurately connecting to the news.  We live in a world of “fake news”, 
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data breaches, election hacking, and cyberwarfare. We live in a world in 
which 280 characters can change everything.  Our analog past has been 
replaced with digital realities.  The world itself is being reprogrammed and 
understanding that phenomenon is critical to understanding the future of 
global society.
15 Reprogramming the World
 
 
 
 
Part I
Networked Geography
“The objective space of a house – its corners, corridors, cellar, rooms – is far 
less important than what poetically it is endowed with, which is usually a 
quality with an imaginative or figurative value we can name and feel: thus a 
house may be haunted, or homelike, or prison like or magical.  So space 
acquires emotion and even rational sense by a kind of poetic process, 
whereby the vacant or anonymous reaches of distance are converted into 
meaning for us here.”
Edward Said
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2
Cyber Landscapes
“What difference does that make, what channel you got?” complains Ed 
Lindsay while he flips the stations on a television in a boarding house 
common room. Lindsay, a character in a 1961 episode of The Twilight Zone, 
is frustrated with the rapt attention that his housemates pay to the television. 
Soon after this exchange, Lindsay retrieves his 1935 console radio from the 
basement, and he finds that it receives, literally, broadcasts from the past. 
The radio’s mystical power eventually transports Lindsay into the past for 
which he longs.1
The episode, named “Static,” avoids the usual, clichéd plot of fear of 
advancing technology coupled with eroding humanity, so often found in 
science fiction.2   Instead, it makes a more subtle point about technology that 
is implicit but often overlooked in these narratives, namely that technology 
shapes the social experience of time and space.  Though a permutation of the 
same broadcast technology, the TV world has different spatial and temporal 
reference points than does the world of radio.  This can be seen in Lindsay’s 
characterization of a musical performance on TV as “ruining a perfectly good 
song.”  The values imposed by the TV (video) are different from the values 
imposed by radio (audio).  This is more than just an issue of production 
quality; it changes the interactions of the individuals within those spaces. 
Television’s visual values prompt Lindsay to refer to his housemates as 
“hypnotized” as they watch.  This is different from the space of radio, which 
created an interactive social space around its speakers, so when Lindsay 
reconstructs his space to the 1940s, the radio is not the focal point in the 
room, instead the focal point is his love interest.
At the surface, this fictional tale is wrapped in a narrative of social 
fragmentation caused by mass media, but beneath this narrative lies a deeper 
1  “Static,” The Twilight Zone, season 2, episode 20 (1961).
2  See, for example, “A Thing About Machines,” The Twilight Zone, season 1, episode 
40 (1960).
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theme that sits at the heart of inquiries into modernity:  the effects of 
technology on the construction of social space.  What Ed Lindsay observes is 
that, though analogous, these technologies each change how the world 
around him is ordered in unique ways.  They literally shape the space of the 
boarding house.   
Cyberspace, as a technology, is no different.  It shapes space, and it does 
this because the technology creates unique spatial orientations.  The goal of 
this chapter is to describe the spatial geography of Cyberspace in terms of its 
technical manifestations, and in terms of the dominant conceptual narrative 
through which Cyberspace is understood.  This description will resist adopting 
a definition of “Cyberspace” in absolute terms. Part of this impetus comes 
from the diverse definitions that already exist in the literature describing 
Cyberspace, but never in complete terms.3 As a result, the chapters in Part I 
will focus on describing Cyberspace to facilitate a richer understanding of its 
contours.  This approach flows from a central hypothesis that Cyberspace is a 
geography in which social relations unfold.  Description is thus prioritized over 
definition due to the difficulty in defining a dynamic space both accurately and 
coherently. Definition is a tool to simplify concepts. Description, on the other 
hand, reveals nuance and complexity critical to a rich understanding, as 
sought herein. This chapter will first use a layered model to describe the 
technical architecture of the Internet, which is distinct from Cyberspace. Once 
this technical space has been articulated, the spatial conceptualization of 
Cyberspace will be explored. Section II of this chapter argues that the 
dominant human understanding of Cyberspace is through a spatial narrative, 
and that this narrative has powerful implications for the social 
conceptualization of Cyberspace. Finally, the chapter will conclude by 
examining the inhabitants of Cyberspace and the implications of networked 
populations.  The spatial geography of Cyberspace is critical to understanding 
the larger thesis that Cyberspace recodes borders and reprograms the world.
Networked Space
Ed Lindsay’s question of “what does the channel matter” can be answered 
easily: a lot.  The technology of TV is such that choosing a channel means 
3  For example, Gompert & Saunders, Paradox of Power (2012) 115 (“Cyberspace [is] 
shorthand for the capabilities and content of computer networking.”); Lessig, Code 2.0 
(2006) 9 (“But ‘cyberspace’ is something more.  Though built on top of the Internet, 
cyberspace is a richer experience.”); Toulouse, “Introduction” (1998) 5 (“. . . a new 
transnational realm of civil society . . .”); Luke, “The Politics of Digital Inequality” (1998) 
121 (“Cyberspace might best be understood as the latest manifestation of nature’s 
pluralization.”); and Betz & Stevens, Cyberspace and the State (2011) 13 (“Cyberspace 
is notoriously difficult to pin down.”).
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choosing a network –  and choosing a network means accepting the content 
chosen by the network.  Changing the channel changes everything, and it 
was the only way to change the output of the TV.  The networks accessible on 
a given TV are limited by location since broadcast TV is a function of 
proximity to the transmitter. Furthermore, accessibility was limited to reception 
from the broadcaster, but not interaction with the broadcaster.  The space that 
TV creates is one of viewers relegated to peering in.
If “Static” were updated for contemporary airing, one could imagine the 
boarding house crowd all gathered in the common room, but the focal point 
would be their own personal electronic devices.  Ed Lindsay, instead, would 
yell because they were not taking part in the social act of watching the TV in 
the common area and building community through the shared experience of 
viewing. While Lindsay’s technological skepticism would be built on 
substantially the same rhetorical claims, the space in which he would be 
making his claims would be very different.  In this updated version, each 
individual would be focused on being in Cyberspace and, importantly, 
interacting with others in Cyberspace.  Each individual will have chosen their 
own channel.  Some of these channels, such as services like Pandora or 
Netflix, mimic previous information technologies. Other channels create vastly 
different opportunities for engagement and interaction.  Indeed, many 
individuals in this alternate take would be interacting with more individuals as 
a result of this technology.  This simple shift changes the constitution of the 
common room space, because “the Internet is not like TV – you use it, it 
doesn’t use you.”4
Technology, in particular information technology, changes human 
interactions.5 This is because these technologies are capable of providing 
more and richer information, and information sits at the core of social 
interactions. Space is constructed by human technology, and humans 
experience spaces differently depending on how technology is deployed.  Ed 
Lindsay experiences the common room of the boarding house differently 
when different technology is deployed. This is similar to trends noted by 
Cohen in which surveillance technologies alter public space. Surveillance 
technologies, beyond simple observation, achieve “the active production of 
categories, narratives, and norms.”6  Cohen argues that these technologies 
change space by “constrain[ing] the range of available behaviors and 
norms.”7  Surveillance technology is emblematic of how the “prolifera[tion]” of 
4  Toulouse, “Introduction” (1998) 12.
5  For historical examples see, Burbank & Cooper, Empires in World History (2010) 
109–110; Mattelart, Networking the World (2000) 1–13; and Kellner, “Intellectuals, the 
New Public Sphere, and Technopolitics” (1998) 175–79.
6  Cohen, “Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure” (2008) 181.
7  Id. at 190.
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“transaction points” changes the experience of physical geography.8 
Before abandoning a happy Ed Lindsay in the 1940s, we should take a closer 
look at the nature of the technology that is defining the space in which he 
lives, or more precisely defining his transaction points.  Mass communication 
in this world is the product of centralized, one-way communication.  In this 
model, power is located at a central position, and is understood as the power 
to transmit.  The entity that controls the transmitter also controls the content 
that the viewer or listener sees. The end device only receives; none of the 
knobs or buttons allow the user to send a message back to the transmitter. 
Mass media in this space is about transmission to the masses that receive it.9 
It is a one-way street, and the space at the receiving end of that street is 
shaped by this technology. The Internet dismantles this one-way paradigm 
and presents the user with an array of opportunities to engage in multi-way 
communication with other individuals, with the masses, and with nearly any 
other type of entity capable of communication. This fundamental difference 
creates dramatic changes for the nature of human interaction and social 
order, because transaction points become myriad and are distributed 
worldwide.  
It is important to note that the Internet is distinct from Cyberspace. The 
Internet, for present purposes, can be understood as the technology that 
makes Cyberspace possible.10 The technology of the Internet facilitates and is 
inseparably entangled with the phenomenon we know as Cyberspace, which 
inhabits broader social dimensions. This means that in order to describe 
Cyberspace, one must first describe the Internet.  
A layered model is adopted herein to explain the technical architecture of the 
Internet.  This model “was developed by computer scientists to explain the 
functional components of the Internet and how they work together to convey 
Internet traffic.”11 A number of legal scholars have adopted the layered 
approach to explain policy and regulation on the Internet.12 While these 
regulatory aspects will be explored later, at present the layered model 
presents a useful model for breaking down the component systems that work 
in concert to make the Internet possible. The layered approach is a 
“conceptual tool” that “divides a networked information system into a 
8  Id. at 200.
9  See Carey, “A Cultural Approach to Communication” (2002) 36–45.
10  Lessig, Code 2.0 (2004) 9 and Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) 31.  
11  Goodman & Chen, “Modeling Policy for New Public Service Media Networks” (2010) 
115.
12  See Goodman & Chen, “Modelling Policy” (2010) 116; Werbach, “Breaking the Ice” 
(2005) 78–80 and Solum & Chung, “The Layers Principle” (2003) 821. 
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hierarchical ‘stack,’”13 presenting the Internet as a combination of different 
technologies with different functions stacked together to form the whole. This 
approach is useful, because the “interconnectivity among networks” is “so 
complex that it is not easily understood.”14 Layering creates a model for 
categorizing diverse, yet interrelated, technologies by function and reveals 
how each “self-contained” category is linked to the layers above and below 
it.15
Different authors have used different stacks of layers.  For instance, Post 
simplifies the Internet into two distinct layers, the network layer and the 
applications layer16; Kulesza uses three layers17; whereas Solum and Chung 
use a six-layer stack (See Fig. 1.1).18 The differences in the models are not 
substantive in nature and are, instead, based on the resolution of the analysis 
of the “conceptual tool.”19  A medium grain four-layer stack will be used here 
to avoid both oversimplification and unneeded complexity. Werbach and 
others have identified a four layered stack, which contains a physical layer, a 
logical layer, an applications layer, and a content layer.20  This four-layer stack 
will guide the analysis here.
Physical Layer Physical Layer Physical Layer
Network Layer Link Layer
Logical Layer Logical Layer IP Layer
Transport Layer
Applications Layer Content Layer Applications 
Layer
Applications 
Layer
Content Layer Content Layer
Post Kulesza Werbach Solum & Chung
Fig. 1.1: Various Layered Models
13 Werbach, “Breaking the Ice” (2005) 71, 66. 
14  Gompert & Saunders, Paradox of Power (2012) 116. See also Leiner et al., “A Brief 
History of the Internet” (2012).
15  Werbach, “Breaking the Ice” (2005) 66.
16  Post, Jefferson’s Moose (2012) 80–83.
17  Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) 125–126.
18  Solum & Chung, “Layers Principle” (2003) 816.
19  Werbach, “Breaking the Ice” (2005) 71.
20  Id.; Werbach, “A Layered Model for Internet Policy” (2002) 37; Reed, “Critiquing the 
Layered Regulatory Model” (2005) 281; McTaggart, “A Layered Approach to Internet 
Legal Analysis” (2003) 573; and Lessig, Code 2.0 (2004) 144–145.
21 Reprogramming the World
The Physical Layer
At the bottom of the conceptual stack is the physical layer. The physical layer 
is made of the hardware on which the Internet runs. This hardware consists of 
routers, servers, cables (copper and fiber optic), cell towers, satellite links, 
and other telecommunications technologies.21 This infrastructure is essentially 
the connective tissue of the Internet, providing the medium through which 
information is transmitted. The physical layer includes all the physical 
equipment associated with the Internet.  This importantly includes the Internet 
backbones and telecommunications networks, which provide the physical 
means through which data flows. 
Internet backbones are a group of services providers that connect to route 
information transfers between autonomous networks.22  These providers sell 
internetwork connectivity access to other providers who provide services to 
third parties such as individual users or corporations.23 This secondary set of 
providers are commonly known as Internet service providers (ISP). An 
Internet backbone 
essentially forms its own network that enables all connected 
end users and content providers to communicate with one 
another. End users, however, are generally not interested in 
communicating just with end users and content providers 
connected to the same backbone provider; rather, they want to 
be able to communicate with a wide variety of end users and 
content providers, regardless of backbone provider. In order to 
provide end users with such universal connectivity, backbones 
must interconnect with one another to exchange traffic 
destined for each other’s end users.24 
Backbones route the flow of information among networks.  It is important to 
note that their function is only the transfer of data. Backbones do not store the 
information on the Internet; they transmit data among networks.  
The backbone providers – and the providers to whom they sell – send data to 
users via telecommunications networks. For instance, most home users 
connect to the Internet via telephone wires or coaxial cable – both of which 
were installed to be used as a medium for different technologies.  But users 
21  Werbach, “A Layered Model for Internet Policy” (2002) 60.
22  Osgood, “Net Neutrality and the FCC Hack” (2004) 32.
23  Id. 
24  Kende, “The Digital Handshake” (2000) 3.
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can also connect to the Internet via cellular networks, radio frequency or Wi-
Fi, or through dedicated lines.  Two things should be noted at this point.  First, 
the Internet is running on a diversity of networks that deploy different 
connective technologies. This means that it facilitates a high level of inter-
operability among diverse technologies. Second, these networks are owned 
by a diverse group of actors, meaning there is a high level of interoperability 
among entities.  The Internet’s functionality is centered on this technological 
ambivalence towards the medium of transmission as well as the identity of the 
transmitter or recipient of the transmission.  This is dramatically different from 
previous telecommunications technologies that were regulated according to 
the specific technological parameters that limited interactivity.  For instance, 
broadcast was regulated according to principles that maximized the efficient 
use of the scarce electromagnetic spectrum, whereas telephone regulation 
was used to maximize public access.25 Technological ambivalence is 
indicative of a trend that is visible at all layers of the conceptual stack: 
convergence. Convergence is a process through which the “historical 
distinctions between communications networks are melting away.”26 
Convergence is a product of the logical layer, which is next in the conceptual 
stack of layers.
The Logical Layer
Convergence occurs at the physical layer because the logical layer re-
configures how information is sent over the physical layer. The logical layer 
consists of the software protocols that define the data being transferred by 
the Internet.  All telecommunications systems transfer data electronically, but 
traditionally this signal was analog and was limited by the strictures of the 
technologies that carried analog signals.27 The advent of computers enabled 
digitization, which allowed for the same content to be encoded as 
standardized data or “fundamentally just a string of ones and zeros” that are 
“ultimately interchangeable, meaning any communications platform can in 
theory, offer any service.”28
The heart of the Internet is the Transfer Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
25  See generally, Krattenmaker, Telecommunications Law and Policy (1998) and 
Kennedy & Pastor, An Introduction to International Telecommunications Law (1996).
26  Werbach, “Breaking the Ice” (2005) 61. See also, Kulesza, International Internet 
Law (2013) 53; McIntosh & Cates, “Hard Travelin’” (1998) 95, 102–03; Tambini, 
Leonardi, & Marsden, Codifying Cyberspace (2008) 3–4; Jayakar, “Globalization and 
the Legitimacy” (1998) 719.
27  Leiner et al., “A Brief History of the Internet” (2012). 
28  Werbach, “Breaking the Ice” (2005) 62; Post, “Against ‘Against Cyberanarchy’” 
(2002) 1375–76.
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(TCP/IP).29  This protocol sets the standards for transmission of data on the 
Internet. It defines two distinct functions. First, it defines how the information 
being sent should be packaged. Digital information, unlike analog information, 
is easily severed and reassembled. When information is sent over the 
Internet, a computer program on the end user’s device will slice it up into 
small packets of data. Each packet is labeled with the order in which it should 
be reassembled. The second function the TCP/IP describes is the Internet 
protocol, which places a distinct address on each packet that tells nodes on 
the network where it should be sent. This process is known as packet 
switching.30
Packet switching revolutionized telecommunications, which to that point 
transmitted analog signals and depended on circuit switching. Every device 
on the Internet has an IP address, a numeric identifier for all traffic to and 
from that device, which is similar to a phone number.31 Historically when a call 
was made on a landline, an analog signal was sent that required constant 
connection to a circuit to the other end of the call.32 That circuit is connected 
through a centralized operator, a process known as circuit switching.33 A 
visual of this process was a common feature of early television programs, 
which would often use a split screen to show the operator physically 
connecting the continuous circuit on a switchboard with a patchcord.  Packet 
switching on the other hand does not require a continuous connection 
because the information is broken into data packets instead of a continuous 
analog signal. This means that the packets can be routed via any combination 
of routes through the network in order to get them to the proper IP address. 
Instead of a centralized operator, there are decentralized routers and nodes 
through which a packet travels. This type of networking allows for more 
efficient transfer speeds by distributing loads across the network.34 In other 
words, the packets do not need to travel along the same path or arrive in the 
same order, so packets are sent along the most efficient route possible.  In 
practical terms this means that an email, for instance, once broken down into 
packets could travel through numerous different servers located in 
geographically disperse places. Packet switching avoids the strain on the 
central operator from which circuit switching suffers.35
A number of salient features of this system should be emphasized.  First, the 
29  See Post, Jefferson’s Moose (2012) chapters 4–6; Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 43–45, 
and Clark & Landau, “Untangling Attribution,” (2010) 27.
30  Brate, Technomanifestos (2002) 104–05.
31  See DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (2014) 37–41.
32  Leiner et al., “A Brief History of the Internet” (2012).
33  Id.
34  Id.
35  See Post, Jefferson’s Moose (2012) 47–59. 
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TCP/IP protocol is designed to transfer a packet regardless of the information 
it contains. Importantly, as currently configured, the routers on which the 
protocol runs do not register what is “in” the packet.36 The router simply 
passes the packet along to the next waypoint on its journey.  This is why the 
Internet is sometimes called “stupid.”37 The design of the Internet is simply to 
allow information to be freely transferred among the various nodes on the 
network meaning that the content of those packets is not stored in the logical 
layer.38 Second, this means that the transmission of the data is neutral in 
regards to the technology on which it travels. The Internet can run over 
copper cable, fiber optics, electromagnetic frequency, or anything else that 
can carry electronic communications. TCP/IP provides a standardized manner 
for packaging and addressing data for transmission. Third, as a result of this 
technological ambivalence the Internet has the potential to be widely 
accessible. The Internet is not a single network, it is a network of networks 
facilitated through a standard protocol. The Internet, when viewed at the 
protocol layer facilitates the linking of dissimilar networks as data packets can 
ride on any telecommunication infrastructure.39 Finally, since the standard 
protocol is meant to ensure interoperability, the network itself is rhizomatic in 
nature inasmuch as it is a non-hierarchical assemblage of networks.40   
It was stated earlier that the logical layer functions as the heart of the 
Internet.  This is because it serves as the vital link between the physical layer 
below it and the applications layer above it through an “open network 
architecture,” which is the “key underlying technical idea” of the Internet.41 
Open network architecture provides a link among disparate physical layer 
technologies and disparate applications layer technologies by creating a 
common language of communication among them as opposed to between 
them.42  The logical layer drives convergence at the physical layer because of 
these attributes, but this convergence is experienced at the applications layer.
The Applications Layers
The statement that the Internet is “stupid” is based on the logical layer’s 
36  This is how the Internet was designed to operate, but it should be noted that deep 
packet inspection technologies are used by some entities.  See DeNardis, Global War 
(2014) 206–07.
37  Post, Jefferson’s Moose (2012) 80.
38  Leiner et al., “A Brief History of the Internet” (2012).
39  Mattelart, Networking the World (2000) 4.
40  See Betz & Stevens, Cyberspace and the State (2011) 38; Leiner et al., “A Brief 
History of the Internet” (2012); and Fielder, “The Internet and Dissent in Authoritarian 
States” (2013) 168.
41  Leiner et al., “A Brief History of the Internet” (2012).
42  Id.
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functionality to be non-discriminatory in the transferring of data packets and is 
commentary on the popular conceptualization of the Internet as a vast archive 
of knowledge.  The Internet is “stupid” because it is an end to end network, 
which means intelligence is “vested in the edge.”43 The devices and 
applications they run at the edges of the network are where the Internet 
“happens,” so to speak.  The data packets that the logical layer transmits are 
only intelligible at the ends of the network, because “the Internet ... was not 
designed for just one application, but as a general infrastructure on which 
new applications could be conceived.”44 Essentially, to use a buzz phrase 
ushered in by smartphones, “there’s an app for that.”
The World Wide Web (WWW) serves as an excellent example. If asked “what 
is the Internet?” many people would likely describe it as the WWW as this is 
still one of the most common ways that people experience the Internet.45  The 
WWW is actually an application that runs on a device and functions at the 
applications layer.46 A rudimentary explanation of how the WWW works will 
help to show how the applications layer functions as well as the end-to-end 
principle. If you want to view a web page you type a Uniform Resource 
Locator (URL), for instance – http://www.dudeism.com – into your web 
browser’s address bar.47 The first thing to be noted is that there are multiple 
web browsers made by a variety of entities including corporations, non-
profits, and individual programmers. The web browser then sends a request 
via your Internet Service Provider (ISP) to a server that contains a file with a 
list of URL’s associated with the .com root name.48  It searches this list, called 
a root file, for dudeism.com, and finds the IP address of the device that is 
associated with dudeism.com through the Domain Name System (DNS).  In 
simple terms, ‘dudeism.com’ is a text-based identifier for the IP address, 
which is 64.91.245.254 (as of this writing). The ISP, on your behalf, then 
contacts this device, which has been configured to act as a server,49 and 
43  Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 111.
44  Leiner et al., “A Brief History of the Internet” (2012).
45  See Toulouse, “Introduction” (1998) 2 and Betz & Stevens, Cyberspace and the 
State (2011) 13.
46  Leiner et al., “A Brief History of the Internet” (2012) See also, Verizon v. FCC, No. 
11–1355, 740 F. 3d 623 (Court of Appeals, Dist. of Columbia Circuit 2014) at 36.
47  The HTTP portion of the URL denotes the type of data being sought, in this case it 
stands for Hypertext Transfer Protocol. This portion of the address is a Uniform 
Resource Identifier (URI), and it identifies that a hypertext file is being sought.  There 
are numerous URIs indicating the type of data a given application is seeking. These 
include the common File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Internet Chat Relay (IRC), and HTTP 
Secure (HTTPS).  
48  Partridge & Lonardo, “ICANN Can or Can It?” (2009) 24–29 and DeNardis, Global 
War (2014) 41–44.
49  A server is an application on the applications layer.  A server, though usually on 
specialized hardware, is simply a computer application that makes computer files 
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looks for a directory named “www.”  Once there, the browser will look for a 
default file, most commonly titled “index.html,” and the ISP will transfer a copy 
of this file, which your computer downloads.50 A copy of the file named index.
html now exists on your computer, and your browser opens this file, which 
contains computer code that a web browser understands and executes. This 
code tells the browser what to display on your screen.  This entire transaction 
is facilitated by the logical layer and is transferred as digital electromagnetic 
signals across the physical layer.  
In this example, we can see very clearly that the information that we access 
while connected to the Internet is stored at the periphery.  The web page is 
not “on” the Internet, rather it is accessible via the Internet, and it exists on a 
connected device.  The file that you see is copied to your computer, meaning 
that information from afar becomes immediately localized, even if temporarily, 
in the memory of the user’s device so that it can be manipulated by the 
software on that device.51 This is the end-to-end principle in practice, which is 
“hard-wired into the Internet’s architecture.”52 In technological terms, this is 
known as “peering.”53 Peering implies equality created between devices 
through the common protocol. Of course, this is equality in technological 
terms only and not to be confused with equality in a legal or political sense.   
A practical effect of the end-to-end principle is that convergence is 
experienced by the user at the applications level.  Indeed, the “there’s an app 
for that” catchphrase captures this very idea. Convergence is experienced 
because information can be digitized, and technological ambivalence 
facilitates a diversity of applications with different outputs. This has resulted in 
a bloom of technological innovation as applications and networks have 
proliferated.54 Possibly the best example is the Internet of Things (IoT) 
available to other computers on a network.  In this case the server has been configured 
to be open to requests from any network.   Servers are essentially file systems 
configured in a hierarchical directory and can be understood to function in a 
substantially similar way to the file and folder system found in most desktop operating 
systems. 
50  Tambini et al, Codifying Cyberspace (2008))  7.  “index.html” is simply a filename 
and “index” is an arbitrary default filename for which browsers search as a result of 
their programming.  
51  Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 268. 
52  Tambini et al, Codifying Cyberspace (2008) 2.
53  Leiner et al., “A Brief History of the Internet” (2012).
54  See Tambini et al, Codifying Cyberspace (2008) 9; Leiner et al., “A Brief History of 
the Internet” (2012); and Goodman & Chen, “Modeling Policy” (2007) 120. Compare 
with Jayakar, “Globalization and the Legitimacy” (1998) 722; Krattenmaker, 
Telecommunications Law and Policy (1998) 367–69; and American Broadcasting 
Company v. Aereo, 573 U.S. (2014).
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concept in which devices other than traditional computers are being 
networked for applications such as home automation. IoT allows nearly any 
machine that can be manipulated by a circuit board to be networked into the 
spatial geography of Cyberspace. So, for example, there are now lightbulbs 
on the Internet.55 Innovation at the applications layer is further driven by the 
decentralization of the logical layer, which gives more individuals access to 
information systems.56  
Another reason that innovation happens at the applications layer is that in 
order to facilitate interoperability of networks, the protocols of the logical layer 
are open, allowing anyone with proficient skill in programming to be able to 
write an application that facilitates new types of information flows. This 
significantly lowers the cost of development of new products, but it also 
means that individual programmers can change how Internet communications 
work – or more precisely change the nature of communications through the 
applications layer. A good example is Phil Zimmermann, who wrote the Pretty 
Good Privacy (PGP) program. This public key encryption program was 
developed to allow users to send secure encrypted messages to other 
individuals via the Internet.57 Interestingly, encryption programs like PGP are 
classified as weaponry under the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
(ITAR).58 These regulations restricted the export of PGP as a defense article.59 
The example of PGP illustrates three important things that will be seen in a 
variety of contexts within this research. First, a single coder changed the 
nature of Internet transactions.  This means that a single individual, taking 
advantage of the innovation-friendly nature of the end-to-end network, was 
able to change the possibilities for human interactions on the Internet and in 
Cyberspace. Second, this technology was unable to be contained by the 
state.  ITAR is specifically directed at the export of weapons technologies that 
appear on the United States Munitions List (USML). These regulations apply 
to technology crossing the border of the United States, yet PGP was freely 
available worldwide soon after its creation, indicating a breach of the space of 
the state. This availability is driven in part by the ephemeral nature of 
software, which is easily shared online. Finally, this application, for the 
purposes at hand, cannot be imbued with normative power.  The descriptive 
bent of this chapter requires that PGP, like all programs at the applications 
layer, be recognized as a technology that can enable good interactions (e.g. 
giving voice to political dissidents in repressive regimes) as well as bad 
55  Wakefield, “Smart LED Light Bulbs Leak Wi-Fi Passwords” (2014).
56  Verizon v. FCC (2014) at 36.
57  Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012) 70–76.
58  Id. at 72–74.
59  International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. 121.1 Category XII(b) (2018).
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interactions (e.g. giving cyber criminals the ability to transmit illicit data free 
from scrutiny).  The innovation facilitated by the applications layer is such that 
it creates openings for all entities – whether they be normatively good or bad; 
state or non-state; commercial or criminal; individual or collective – to engage 
in a variety of measures of control and liberation.
The Content Layer
Content is what concerns most people using the Internet.  They neither care 
to know nor need to know the specifics of the code that is running beneath 
the content layer at either the application or logical layer. Nor do they likely 
understand the intricacies of the physical network past their connection to the 
ISP.  They are concerned with content, and in a digital world, content can be 
just about anything. While sights, sounds, and words have been the 
traditional domain of the Internet, in no way is the Internet limited to 
transferring only these types of information.  
The Thingiverse website is an online repository of 3D printable objects.60 Or, 
more precisely, it is a repository for programs that will instruct a 3D printer to 
print a specific three-dimensional object. The object itself is not sent through 
the Internet, but the effect is the same since the object materializes at the 
user’s device. Essentially, if hardware can be developed that can output a 
type of information digitally at the applications layer, then that data can be 
transferred across the Internet. The output of end devices is the content layer. 
The content layer is, obviously, the layer where most of the public debate on 
Internet regulation occurs. This is because the interaction of the three layers 
below the content layer allow for large amounts of data to be transferred 
quickly to anyone no matter where they are so long as they have network 
access. The content layer of the Internet is dramatically different from the 
content layer of previous telecommunications sources, which disaggregated 
different functions.  Broadcast is a one directional method that reaches mass 
numbers of people, whereas the telephone allowed for bidirectional 
interactions but not on a mass scale. The centralization of broadcast made it 
easily susceptible to societal controls over the content whether through 
regulations or norms. The telephone, on the other hand, offered little control 
over content, but architecturally minimized the possible reach of the 
communication. 
Content on the Internet is both multidimensional and mass, meaning there is 
low control over the content and the reach of information. This can most 
60  Thingiverse, https://www.thingiverse.com/ .
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clearly be seen in the concerns that numerous states have about content 
coming in through their borders such as political propaganda or 
pornography.61 
Much of the discussion around Internet governance focuses on issues of free 
speech and censorship centering debate on the content layer. This is 
because the three underlying layers in concert amplify traditional societal 
concerns with flows of information.  Information now flows across networks 
that are distributed in nature, permeate borders, and maximize access by 
individuals.  This is a paradigm shift in telecommunication technology, and its 
effects on society are broad.   The content layer is the locus of these effects, 
as it is the content – whether the content is in the form of economic activity, 
religious ideology, political activism, or criminal conduct – transmitted via the 
Internet that creates societal issues. 
Cyberspace
A genre of movies and songs from the late 70s and earlier 80s celebrate the 
culture of Citizen Band (CB) radio.  In particular, the film catalog of Burt 
Reynolds is notable with Smokey and the Bandit (1977), Smokey and the 
Bandit 2 (1980), Cannonball Run (1981), and Cannonball Run II (1984). 
Aficionados might also appreciate television series such as The Dukes of 
Hazzard (1979–1985), B.J. and the Bear (1979–1981), and Movin’ On (1974–
1976), and country music offered up a plethora of songs such as C.W. 
McCall’s “Convoy” (1975), Red Sovine’s “Teddy Bear” (1976), and Cledus 
Maggard’s “CB Lingo” (1976). These cultural nuggets give a glimpse into a 
culture built around a network of people that interact on CB radio channels. 
In these narratives, news often spreads quickly across the network leading to 
collective group action, which usually finds expression in highway hijinks. The 
CB goes hand in hand with the automobile as both served as potent symbols 
of individual autonomy (and it is likely no coincidence that these narratives 
often glorify running from the law enforcement in high speed chases). One of 
the most notable things in this genre is that the CB has its own language that 
socializes the participants in the network.  CB in these films is portrayed as 
more than just a communication technology.  Instead, it is the glue that 
structures the social space of mobility-driven culture.
61  See generally Eppenstein & Aisenberg, “Radio Propaganda in the Contexts of 
International Regulation and the Free Flow of Information as a Human Right” (1979) 54; 
Robertson, “The Suppression of Pirate Radio Broadcasting” (1982) 71–101; United 
Nations General Assembly, Res. 37/92: Principles Governing the Use by States of 
Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting” (1982); and 
EUTELSAT, “Eutelsat condemns jamming of broadcasts from Iran and renews appeals 
for decisive action to international regulators” (2012).
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If the Internet is a stack of functional layers, then Cyberspace is the Internet 
with the addition of a social layer.62  This may seem a little obvious. After all, 
the Internet is not a natural phenomenon and is a human creation, meaning a 
social layer may be presupposed.  While true, the point here is to highlight 
something more than just human usage of the technology.  It is, instead, to 
highlight the scope and integration of the Internet into societies globally.  The 
social layer creates a “structure of metaphors and visions” that conceptualize 
the space that the Internet creates.63  The technology of CB radio still exists 
and is used, but when was the last time that a story about human activities on 
CB topped the news?  The reason for the dearth of media coverage of the CB 
network is that much of the social layer has been removed as CB was 
supplanted by cellular phones, which better served most people’s needs. The 
drop in scale of usage means that the network has less importance.64  It is 
precisely the fact that 48% of the world’s population is connected to the 
Internet and this number is rapidly growing that makes Cyberspace an 
important social phenomenon.65  Social interactions of all sorts are taking 
place there, but where is there?
This section will first establish that a spatial narrative serves as the dominant 
conceptualization of Cyberspace.  Then it will probe the attendant metaphors 
to this spatial narrative and attempt to identify Cyberspace in terms of location 
and place.  
Cyberspace as Space
A great deal of the early literature on Cyberspace debated specifically 
whether it constituted a new space distinct from the space inhabited by 
states. The legal debate, focused on the multijurisdictional effects of 
Cyberspace, is best exhibited in the scholarly exchange between Jack 
Goldsmith and David Post.  Goldsmith argues that Cyberspace presents no 
novel legal problems, and that “Cyberspace transactions do not inherently 
warrant any more deference by national regulators, and are not significantly 
less resistant to the tools of conflict of laws, than other transnational 
transactions.”66  Post on the other hand, a self-proclaimed 
“cyberexceptionalist,” argues that Cyberspace should be approached as a 
new geography that humans inhabit.  At the heart of this debate is one 
fundamental issue: is cyberspace a space?
62  Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 9 and Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) x–xi.
63  Streck, “Pulling the Plug on Electronic Town Meetings” (1998) 20.
64  See generally Post, Jefferson’s Moose (2012) 68–69.
65  International Telecommunications Union, ICT Facts and Figures 2017 (2017) at 2. 
66  Goldsmith, “Against Cyberanarchy” (1998) 1201.
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Goldsmith’s answer to this question is that since Cyberspace exists on the 
Internet, then Cyberspace exists where the physical links and users do.  The 
physical layer and users exist within physical territory of the state.  Through 
this lens Cyberspace only has a “space” to the extent that its physical 
components do. Post on the other hand would argue that something 
fundamentally different is happening, because Cyberspace mediates the vast 
number of human interactions without regard to the physical and political 
boundaries of the terrestrial sphere.67  He argues that the difference between 
real space and Cyberspace is akin to the difference between “life on land” or 
“life in the sea.”68  In this model, Cyberspace’s spatial dimension is defined by 
the entire layer stack, and not just the territorially grounded physical layer.
The problem is that, to some extent, both authors are correct. Most of 
Cyberspace’s physical manifestations do exist within state borders. Thus, a 
regime such as that in North Korea can control the spread of Cyberspace by 
maintaining tight controls on the dispersion of physical technology at its 
borders – leading activists to attempt to send in technology using balloons.69 
Cyberspace, at the same time, defies containment by the state and seemingly 
exists everywhere.  The Pirate Bay, a prominent torrent website carrying links 
to copyrighted material, has repeatedly evaded being shut down by state 
power structures through the use of mirror sites, which disperse the site 
across servers in various geographic regions.70  The reality is that Goldsmith’s 
argument while logically solid is often “more honoured in the breach than in 
the observance.”
One of the problems with Goldsmith’s view is that it ignores a simple fact: 
humans understand Cyberspace as a space. Cyberspace is conceptualized 
as space through a spatial narrative that serves as a dominant metaphor for 
human understanding of Cyberspace.71 In other words, Goldsmith 
“presuppose[s] a hard division between a regulated physical layer and 
everything else.”72 Goldsmith’s argument seems facile when applied to the 
Internet, but it becomes dissonant when applied to Cyberspace.  This is 
because the spatial narrative makes technological reductionism impossible, 
67  Post, “Against ‘Against Cyberanarchy’” (2002) 1374.
68  Id.  
69  Halvorssen & Lloyd, “We Hacked North Korea With Balloons and USB Drives” 
(2014).
70  Brown, “Pirate Bay Mirror Is Proxy-Friendly, Bypasses UK Ban” (2012); Mlot, “The 
Pirate Bay Is Back Online (Sort Of)” (2014); and Hamill, “Pirate Bay Is BACK” (2015). 
See also Domscheit-Berg, Inside WikiLeaks (2011) 21.
71  But see Gelernter, “The End of the Web Search and Computer as We Know it” 
(2013); Seife, Decoding the Universe (2007) and Lloyd, Programming the Universe 
(2006).
72  Werbach, “Breaking the Ice” (2005) 79. 
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as “the way we describe a thing can change the nature of that thing.”73  The 
spatial narrative that accompanies Cyberspace is very much a description of 
social experience in Cyberspace.74 The spatial narrative “transform[s]” the 
“experience” of Cyberspace.”75  
The spatial narrative is found within the common vocabulary used to describe 
Cyberspace.  Users go online and visit chatrooms or websites. These can be 
found by typing in an IP address that is often denoted by a Uniform Resource 
Locater (URL) which includes a domain name. That name is understood to be 
owned by an entity, which will probably have a firewall up to keep intruders 
out of its local server.  Lessig notes that “cyberspace is something you get 
pulled ‘into.’”76  Ferguson and Mansbach note terminology such as “electronic 
highway, electronic mail, infobahn, infosphere, ... information superhighway ... 
online community, virtual community, and virtual reality.”77  Barlow’s influential 
“Declaration of Independence for Cyberspace” declares that states have “no 
sovereignty” in the “new home of the mind.”78 Resnick refers to the “land of 
Cyberspace,”79 and Post uses the metaphor of exploring a new territory to 
evaluate law in Cyberspace.80 In short, Cyberspace has a “placeness.”81
This metaphor is central to the social construction of Cyberspace, because 
“metaphors have a profound effect on computing.”82  As the Internet reached 
more users, these concepts could often be found in the iconography of 
Internet Service Providers (ISP). For instance, America Online (AOL) was one 
of the first mass market ISPs, and, as a result, AOL was the initial first online 
experience for a large portion of the Internet users that flooded the Internet 
when it was privatized in the mid-1990s.83 AOL used skeuomorphs to orient 
these new users.  For example, the sound of an opening and closing door 
was used to denote entrance and exit of users from chatrooms.  Similarly, an 
icon of a traditional roadside mailbox denoted the email server thereby linking 
the email concept to its physical counterpart, which would have specific 
geographic location denoted by a physical address. AOL is not an isolated 
73  Streck, “Pulling the Plug on Electronic Town Meetings” (1998) 26.
74  Fritsch, “Technology and Global Affairs” (2011) 31.
75  Streck, “Pulling the Plug on Electronic Town Meetings” (1998) 26. 
76  Lawrence Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 9.
77  Ferguson & Mansbach, Globalization (2012) 10.
78  Barlow, “The Declaration of Independence for Cyberspace” (1996).
79  Resnick, “Politics on the Internet” (1998) 51. 
80  Post, Jefferson’s Moose (2012).
81  Johnson & Post, “Law and Borders” (1996) 1379; see also Betz & Stevens, 
Cyberspace and the State (2011) 13.
82  Gelernter, “The End” (2013) and Streck, “Pulling the Plug on Electronic Town 
Meetings” (1998) 26.
83  See Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 88–94.
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example; skeuomorphs have been used extensively in digital design to help 
orient users.84 The desired effect is the creation of a visual, spatial geography 
that new users can easily orient themselves using concepts associated with 
physical geography.
The pervasiveness of the spatial metaphor illustrates something very 
important that is often overlooked in Goldsmithian type arguments.  No matter 
whether Cyberspace exists in a physical place, it is conceptualized and 
understood as a space by its users.  Cyberspace is experienced as space, 
and it is “different from real space.”85
Cyberspace as a Place
If Cyberspace is a space then where is it? Space is intrinsically linked to the 
idea of location. Locating Cyberspace is a difficult task, and the spatial 
narrative can only be pushed so far.86 Part of the problem is that an individual 
can never be wholly in Cyberspace, yet this has not kept Cyberspace from 
being understood in terms of spatial concepts. The Internet’s layers, 
discussed above, construct the spatial geography of Cyberspace by setting 
the metes and bounds of human interaction online. In the same way that 
rivers and mountains create natural boundaries, Internet technology creates 
boundaries for human interactions.  The spatial metaphor invokes a number 
of important concepts that shape social understanding of Cyberspace.   
Cyber-realists will claim that Cyberspace is located within the physical 
bounds of the state. For instance, in terms of the WWW, URLs denote a 
specific server on the Internet, which does exist in a physical location and is 
owned by an entity. The URL is conceptually very similar to the idea of an 
address, which denotes a specific geographic location, so the URL points to a 
place with a location that is within the borders of a state, and to a specific res 
within that state. This answer to the location problem is not without issues, 
though.  URLs are freely associable to other servers that can contain either 
the same information or different information. The server itself may be static, 
but the website that is visited in Cyberspace is not. It can move with a simple 
change to the DNS root file, which will resolve the URL to a different IP 
address, and to a different res. The distinct site that the user visits is indeed 
fluid in a spatial sense. Cyberspace exists in a geographic duality.  Like Papa 
Legba with one foot in the grave, Cyberspace has one foot firmly planted 
inside state borders, but the other foot is planted somewhere outside those 
borders.
84  Heddaya, “See a Map, Not a Territory” (2013). 
85  Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) xii. 
86  For instance, Johnson & Post, “Law and Borders” (1996) 1378.
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The spatial narrative is a social conceptualization that renders Cyberspace as 
a “distinct ‘place.’”87  As a place, it exists concurrently yet separately from the 
state, meaning it both borders and intersects the state.  Because Cyberspace 
has transnational effects that are unbounded by physical geography, it is 
submitted here that Cyberspace constructs and is located in a global space.88 
A global location implies two things. First, Cyberspace is a space with world 
scale, and its growing level of integration into societies worldwide is hardly 
deniable.  Second, Cyberspace is a geography that is exterior to international 
space.  The network architecture that underlies Cyberspace allows it to evade 
the strictures of national borders. Global space is located where internation-
ally defined territory thins and runs out.
To understand this, one must first recognize that the concepts of space and 
location also implicate further notions such as borders and property.  The 
often-quoted trope from the early days of the Internet that “borders are just 
speed bumps on the information superhighway” points directly to 
Cyberspace’s spatial character and global location. Indeed, the spatial 
metaphor of a highway is a reminder that all the locales in Cyberspace exist 
in the same place, or maybe better stated, they all have addresses on the 
same street.  All IPs on the Internet are equally close to the user.  While the 
ability of states to raise borders in Cyberspace is not completely absent, the 
user’s ability to thwart those mechanisms allows for penetration of those 
borders at will, showing that software borders are indeed soft.  The rhetoric of 
the spatial narrative supports this. For instance, John Perry Barlow’s 
“Declaration of Independence for Cyberspace” declares explicitly that 
“Cyberspace does not lie within [a state’s] borders.”89 Barlow is linking the 
independence of Cyberspace to its own territorial sovereignty, stating later 
that he “felt like the answer to sovereignty was sovereignty. To fight them on 
their own terms.”90 The spatial narrative gives conceptual credence to 
extraterritoriality of Cyberspace.  
The concept of property is also implicated. The Western norms of ownership 
and exclusion are set on end in Cyberspace, which “makes a hall of mirrors 
out of conventional understandings of what constitutes private and public 
property.”91 Take the website example used above. Users often reference 
ownership of a website, but this is inexact at best. What these users are 
describing is two different phenomena of “ownership.” First, they are 
describing the URL which indicates location of the website, but this domain 
87  Id.
88   See Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) 29. 
89  Barlow, “A Declaration” (1996).  
90  Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012) 256.
91  Toulouse, “Introduction” (1998) 13.
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name is only registerable and not owned so an individual’s rights in it do not 
represent traditional property rights. While entities may own intellectual 
property rights to attributes of the URL,92 they must maintain their registration 
in order to keep the URL, whether they use the URL or not.  Interestingly, this 
means that it is possible to register a URL to keep it from becoming a place in 
Cyberspace.  Furthermore, the URL can easily be pointed to another server 
by associating it to a new IP address, meaning that the URL as an owned 
space is to some extent ephemeral.  This points to the second phenomenon 
of ownership that users are describing when they discuss ownership of a 
website, which is ownership of the content that is displayed in the browser 
window, which can be thought of in terms of intellectual property.93 Since the 
webpage is available worldwide, questions about the territory that protects 
those intellectual property rights arise.  This becomes messier when one 
takes into account that a great deal of web content is copied and stored on 
the local machine, and when one contemplates that the success of social 
networking websites is often predicated on serving content that is sourced 
from somewhere other than the website’s “owner.” Interestingly, a third 
concept of ownership is not usually invoked when referencing website 
ownership, which is ownership of the server in the physical layer, where the 
cyber-realist focuses their analysis. This type of ownership is diminished in 
importance since a URL and data can be moved to new servers at will, 
meaning that the physical location changes fluidly.94 Additionally, the entity 
that places the content on the server often rents that server space from a 
third party and has no physical control over it further muddying the 
ownership waters.95 
The website example hints at the underlying issue for property narratives in 
Cyberspace: hard physical location is ephemeral because property in 
Cyberspace is practically infinite. Western understanding of property is 
predicated on scarcity, which rests on the idea that “they aren’t making 
anymore of it.”  In Cyberspace, property is fragmented across physical space 
and metaphysical space resulting from the effects of the logical layer which 
makes data fungible such that it can move freely from place to place and exist 
simultaneously in all those places. Property in Cyberspace expands simply by 
adding devices with computer memory to the network, or by adding new files 
to established servers (e.g. adding a new post to a blog).96 Notions of 
92  See generally, Merges, Menell, & Lemley, Intellectual Property in the New 
Technological Age (2012) 911–930.
93  See Lessig, Free Culture (2004); Partridge & Lonardo, “ICANN Can or Can It?” 
(2009); and Ranieri, “EFFecting Digital Freedom” (2014) 52–53.
94  Domscheit-Berg, Inside WikiLeaks (2011) 21.
95  See Bearman, “The Untold Story” (2015).
96  Spar, “The Public Face of Cyberspace” (1999) 348 and McIntosh & Cates, “Hard 
Travelin’” (1998) 95.
36Cyber Landscapes
property based on scarcity and ownership become tenuous as scarcity 
decreases and ownership fragments.97 So, for instance, scarcity of land is 
central to Schmitt’s conception of the land generating the law – as it is the 
scarcity of land that drives its division.  However, when territory is infinite the 
need for division is functional as opposed to economic. This is not to argue 
that there is no economic value in domain names, but that value is derived 
not necessarily from scarcity, but from the idea contained in the domain 
name, which is most often linked to the name recognition associated with a 
company or brand. Thus any URL, in theory, has the potential to be of high 
value if it achieves high recognition, whereas real properties value is linked to 
physical attributes.   
None of this is to say that traditional notions of borders and property do not 
still have sway.  As noted earlier, Goldsmith’s observation of physical location 
granting state’s territorial control over Cyberspace technologies is relevant, 
because users are “always in both places.”98  This, however, is only part of 
the story. States can only control the parts of the Internet they can literally 
touch, but not necessarily all the parts of the Internet that can touch them. 
The technological landscape that intersects state territory is architected in 
such a way that much of Cyberspace is located outside the state.   
Metaphysical Geographies
The critical notion in this chapter is that Cyberspace is understood by humans 
as a space and as such it also has location and place. Despite its 
metaphysical nature, individuals cannot help but envision Cyberspace in 
terms of its spatial characteristics.  This is no surprise to anyone familiar with 
the literature on Cyberspace, which struggles with the ethereal nature of a 
place that is both there and not there in the sense of “traditional 
dimensionality.”99 Indeed, the concept of virtual reality embeds the spatial 
narrative quite deeply into understandings of Cyberspace.  At its inception, 
virtual reality was portrayed as the ability to go into a new space and to 
experience it as real.100 This concept materialized in applications such as 
Second Life, which allowed a user to explore and interact in a virtual world 
that was created by the individuals that inhabited it.101  Virtual reality’s current 
inception through devices such as Microsoft’s Hololens allows the users to 
97  See Tambini et al., Codifying Cyberspace (2008) 68 and Goodman, “Media Policy 
and Free Speech” (2007) 1221.
98  Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 298.
99  Betz & Stevens, Cyberspace and the State (2011) 35.
100  For example compare, The Lawnmower Man (New Line Cinema 1992) and The 
Matrix (Warner Brothers 1999).   
101  See Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 108–111.
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visit virtual spaces as well as real spaces.102 Additionally, led by the 
pornography industry, devices are being created that allow for richer 
interactions of individuals in Cyberspace.103 These technologies move beyond 
an audio/visual experience in Cyberspace and allow users to take part in the 
experience portended by AT&T’s 1980s ad slogan “Reach Out and Touch 
Someone.”104 The ability to physically “touch,” even through an Internet 
connected device means that the metaphorical has become the experiential. 
Physicality is now freely transportable beyond borders, which become much 
less benign in an example like Stuxnet where code was used to physically 
and surreptitiously manipulate centrifuges in an Iranian nuclear facility.105 
Cyberspace cannot remove a mountain in between two places, but it can 
render many of the mountain’s effects irrelevant.  
The idea of touch leads to a final observation that must be made about 
Cyberspace: as a space it has inhabitants.106  Granted these individuals live 
both in Cyberspace and out. There is developed rhetoric that refers to 
netizens and cybercitizens, both of which implicate a core concept of 
citizenship that is traditionally linked directly to territorial authority.107 Arguably 
the term “global citizen” found in the literature on global governance can only 
be conceptualized with a technology that can free the individual from the 
strictures of their national citizenship. While such ideas might be dismissed as 
purely rhetorical, we can see that they indeed do have manifestations such as 
Estonia’s e-Residency campaign, which extends digital rights to registered 
entities.108 
Digital natives may be the most potent of these metaphors for inhabitation, as 
society has not yet entered a time in which individuals have no concept of 
what it is like to not be contained within networked space. Digital natives, a 
naturally rising part of the population, will not conceptualize spatial 
organization without the inclusion of Cyberspace. Rhetorically, the term 
‘digital natives’ indicates that these individuals are more than just transitory 
surfers.  Their geographic experience will always be networked and machine 
mediated. In such a world, a digital-self existing on the network becomes a 
normalized human attribute, and the population as a whole becomes 
respatialized as social constructions of space become morphed by networks.
102  Microsoft, “HoloLens” (2015). 
103  Stadtmiller, “Virtual Reality Sex Is Coming” (2015). 
104  Ramey, “When AT&T Asked Us to ‘Reach out and Touch Someone’, Did They Mean 
That Literally?” (2008).
105  Oliver, “Stuxnet” (2013) 127–59.
106  Post, Jefferson’s Moose (2012) 31–36 and Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 298.
107  Luke, “The Politics of Digital Inequality” (1998) 123. 
108  e-Estonia, “What is e-Residency?” (2015).
38Cyber Landscapes
Machine mediated space means that new and different boundaries are 
experienced based on the architecture of those machines. This is not to imply 
a dystopian science fiction plot, such as that of The Matrix, in which the 
human conscience only exists within digital bounds. The individual will 
certainly still exist and move through physical space, but there will be new 
understanding of the nature of boundaries and borders as individuals 
recognize an “extraordinary possibility for many to participate in the process 
of building and cultivating a culture that reaches far beyond local 
boundaries.”109
As already noted, IoT is indicative of such networked space.  IoT allows the 
networking of devices that can be controlled by electrical current, thus a small 
computer known as a microcontroller can be used to spin motors, adjust 
electrical current levels, flip switches, and accomplish a variety of other tasks. 
Microcontrollers with a network connection allow a user to exert control over 
physical space through a network connection. 
One of the most popular applications of IoT is enabling home automation via 
the Internet, effectively networking an individual’s physical personal space. 
Transaction points literally proliferate through the space of the home.  For 
instance, lights have traditionally been controlled with a physical switch 
implicitly requiring a person to move through the physical in order to operate 
it. IoT, though, ends the “who is turning off the lights” debate that so many 
couples have by removing the distance to the switch.  More striking, it allows 
the user to turn the lights on or off from a foreign country and even allows an 
outside party to control the lights.  The interior space once defined exclusively 
by the walls of a room is now open to new forms of control as those walls are 
breached.  The borders physically defined by walls are no longer boundaries 
to certain types of computer mediated changes in that space. Needless to say 
this changes the experience and perception of the space of “home” for that 
user.
---
This chapter has described the spatial geography of Cyberspace, focusing on 
both its technical and conceptual landscapes. The spatial orientations that are 
employed in Cyberspace create strong metaphors that steer social 
understanding. One of the attributes discussed in this chapter was the 
dynamism of Cyberspace, and its ability to expand nearly infinitely, making 
the contemplation of its borders difficult.  
109  Lessig, Free Culture (2004) 9.
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The next two chapters in Part I will use the concepts of legal geography and 
political geography to better understand the true limits of Cyberspace and 
define its borders. 
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Legal Terrains
One of the most striking things about air travel is the labyrinthine airport 
layouts that create and demarcate a variety of distinct spaces for the traveler. 
Passengers move through underground passageways and shopping mall-
esque avenues en route to boarding their airplane. They move from a non-
sterile zone to a sterile zone after crossing security borders that demarcate 
changes in rules. While travelers experience these layouts as minor 
annoyances, they often fail to recognize how airports are architected to 
control the travelers within them.  Airports by design demarcate and produce 
the rules of behavior within different zones of space. This is not a 
characteristic unique to airports, as nearly all architecture deploys some sort 
of control.1  For instance, architected control is the underlying premise of 
Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, but it can be also seen deployed in the 
layouts of public spaces such as Walmart stores and museums.2 Architected 
control is visible in private spaces as well, as doors and walls are 
architectural mechanisms that help to maintain privacy.  Architecture controls 
how individuals experience space by enabling and disabling them in a variety 
of ways, and Cyberspace’s open network architecture is no different. 
Along these same lines, airports use architecture to segregate international 
passengers, particularly international arrivals, from the rest of the airport 
population.  International passengers are ushered into arrivals halls that are 
designed with a series of counters at which sits an authority of the state that 
checks the passport and documentation of each traveler. There are signs that 
indicate that this line of counters is the border of the country at which the 
plane has landed. Despite the fact that these travelers are usually deep within 
the interior of the territory of that state, they have not yet entered the state.  In 
this case, the geography of the border is warped to match the legal 
geography of jurisdiction, creating nearly unmappable zones of exclusion on 
a map of national borders.
1  Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 38–60.
2  Cohen, “Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure” (2008) 184.
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These examples illustrate different sides of the same coin.  Legal 
geographies can be deployed by technologies of enforcement to limit 
individual ability to transgress the norm being enforced.  Additionally, these 
geographies can also be reimagined to include or exclude space despite the 
physical location of that territory. The state’s ability to dynamically 
conceptualize its borders in such a way as to create legal fictions within 
territory renders borders into markers of a legal geography based on 
jurisdiction.3 This is why architectures of control are used at borders: they 
give materiality to imaginary lines, because state’s borders are only as solid 
as the state itself can make them.
The legal geography of Cyberspace is a question of how architectures of 
control are deployed within it. The analysis here applies across the layered 
model established in Chapter 2.  First, it will probe the idea of jurisdiction as a 
type of geography. To do this it will examine the traditional link between 
territory and jurisdiction. The second section will use the link between 
architecture and control to examine a fundamental principle of how regulatory 
power is distributed in Cyberspace through examination of Lessig’s principle 
that “code is law.”  Finally, this chapter will turn to the idea of code as a 
constitution of Cyberspace and explore the governance implications that flow 
from such an idea. This final section will then draw conclusions on the 
dispersion of jurisdiction in Cyberspace.  
The Space of Law
Jurisdiction is the space of law. It can be understood, in at least one sense, 
as the literal geographic limitations of the law.4 As a legal concept, jurisdiction 
can seem ephemeral, but it is literally part of the language that we use to 
locate ourselves within the world. “I’m from …” is a phrase that is likely to end 
with a designation of a legal jurisdiction such as a state or its political 
subdivisions such as provinces, counties, or municipalities. These 
subdivisions, which are often nested like matryoshka dolls, each denote 
space with a particular set of legal characteristics.  This is what is meant by 
legal geography.  Importantly, these nested jurisdictions overlap in such a way 
that an individual is often standing in a hierarchical stack of overlapping 
jurisdictions. It is argued herein that Cyberspace also deploys a legal 
geography of jurisdiction over the individual, but this geography resists 
containment within jurisdictions as conceptualized in the international 
governance regime.
As noted in Chapter 2, Cyberspace alters our spatial experience. Jurisdiction, 
3  See Bowman, “Thinking Outside the Border” (2007) 1192–95.
4  Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) 2–3.
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in the modern state system, is linked directly to territory. Territory serves as 
the critical link between jurisdiction and power in a state’s deployment of 
governance, because historically there has been “a general correspondence 
between borders drawn in physical space ... and borders drawn in ‘law 
space.’”5  This is by no means a ‘natural’ connection, but it has been a de 
facto connection based on technologies through which power is exerted and 
through which global order unfolds.  
To this end, international law has recognized five bases from which a state 
may extend its jurisdiction and thereby exert its power: territorial, personal, 
protective, passive personality, and universal.6  Each of these principles for 
extending jurisdiction has their own internal logic, but all – save one – are tied 
back to physical territory. This embeds territorial understandings into the 
concept of  jurisdiction within international space.7 Personal jurisdiction is 
linked back to a territory via auspices of nationality; protective jurisdiction is 
linked to protecting the territory of the state from harm; and passive 
personality links to the concept of nationality, which in turn links to territory. 
Only universal jurisdiction seems to evade the territorial link, because its 
original incarnation was as a mechanism to address actors external to the 
territorial borders of any state, such as pirates.8 Universal jurisdiction, 
though, does require that malefactors be brought into the territorial jurisdiction 
of the state in order for it to exert legal power.9  
What these accepted principles of jurisdiction exhibit is that territory is 
foundational to jurisdiction in the international system, and that jurisdiction 
can be understood as the space in which the state can exert its power, both 
juridical power and through its monopoly on violence.10 It is important to 
understand the territorial limitation of state power, because territory sits at the 
heart of the international legal system. The borders drawn by that system 
show a particular configuration of jurisdiction superimposed on the space of 
the world.  While “[w]e take for granted a world in which geographical borders 
... are of primary importance in determining legal rights and responsibilities,” 
this configuration is only a static rendering of a dynamic set of lines that 
5   Johnson & Post, “Law and Borders” (1996) 1368.  
6  Akehurst, “Jurisdiction in International Law” (1972) 145; Schabas, Genocide in 
International Law (2009) 409; and Blount, “Jurisdiction in Outer Space” (2007) 299.
7  Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) 4.  
8  See Schmitt, Nomos of the Earth (2003) 42–44.
9  See for example the cases of Adolf Eichmann: Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem 
(1963) 262–263; Augustus Pinochet, Roht-Arriaza, “The Pinochet Precedent and 
Universal Jurisdiction” (2001) 311–19; and Humberto Álvarez Machaín, Zaid, “Military 
Might versus Sovereign Right” (1996) 829.
10  Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) 6. 
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indicate a variety of fluid spaces.11
The argument advanced by this section is that jurisdiction, understood as a 
legal geography, is neither a continuous nor a static space, and that it is 
reconfigurable not only through a state’s own conceptualization of its borders, 
but also through external processes that reshape the nature of legal space. 
This section will proceed in two parts, both of which are designed to show the 
gaps in the link between territorial space and regulatory space. First, this 
section will show how Cyberspace fractures national jurisdiction, and then, it 
will pursue the same goal in terms of international space.  It should be noted 
that the claim made in this section is not that state jurisdictions have wilted 
away, but that jurisdiction is not “already, and forever, ‘settled.’”12 The state 
retains a great deal of power in relation to objects and individuals within its 
territory.  However, Cyberspace creates a spatial situation in which regulatory 
power associated with territory runs out, and at this point we can see where 
Cyberspace’s legal geography begins.    
National Space
The debate on the nature of Cyberspace, typified by the exchange between 
Post and Goldsmith discussed in Chapter 2, is important in the discussion of 
legal geography. The debate was centered on whether or not Cyberspace 
was a new space, but specifically as legal scholars, the dispute centered on 
whether Cyberspace created new alternative legal geographies of jurisdiction. 
Such claims had been advanced in Barlow’s “Declaration of Independence for 
Cyberspace.” Barlow’s claim that states “were not welcome” in Cyberspace, is 
rooted in the notion of an independent territorial sovereignty as the source of 
legitimate governance in Cyberspace.13  
While Goldsmith rejects such rhetoric outright, Post takes a more nuanced 
position. He claims that “cyberspace is somehow different” and that this 
difference “matters for the purposes of understanding these jurisdictional 
questions.”14  Post’s argument is rooted in the idea that Cyberspace creates a 
world “of inter-connected and geographically complex cause and effects.”15 
He notes that
transactions in cyberspace can take place at much greater 
physical remove; they are consummated by means of the  
11  Johnson & Post, “Law and Borders” (1996) 1368.
12  Post, “Against ‘Against Cyberanarchy’” (2002) 1373.
13  Barlow, “Declaration” (1996).
14  Post, “Against ‘Against Cyberanarchy,’” (2002) 1368.
15  Id. at 1381.
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movement of bits rather than atoms; they are digitally 
encoded; they are unaffected by the participants’ sense of 
smell; they are embedded in and mediated by computer 
software; they travel at the speed of light, etc.16
Massively distributed computer mediation of transactions, in Post’s view, 
requires reevaluation of “settled understandings” of concepts such as 
jurisdiction.17
To understand Post’s arguments, the critical gaze must again turn to the 
borders that define the state.  Older transborder technology was often 
controlled by technological standards that were adopted by a given state. 
This was a unique function of legal jurisdiction that could create architectural 
controls at the border of a state.  For example, by adopting a different 
standard railroad gauge a state could ensure that all train shipments were 
disembarked and reloaded under the state’s watchful eye.18  Standard setting 
is a tool by which technology is directly regulated.  The logical layer of the 
Internet adopts standards that enforce universal interoperability, meaning that 
the logical layer bypasses borders by rendering a state’s physical 
telecommunications standards irrelevant. The physical technology of the 
border is undermined as Cyberspace reroutes border crossings to the 
applications layers running of the Internet.  The proliferation of transaction 
points also drives the proliferation of border intersections.  For the territorial 
border, “[d]igitization means dematerialization.”19
This is not to say that border crossing technologies have not been issues for 
the international community before. Indeed, radio transmissions20 and satellite 
broadcasting21 both caused debate in the international arena. As Post notes 
though, the scale of Cyberspace is dramatically different from previous 
technologies.22 The ability to instantaneously communicate with the entire 
online population forces new understandings of jurisdiction, since this means 
that data transmissions cross all borders at once.  
The architecture of Cyberspace is such that it forces geographically remote 
16  Id. at 1375–76.
17  Id. at 1373.
18  Mattelart, Networking the World (2000) 1–13 and Werbach, “Breaking the Ice” 
(2005) 60.
19  Luke, “The Politics of Digital Inequality” (1998) 125.
20  Robertson, “The Suppression of Pirate Radio Broadcasting” (1982) 71–101 and 
Eppenstein & Aisenberg, “Radio Propaganda” (1979).
21  See Lyall & Larsen, Space Law (2009) 256–269 and UNGA, Res.3 7/92 (1982).
22  Post, Jefferson’s Moose (2012) 60–89.
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states into direct contact with each other by bringing their borders together. 
This often means that “multiple noncoordinating jurisdictions” are brought into 
proximity as the Internet networks those jurisdictions into contact.23 
Cyberspace creates contact points between and among all networked 
physical space.  This is problematic because laws “mostly concern national 
spaces.”24  This can be seen in the quintessential France v. Yahoo! case.25 
Suit was brought against Yahoo! in France because Yahoo! maintained an 
auction website that facilitated the sale of Nazi paraphernalia, which is illegal 
in France.26  Yahoo!, an American company, was held culpable in France for 
the availability of this website within France’s territory.27  Two things should be 
made clear. First, this website was available to anyone with an Internet 
connection and a web browser regardless of location.  Second, France’s legal 
claim was only that the availability within the territory of France was illegal. If 
Yahoo! capitulated to the French demand for removal, the website would not 
be available anywhere in the world, including places where sale of such 
memorabilia is legal, leading to French law and values being enforced 
globally.  Yahoo! sought a declaratory judgement in a United States federal 
court to render the decision unenforceable, but the 9th Circuit declined to 
grant the declaratory judgement on the grounds that it did not have 
jurisdiction over the French entity LICRA, which brought the original suit.28  
While the cyber-unexceptionalist might argue that this is indicative of courts 
being perfectly capable of applying law to cases involving Cyberspace, the 
Yahoo! case has deeper implications that make such a stance tenuous.  If this 
transaction were to occur in a pre-Internet environment there are a number of 
factors that would have made it different.  First, a French citizen would need 
to leave France in order to take part in the auction making it a costly 
23  Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 300. 
24  Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) 86. 
25  Post, Jefferson’s Moose (2012) 164–71; Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 294–97; and 
Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) 107–08. A similar case is the German 
CompuServ case which addressed the availability of pornography via CompuServ 
services. See Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) 106–107 and Lessig, Code 2.0 
(2006) 39.
26  Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) 107.  
27  The technology that led to the Yahoo! case predated technology that allowed for 
geolocation of users through their IP addresses. Kulesza, International Internet Law 
(2013) xiii.  Debates on the geographic control of IP addresses persist Leiner et al., “A 
Brief History of the Internet” (2012); ITU, “Resolution 102 (Rev. Busan, 2014) ITU’s 
Role with Regard to International Public Policy Issues Pertaining to the Internet and the 
Management of Internet Resources, Including Domain Names and Addresses” (2014) 
148; and ITU, “Resolution 133 (Rev. Busan, 2014) Role of Administrations of Member 
States in the Management of Internationalized (Multilingual Domain Names” (2014) 
183.   
28  Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme, 433 F. 3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
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endeavor. That citizen would then need to physically transport the item over 
the French border and negotiate regulatory pressure points applied at border 
crossings. The Internet on the other hand allows all French citizens to take 
part in auctions that are “in” the United States in terms of server location. 
Three things are important here. First, the border crossing is not physical. 
This means that the state has lost some control over where its border is 
drawn.  Second, the border crossing occurs on a private network. The state’s 
apparatus for controlling borders is located physically at the borders in the 
form of checkpoints, which are places of inclusion and exclusion. In this case, 
the “checkpoint” has been routed around and the state has been excluded 
from its usual control function.  Finally, the scale of Yahoo!’s actions are at a 
much different level of magnitude, as actions in Cyberspace have a “multi-site 
effect” fragmenting the idea of the lex loci.29
Yahoo!’s auction site allowed everyone in France with Internet access to take 
part in these auctions by minimizing the transaction costs associated with 
borders. The physical geography pre-Internet stood as a barrier to all but the 
wealthiest and most dedicated of collectors. Now technology facilitates easy 
access by all to these auctions. Yahoo! was acting within the jurisdiction of 
France, yet France lacked the jurisdictional capacity to reach out and 
physically touch Yahoo! meaning that jurisdiction tapers as France’s territory 
runs out.  Before the Internet such interactions were marginal, but post-
Internet they are facilitated.30
Jurisdiction as a function of territory requires that transactions be located 
“geographically somewhere in particular,” which is “most unsatisfying.”31 The 
enduring lesson from Yahoo! is that state control over persons and property is 
being diminished as the borders that define that jurisdiction no longer 
represent a barrier to social transactions.32  The space of the state runs out as 
a social space beyond its control opens.
International Space
Since the scale of transactions on the Internet is global in scope, many 
scholars have turned to international law as the way in which Cyberspace can 
be appropriately regulated. This approach is seemingly a natural one, since 
flows of information in Cyberspace are often transnational in nature, but this 
29  Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) 103.  See also Spar, “The Public Face of 
Cyberspace” (1999) 345.
30  Post, “Against ‘Against Cyberanarchy’” (2002) 1383.
31  Johnson & Post, “Law and Borders” (1996) 1378.
32  See Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) 14 and McIntosh & Cates, “Hard 
Travelin’” (1998) 85.
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too presents several issues, and the dearth of international law addressing 
Cyberspace is telling.    
First, it should be noted that the national is embedded in the international and 
vice versa.  International space is a conceptual extension of national space.33 
The international system itself is made up of states that participate based on 
principles of nonintervention and sovereign equality.34 As a result, modern 
international law is oriented toward the “territorial integrity” of the state itself.35 
International law reifies the geography of the state by rendering jurisdictional 
edges as borders of exclusion through the principle of nonintervention.36 
Indeed, until very recently, international law’s regulatory focus was the border 
of the nation state, and only the most marginalized of territories are without 
legal standing in international law.37
States have long debated the control of transborder information flows as a 
matter of international law. Radio Free Europe and Voice of America are 
excellent examples of state attempts to penetrate the borders of other states 
with telecommunications technology.38  But these interventions were limited in 
scope as both technology and geography ran out. Radio technology is limited 
by the ease of jamming as well as geographic constraints on the transmission 
power of the station.39  Similarly, satellite technology raised issues resulting in 
a controversial set of principles adopted by the UN General Assembly.40 
Cyberspace is a new context for these same issues as it gives users “new 
opportunities for exchanging information and opinions.”41 
Concern with international communications is reflected in the international 
forum for addressing such issues – the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) – which is the “oldest international organization in the world.”42 
The ITU is the international organization (IO) tasked with coordinating 
international telecommunications with the “object of facilitating peaceful 
relations, international cooperation among peoples and economic and social 
33  Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (2001) 63.
34  Clapham, “Degrees of Statehood” (1998) 145 and Walzer, “The Moral Standing of 
States” (1980) 212.
35  UN Charter (1945) Art. 2(4).
36   Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (2001) 64.
37  Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights (2006) 54.
38  Eppenstein & Aisenberg, “Radio Propaganda” (1979).
39  Id.  at 154–156.
40  UNGA, Res. 37/92 (1982).
41  Council of the European Union, “EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of 
Expression Online and Offline” (2014) I.D.35.
42  See Codding, “International Telecommunications Union” (1994) 501. For other 
historical IOs see Mattelart, Networking the World (2000) 6–8.
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development by means of efficient telecommunications services.43 The ITU 
has three sectors,44 each with its own mandate: the Radiocommunication 
Sector “ensur[es] the rational, equitable, efficient, and economical use of the 
radio-frequency spectrum”45; the Telecommunications Standardization Sector 
which promotes standards that work across national borders46; and the 
Telecommunication Development Sector which promotes the development of 
telecommunications systems in developing countries.47  Cyberspace, while 
clearly a form of international telecommunication, does not fit distinctly within 
these well-defined silos of the ITU.  As a result, the ITU has had little power to 
assert any sort of direct governance over Cyberspace.48  
The gap that the ITU cannot fill has also been left empty by other international 
law-making processes. There is a notable dearth of treaty law.  The only 
cyber-oriented, multilateral treaty is the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, 
and it is weak at best.49  The Budapest Convention attempts to set standards 
on the prevention and prosecution of cybercrime, but it falls short of being a 
document with any teeth to compel state action. Instead of strong 
international obligations, the treaty shifts implementation and enforcement 
burdens to states and extends no jurisdiction by any international entity.  By 
vesting right and obligation in the domestic system of the states, the 
Convention on Cybercrime reifies the central position of the state and ignores 
the vastly different governance dimension that Cyberspace presents.  In fact, 
much of the scholarship on international law and Cyberspace seems to imply 
that it is an ineffective mechanism.50  Sofaer et al. suggest that cyber war, 
cyber intelligence, content restrictions, human rights, and national security will 
all remain outside the scope of international agreements.51  Notably, conflict 
and human rights are specifically within the scope of extant international 
agreements, indicating a significant shift in power.  
It is precisely the orientation to the national that has rendered international 
law ill-equipped to deal with the global nature of Cyberspace as it uses a 
siloed regulatory paradigm based on physical territory.  While scholars have 
looked to both customary international law52 and soft law principles,53 there is 
43  Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union (2010), preamble.
44  See Codding, “International Telecommunications Union” (1994) 508.
45  ITU Constitution (2010) Art. 12.
46  Id. at Art 17.
47  Id. at Art 21.
48  Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) xiii–xiv.
49  Convention on Cybercrime (2004).
50  Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) 29, 60.
51  Sofaer, Clark, & Diffie, “Cyber Security and International Agreements” (2010). 
52  Zalnieriute, “An International Constitutional Moment” (2015) 99–133.
53   See generally, Power & Tobin, “Soft Law for the Internet” (2011) 31–45; 
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little consensus on how cyber should be treated by nation states. The terrain 
seems to be frozen in terms of international law making.54  This is not to say 
that states are unable to negotiate a treaty aimed at governing Cyberspace. 
They could do just that. The claim, instead, is that states are unable to deliver 
such a treaty, because they understand their own limitations in effectuating 
control in a sphere marked by severe jurisdictional uncertainty.55  The non-
territoriality of Cyberspace disembowels the notion of jurisdiction as contained 
in international law.56
A final distinction must be made. Chapter 2 posits a global location for 
Cyberspace, and it must be acknowledged that there are areas external to the 
state that exist within international space and are fully contemplated by 
international law.  A group of areas known as global commons are defined 
within the bounds of international law, but outside the bounds of the national. 
The high seas, Antarctica, and outer space are all territories delineated by 
international law as global in nature.57 Cyberspace does not fit within this 
category because it lacks a key common element with the global commons: 
Cyberspace is not a res communis in the sense contemplated by international 
law. 58 Global commons share a core legal prohibition against appropriation by 
a state. Cyberspace though, throughout the layered model, is marked by a 
dispersion of ownership with some components being owned by states 
themselves. 
Cyberspace emerged appropriated and is therefore not a global commons 
within the legal sense of the word, making it difficult to classify within the 
international system.59
Yannakogeorgos & Lowther, “The Prospects for Cyber Deterrence” (2013) 49–77; and 
Hurwitz, “A New Normal?” (2013) 233–64. See generally Finnemore & Sikkink, 
“International Norm Dynamics and Political Change” (1998) 887–917.
54  See Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) xiii–xiv and Hurwitz, “A New 
Normal?” (2013) 243. 
55  See Power & Oisín Tobin, “Soft Law for the Internet” (2011) 35.  On uncertainty, see 
generally, Clark & Landau, “Untangling Attribution” (2010) 25; Libicki, “Two Maybe 
Three Cheers for Ambiguity” (2013) 27–34; Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 25; McDermott, 
“Decision Making Under Uncertainty” (2010) 227–41
56  Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) 15 .
57  Id. at 20. 
58  But see Betz & Stevens, Cyberspace and the State (2011) 107.
59  But see, Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) 69. See also the related 
concept of global public goods Stiglitz, “Knowledge as a Global Public Good” (1999) 
308–25; Sy, “Global Communications for a More Equitable World” (1999) 326–43; Spar, 
“The Public Face of Cyberspace” (1999) 344–62; and Tambini et al, Codifying 
Cyberspace (2008) 10.  
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Codes
The inability of national and international legal space to contain Cyberspace 
is rooted in the fact that users are “[s]eparated from doctrine tied to territorial 
borders.”60  In order to articulate a legal geography of Cyberspace, an inquiry 
into what regulatory mechanisms pick up when the territory of the state runs 
out must be made.  Despite the fact that Cyberspace is sometimes compared 
to the Wild West61 implying a degree of lawlessness, there are a number of 
sources of regulation in Cyberspace that exert control when and where the 
state cannot.62  
As discussed in Chapter 2, Cyberspace has a technical architecture that sets 
its spatial boundaries and borders and serves to constrain inhabitants of that 
space.  In the same way that a mountain range can prevent migration, the 
geography of Cyberspace is such that individuals can be stopped from 
migrating to certain networks as the result of virtual walls. The major differ-
ence, aside from one being virtual and the other existing in “meatspace”, is 
that Cyberspace is an architected geography.63
Cybergeography – i.e. its mountains and valleys and other “natural” attributes 
– is a manifestation of the code and hardware deployed across the layered 
conceptual model.64 To conceptualize how code restricts, consider a simple 
example of the early arcade game Pong, which was a simple game that was 
released for the Atari game system in 1972.65 In Pong, two players control 
blocks on the screen that function as paddles. These paddles are used to hit 
a dot on the screen, which represents a ball. The paddles that the players use 
move across a single axis, up and down, on the lateral ends of the screen, 
and the ball bounces off the top and bottom of the screen.  Game play 
continues until one player misses the dot allowing it to pass the paddle and 
touch the left or right edge of the screen.  
In other, less convoluted terms, Pong is an electronic version of ping-pong or 
table tennis. There is a critical difference, for the purposes at hand, beyond 
just the equipment needed for each version: in ping-pong a player can break 
60  Johnson & Post, “Law and Borders” (199) 1367; Kulesza, International Internet Law 
(2013) 124; and McIntosh & Cates, “Hard Travelin’” (1998) 114.
61  See, for instance, Mattice, “Taming the ‘21st Century’s Wild West’ of Cyberspace?” 
(2013) 9–12.
62  Tambini et al, Codifying Cyberspace (2008) 5.
63  Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 6.
64  Tambini et al, Codifying Cyberspace (2008) 5 and Hayden, “The Future of Things 
Cyber” (2013) 4.
65  “About Pong,” www.ponggame.org (2016). 
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the rules.  It is a game with a set of rules. Those rules constrain the players 
through threat of penalty, but there is possibility that the players can subvert 
and violate those rules.66  In Pong, on the other hand, players are incapable 
of cheating.  Pong’s rules are enforced perfectly in the sense that players are 
compelled to obey them, not through threat of consequences for violation, but 
through compulsion of the game’s architecture implemented through the 
computer code that sets constraints on the player within the game space. 
The rules are enforced perfectly, so players need not be given a rulebook or 
even notice of the rules to avoid violating them. 
This example is used to illustrate Lessig’s “code is law” principle.67  Lessig’s 
principle states that when technology of any sort mediates transactions, the 
code, or architecture, of that technology also regulates the possibilities for 
those transactions.68  Regulation embedded into architecture can achieve 
near perfect enforcement because rules are compressed into the structure.69 
At the heart of Lessig’s theory is the concept of regulability. He argues that 
individuals are “regulated” by a variety of forces including markets, law (in the 
formal sense), norms, and architecture or code.70  Each of these forces exerts 
limitations on an individual’s actions. Lessig posits that in Cyberspace 
“regulation is imposed primarily by code”71
Code regulates Cyberspace because it “defines the terms upon which 
cyberspace is offered.”72 The code is law principle requires analytic focus to 
be returned to the layered model wherein we can see the variety of 
architectures through which code is deployed. The layered model reveals 
specifically that there is code running across the bottom three layers that, 
combined, influence the user experience at the content level. These layers 
“are the unacknowledged legislators of cyberspace.”73 A benign example is 
Netflix, a website that streams movies to subscribing customers.74 Netflix 
licenses distribution rights for intellectual property and makes that intellectual 
property available to view by its customers.  Netflix has several core concerns 
66  International Table Tennis Federation, “The Laws of Table Tennis” (2016).
67  Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 5.
68  Id. at 77–78, 124; Tambini et al, Codifying Cyberspace (2008) 11; Cass R. Sunstein, 
Republic.com 2.0 (2007) 95. See also Eppenstein & Aisenberg, “Radio Propaganda” 
(1979) 155–56.
69  Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 110; Noveck, “Designing Deliberative Democracy in 
Cyberspace” (2003) 7.
70  Lessig, Free Culture (2004) 123 and Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 16.  See also, Tambini 
et al, Codifying Cyberspace (2008) 11–12.
71  Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 24.
72  Id.  84.  
73  Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012) 148 (quoting Nick Mathewson).
74  http://www.netflix.com.
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in making its business model operate effectively and profitably.  The first is 
avoiding theft in the sense of nonsubscribers gaining access to the Netflix 
collection.  Netflix does not rely on a notice forbidding non-subscribers from 
entering the website under force of prosecution. This would plainly be futile. 
Instead, Netflix uses code at the applications layer that requires a subscriber 
to verify their identity in the form of a login using a username and password. 
Netflix discourages widespread sharing of these credentials by deploying 
code that limits the number of IP addresses (and therefore devices) that can 
access the collection from a single account at a given time. Second, Netflix is 
concerned with abiding by the terms of the distribution license it has with the 
owners of the intellectual property it streams. Netflix uses code at the 
applications layer to make movie files stream to user devices instead of fully 
downloading, which keeps Netflix from distributing unauthorized copies of the 
files.75 License agreements are also likely to contain geographic restrictions 
on distribution.  Netflix uses the user’s IP address, which is part of the code of 
the logical layer, to filter out devices logging in from outside the territory in 
which the distribution license applies.  Finally, Netflix wants its service to work 
for its subscribers. To do this it analyzes the bandwidth of the subscriber’s 
connection and adjusts the resolution of the display accordingly to ensure 
smooth streaming.  Bandwidth is highly dependent on the architecture of the 
physical layer through which the subscriber connects to Netflix.  Netflix’s user 
experience is shaped by the layered architecture. The user likely does not 
experience the code as regulations or rules that command compliance. 
Instead, all of the regulatory mechanisms – save IP filtering, which maps to 
territorial concerns – are likely experienced as functionality of the service.
Netflix is a benign example, but it highlights one of Lessig’s key insights. 
Coded regulations are hidden in the architecture of the space.  This means 
that regulatory effects are often experienced as functionality rather than 
limitation, meaning that hidden regulations can be developed and imposed 
outside of public scrutiny. Code hides from the user, and there is rarely 
conversation between the user and the developer as to how code is to 
function. Indeed, users may not have any notice at all of the rules or how they 
are being applied. In applications such as Pong and Netflix this can be of little 
importance to the user, but when considered in terms of a global network that 
interconnects individuals such hidden rules become problematic as machine 
mediated interactions proliferate. The “code is law” principle explains how the 
regulatory space is shaped, but opens the questions of the sources of code 
and how code is implemented.  
75  Streaming technology allows services to send only parts of a media file being 
actively watched to a user’s devices, and it avoids local caching, so that the user’s 
device does not retain the data that is sent.
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Source Code: Software and Softlaw
Law comes from lawmakers. In a liberal democracy, it is, in theory, meant to 
be very easy to see from whence law comes.76 Transparency in law and 
regulation is a function of the liberal democratic system of governance.  This 
system implements a standardized process for lawmaking, which creates 
openness in the public forums in which law is made and adjudicated. The 
standardized procedure allows for individuals to access the law. The coupling 
of transparency and procedure allows citizens to peer in and see how the 
laws that govern them are constructed and applied. This process hinges on 
legitimacy in the substance of the law being confirmed through the 
legitimating act of proper procedure. It also opens political space by setting a 
framework for government action.
Code comes from coders; that is, people who write code. Coders are 
everywhere. They can be employed by a government, contracted by a private 
entity, working as a collective for the public good, part of a criminal cartel, or 
working on their own for simple personal satisfaction. The motivations and 
goals of coders are non-uniform.  They can be writing code for economic gain 
or public benefit.  The code they release can be proprietary and secret, or it 
can be open and transparent.  Code can be deployed at any of the layers of 
the layered model. The implication being that there is no standardized 
procedure for developing code and there is no open and transparent forum in 
which code as a category of regulation is debated. This is because in 
Cyberspace code is ubiquitous and non-monolithic.  
Code, like the Internet itself, is rhizomatic in nature. It develops irregularly 
across space and time from multivariate, unpredictable sources, and it is 
deployed dynamically across networks that mediate interactions. This is a 
function of the end-to-end network, which has already been demonstrated to 
facilitate innovation at the edges of the network. Coders working at the 
applications layer to proliferate transaction points through the development of 
innovative applications.  The open architecture literally allows an individual to 
change the legal geography of Cyberspace by writing code.  For example, the 
Silk Road, an online marketplace for black market goods was programmed 
and operated primarily by a single individual.77 The Silk Road changed the 
space of the online marketplace by facilitating anonymous transactions to 
remove the burden of state regulation.  
Code must be understood as dispersed: across layers, across actors, across 
motivations.  At any given time, a user in Cyberspace is being regulated by 
76  Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971) 56.
77  Bearman, “The Untold Story of Silk Road” (2015).
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multiple layers of code. Operationalized, the ‘code’ is law principle means that 
it is difficult to discern applicable regulations when analyzing user level 
interactions.  There is literally too much code for the user to evaluate, and the 
user must find ways to extend trust in code without needing to understand all 
code structuring interactions. Users can do this by using a variety of 
mechanisms such as user agreements, security certificates, trusted sources, 
etc. The practical result of this dispersion of code is that Cyberspace is 
embedded with a preference for self-regulation.78 This result flows from the 
non-hierarchical architecture implemented in the logical layer.  
States have significant power to oversee parts of this architecture, but not 
enough to regulate Cyberspace as a whole, because the decentralized nature 
of the network gives “all actors ... an equally strong position in defining its 
nature.”79  It facilitates multiple entry points for co-regulators to deploy code. 
While states might use a device’s IP address to reveal the identity of the 
individual using that device, Tor browser technology can be deployed at the 
applications level to encrypt and obscure a device’s IP address thereby 
diminishing the reach of the state’s regulatory power and giving the individual 
the ability to choose rights inconsistent with those defined in the legal 
geography of the state.80 Self-regulation allows for the dispersion of 
governance over a complex system, and it “is the laboratory of law and 
regulation for the Internet.”81 
The self-regulatory preference is salient because law has traditionally been 
an inefficient means of governing rapidly developing technology.  Law moves 
slowly compared to technology, thus law can be slow to react to technological 
developments, and changes in technology can warp legal terms and entrench 
outmoded legal provisions.82  This is one of the reasons that, in the modern 
bureaucratic state, lawmakers pass specificity down hierarchically to 
regulators, whose procedural rules make them more dexterous in rulemaking. 
These more dexterous means though are still burdened by formal procedure. 
Self-regulatory mechanisms perform a similar function, but are able to 
implement standards (i.e. regulatory mechanisms) by stripping process to a 
minimum and focusing on narrowly defined problems.  
Cyberspace is big, and its architecture is designed to handle its massive 
78  Johnson & Post, “Law and Borders” (1996) 1388 and Kulesza, International Internet 
Law (2013) 60.
79  Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) 125.  
80  Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012) 139–143.
81  Tambini et al, Codifying Cyberspace (2008) 4. 
82  For example, see Gellman, “Civil Liberties and Privacy Implications of Policies to 
Prevent Cyberattacks” (2010) 273–309. 
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scale.83  One of the ways that it does this is by dispersing governance across 
public, private, and civil society networks and devices.  As noted, the state 
holds significant regulatory power over individuals and physical property, but 
Cyberspace governance is an assemblage, and the state is only one 
component of that assemblage. Similarly, international institutions such as the 
ITU and UN, despite their limitations, constitute another component of the 
assemblage as an expression of consensus, or lack thereof, of member 
states. The rest of the assemblage is composed of a variety of actors that 
work across the Internet’s layers and exert different degrees of self-regulatory 
powers. For the purposes at hand, these non-state actors will be divided into 
three groups: commercial actors, civil society, and the individual. These 
groups are not discrete, and are chosen as representative points on a 
spectrum of actors.
Commercial Code
Commercial actors have long been considered to wield regulatory power, 
primarily through market forces. Indeed, Western European empires were 
built around private companies with the ability to extend regulatory authority 
through a lex mercatoria.84 Commercial power is central to critiques of 
neoliberalism and the rise of the multinational corporation (MNC). One of the 
key lessons from globalization literature is the embeddedness of the MNC 
throughout the world, and its ability to skew law and policy through the 
extension of economic power has been confirmed.85
Cyberspace is, of course, no different.  Commercial interests pervade three 
layers of the Internet.  Corporations own physical infrastructure; corporations 
develop software at the applications layer; and corporations own content at 
the content layer.  Only the logical layer is relatively free of direct corporate 
ownership and that is because the principle of interoperability requires the 
logical layer to be open, transparent, and the code free of proprietary claims. 
Corporations though are invested in the logical layer and are active in Internet 
Governance Communities (IGCs). 
Tambini et al. show that corporate self-regulation happens along industry 
divisions and is rooted in the notion “that conventional regulation involving 
legislative lag and inexpert courts, would be inappropriate and would 
risk breaking the architectural principles of this new technology.”86  Different 
83  Post, Jefferson’s Moose (2012) 60–79.
84  Burbank & Cooper, Empires in World History (2010) 153–162.
85  For a salient example, see Saro-Wiwa, “On Environmental Rights of the Ogoni 
People in Nigeria (1995)” (2007) 360–363.   
86  Tambini et al., Codifying Cyberspace (2008) 30 and Jayakar, “Globalization and the 
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industry divisions deploy self-regulatory mechanisms to ensure compatibility, 
user trust, and accountability.  These groups use mechanisms such as codes 
of conduct, industry standards bodies, and interfaces that allow users to 
report norms violations in order to ensure compliance with the law as well as 
user satisfaction.87 Self-regulatory activities by corporations are subject to the 
same critiques as self-regulatory bodies in other commercial areas. 
Questions of democratic deficits, the reification of power structures based on 
concentration of capital, and legitimacy are all raised for obvious reasons.88 
In Cyberspace, as Tambini et al. observe, one of the central problems is that 
commercial bodies maintain control over information and how it flows, 
meaning that private interests become the arbiters of the “freedom of 
expression.”89 Importantly, corporations that exist in the global space of 
Cyberspace at a sufficient scale become the arbiter of this right across global 
spaces not linked to territorial jurisdictional limitations.
A second analytical problem caused by corporate self-regulation is that there 
are numerous different types of corporate actors. Phrases like “corporate 
interests” and “commercial interests” often indicate a unitary set of interests, 
but no such unitary interests can be identified for the ‘Internet industry.’  Self-
regulation by commercial actors is architecturally dispersed and dependent 
on where a corporation functions within the layered model. Commercial actors 
innovating at the applications layer have an interest in maintaining open, end-
to-end data transfers in the logical layer. This means that commercial 
interests owning physical infrastructure, like backbones and ICT networks 
are, due to market forces, required to maintain bandwidth sufficient to pass 
along the data required by the applications layer.  The mismatch of interests, 
between content and bandwidth, can be seen in the net neutrality debate 
taking place in the US and Europe.  The rise of streaming applications, such 
as Netflix, led to a steep rise in bandwidth requirements at the backbone 
level.90 Due to the nature of agreements that arrange peering between 
backbones, the commercial owners were experiencing costs associated with 
increased bandwidth. The natural commercial solution to this problem is to 
pass those costs along to the entities using the bandwidth, and ISPs in turn 
want to pass those costs on to users.  From a commercial perspective this is 
exactly how a market economy works, but this means that the ISP is also 
Legitimacy” (1998) 726–29.
87  See generally, Tambini et al, Codifying Cyberspace (2008).
88  Id. at 112.
89  See, UN General Assembly, Res.  217 A(III). Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948) Arts. 18 & 19; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976) Art. 19; 
European Convention on Human Rights (2010) Art. 10; and American Convention on 
Human Rights (1978) Art. 13.
90  Osgood, “Net Neutrality and the FCC Hack” (2014) 33–34 and Verizon v. FCC 
(2014) 5–6.
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incentivized to give preference to some types of bandwidth usage.91 As a 
result, an ISP and an Internet Content Provider (ICP) might enter into a 
contract that gives that ICP’s content a priority to bandwidth or even excludes 
bandwidth traffic from a competitor. This could prove to be a viable profit 
stream to an ISP as well as potentially fatal to an ICP that lacks sufficient 
market power. ICP interest in providing content implicates free expression 
issues as well as the innovative architecture of the Internet itself.  If the end-
to-end architecture fails to connect ends, then the space created by the 
technological landscape is dramatically changed. The point here is not 
necessarily to discuss the merits of net neutrality, but to show how corporate 
interests at different points in the stack of layers diverge. Net neutrality shows 
how a simple supply and demand issue at the physical layer permutates 
across the other Internet layers and reveals deep governance issues 
concerning the nature of the network  and core human rights.
The net neutrality example reveals divergence of corporate interests, but it 
also reveals a convergence as well, namely that as technologies converge, 
corporations often merge. Many ICPs are not owners of the intellectual 
property rights in the content that they provide.92 The control of intellectual 
property has been key contestation in Cyberspace and has a pedigree that 
includes ICPs such as Napster and Pirate Bay. Successful ICPs such as 
YouTube, push content controls to users, which has been a thorn in the side 
of content owners who want to be the sole arbiters of that property. Net 
neutrality serves as a reminder that companies, such as Time Warner, are 
both content owners and ISPs.93 Such corporate convergence without net 
neutrality would allow these companies to constrain ICPs from both directions 
in the layer stack. Such corporate convergence can create new sources of 
regulatory power as diversified companies seek to leverage different 
mechanisms to maximize profitability and filter out the competition.
Public Code
Public spaces are coded.  As an example, Lessig cites the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, a law that recoded public space in order to increase access.94 
Similarly, newly constructed public and private places must be built “to code.” 
91  Rick Osgood, “Net Neutrality and the FCC Hack” (2014) 34; Verizon v. FCC (2014) 
740 F. 3d 623 SLIP (Court of Appeals, Dist. of Columbia Circuit 2014) 6. See also Spar, 
“The Public Face of Cyberspace” (1999) 352; and Tambini et al, Codifying Cyberspace 
(2008) 8–9; Werbach, “Breaking the Ice” (2005) 78–9; Ranieri, “EFFecting Digital 
Freedom,” (2014–2015) 52–53.
92  Osgood, “Net Neutrality and the FCC Hack” (2014) 35.
93  See Stout, “Comcast-Time Warner Cable Deal’s Collapse Leaves Frustrated 
Customers Out in the Cold” (2015).  See also, kliq, “Xfinite Absurdity” (2014) 51.
94  Lessig, Code 2.0 (2016) 127.
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Building codes ensure a number of different things: they ensure compatibility 
between structures and public utilities such as the electrical grid; they ensure 
safety by describing construction techniques that will give the building the 
required structural integrity, and these codes also enforce certain types of 
spaces.  Helen, GA is an example. Helen, GA is a small tourist town in the 
Appalachian Mountains of Northeast Georgia. It has all the amenities of a 
vintage tourist town from an age when road trips were forced down winding 
highways: restaurants, including fast food chains, mini-golf, wine shops 
serving local rotgut, and motels for weary travelers. Popular with bikers on 
long mountain drives and summer camp field trips to “tube the Hooch,” Helen 
sounds like numerous other outposts across Appalachia, but Helen looks 
different. Specifically, Helen looks like a Bavarian village lifted out of Germany 
– even the McDonald’s conforms to the aesthetic.  Helen uses its building 
code to transform itself into a particular type of public space, which is 
designed to structure an economic space built around tourism. The building 
code enforces architectural predictability in both the public space and the 
private commercial space.
ISPs and ICPs own and operate networks on the network of networks. To 
extend the ‘information superhighway’ metaphor, these are the private spaces 
that you see as you drive along the highway.  They consist of businesses with 
their doors open to the public, and businesses that are closed to all but those 
authorized to enter. Additionally, there are mom and pop stands, yard sales, 
and other roadside attractions.  There are also private residences that remain 
closed to the public, and churches that are open to all.  As you drive, though, 
you are in public space. You are on a road, that is maintained by a public 
authority for the public good, but this authority is not a government authority 
enforcing local zoning standards.  
Public space on the Internet is most visible at both the logical layer and the 
applications layer. These layers are where interaction points proliferate, but 
those interaction points must be architected. This has led to an interesting 
assortment of entities that maintain this public space through standardization 
procedures that are meant to ensure many of the same things building codes 
accomplish, namely interoperability, stability, and maintenance of the public 
space. Standardization is the means through which these entities work to 
structure the parameters of online interactions, because standardization 
makes architecture predictable.
Standard setting bodies are by no means an innovation.  Government and 
commercial standards settings bodies have always been a feature of market 
economies. Government interest in setting such standards is in the 
maintenance of public space.  While commercial interests are often vocal in 
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the standards adoption process, they can be met with skepticism when they 
become the arbiters of rights within the public space.  As already established, 
states only have partial control of the public space of the Internet, so as the 
state’s territory runs out, a different type of self-regulatory body has stepped 
in: Internet Governance Communities (IGCs).95  These governance bodies are 
self-regulatory in nature, and are marked by various levels of open 
membership that allows anyone with an interest and sufficient technical skill 
to take part in their deliberations. IGCs have grown organically with the 
development of Internet technology, and they constitute a community in which 
standard technical structures are negotiated.96  Unlike the ITU, which has 
been unable to extend its regulatory power over Internet protocols, IGCs 
routinely adopt standards that affect functionality across all layers of the 
Internet.  IGCs will be central to the analysis found in Chapter 7, but two brief 
examples are offered here as illustrations.
The heart of the protocol stack, the logical layer creates a public space 
through its open code.  It facilitates the digital handshake between devices on 
the Internet, and the open standards that create the logical layer allow entities 
to set up shop on the information superhighway.  The standards that facilitate 
such interoperability need to be open, nonproprietary, and accessible, and 
they must work well enough to ensure wide adoption, which facilitates 
architectural predictability. These standards are developed by the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF). The IETF was established by the researchers 
initially developing the Internet, and “probably has the largest influence on the 
technologies used to build the Internet” despite its lack of “formal authority.”97 
Originally a group of computer scientists hailing from universities and making 
contributions to the early network architecture, the IETF now allows anyone to 
join and take part in deliberations on its non-binding standards.98 Though non-
binding, these standards are adopted under a decision procedure that 
emphasizes “rough consensus and running code,” a deliberative stance that 
values agreement and functionality equally.99 The IETF places great emphasis 
on transparency in decision making, and it’s essential “read me” document 
states explicitly a rejection of “kings and tyrants.”100
A second example is the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). The innovation 
enabled at the logical layer means that other public spaces can be opened in 
Cyberspace through the use of the applications layer.  As examined before, 
95  IGCs is used to delineate these from IOs and to denote them as a distinct type of 
NGO (to the degree that they fit the definition of NGO).
96  See Leiner et al., “A Brief History of the Internet” (2012).
97  Alvestrand & Lie, “Development of Core Internet Standards” (2009) 126.
98  Id. at 129.
99  Internet Engineering Task Force, “The Tao of IETF” (2012).
100  Id.
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WWW is an applications layer code, and its basic language is HTML. 
Specifically, HTML enables the concept of hypertext, which allows conn-
ections to be made among digital documents, a function commonly called 
linking.101 In order to facilitate such hypertext linking, HTML needs to be 
standardized and open. The W3C is the standards setting body that ensures 
the publicness of the WWW.102 W3C describes itself not as an organization 
but as an “international community that develops open standards to ensure 
the long-term growth of the Web.”103 It too has open membership allowing 
both organizations and individuals to join, and its decisions are taken by 
“community consensus.”104
Both of these examples exhibit key characteristics that make IGCs difficult to 
characterize in organizational terms, making their evolution as a governance 
mechanism significant to understanding the legal geography of Cyberspace. 
First, IGCs are a reflection of the distributed, open nature of Internet 
architecture. Their open membership schemes potentially distribute decision 
making globally, and their process is open in order to ensure goals of 
interoperability.105  Second, as communities – rather than organizations – their 
decisions impose community values into architectural design. In IGCs, the 
public, as a collective, creates and maintains the code of public space.  
Personal Code
The end-to-end network reduces barriers to innovation as does open code at 
the logical level.  These innovative edges open up spaces in which individuals 
can act at a global level and change the nature of interactions in Cyberspace 
at the applications level. Both PGP and the Silk Road, discussed above, are 
examples of coders rewriting state regulatory power.  These application layer 
codes inscribe new rules on the state’s ability to control information using 
cryptographic technologies, or as one commentator claims, the user is 
empowered to “[c]reate the digital world, and with it, [one’s] own rules.”106 
The individual is given direct access to implementing innovations that can 
reconstruct the legal geography the user inhabits. The implication that the 
individual can directly regulate in Cyberspace is controversial at best, and 
many would outright reject such a notion. Alternate readings would likely 
suggest that the code deployed by these individuals will be the subject of 
criminal or commercial law. Such readings inscribe national jurisdiction 
101  On hypertext see Brate, Technomanifestos (2002) 33–52, 220–225. 
102  Alvestrand & Lie, “Development of Core Internet Standards” (2009) 138–139.
103  World Wide Web Consortium, “About W3C” (2016).
104  Id.
105  See Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 148.
106  Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012) 148.
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around the individual as the subject of the law.   
These readings are rooted in territory and overlook ways in which these 
technologies re-architect legal geography.  Applications extend to individuals 
the ability to be the arbiter of their own rights in terms of informational 
freedoms. They are an “arbiter” in the sense that they can effectively hide 
personal interactions and remove them from the legal geography of territory. 
The logical layer allows applications layer code to bypass the state 
jurisdiction. The user respatializes to a legal geography that exists outside of 
the state’s territorial gaze. The user as coder chooses the values contained in 
the code that he or she writes. This means that some may use these 
technologies to assert a freedom of political expression, but others can imbue 
the right with more nefarious content such as child pornography or terrorism. 
Such uses will be the subject of Chapter 8.
WikiLeaks serves as a good example.  WikiLeaks is more than just a 
webpage. It is applications level code that allows individuals to send 
information to WikiLeaks while preserving anonymity.107 Developed and 
deployed by Julian Assange with the help of a handful of other programmers, 
WikiLeaks became a global actor after it published a number of prominent 
leaks.  This media attention peaked with the publication of thousands of State 
Department cables leaked by Chelsea (formerly Bradley) Manning.108  Two 
things are important here, first Julian Assange’s purposes for developing 
WikiLeaks specifically to invoke changes in world order and, second, the re-
empowerment of the individual.109  WikiLeaks is “a platform, a tool, an instance 
of technology,” but it has an explicit legal purpose of diminishing the state’s 
enforcement jurisdiction by reducing “incalculable legal costs” by transporting 
leakers to a new legal geography.110
The second thing to note is the power of the code. Cablegate leaker, 
Manning, was not caught as a result of the state following her digital trail. 
Instead, Manning revealed herself to a fellow coder, Adrian Lamo, who turned 
him in.  Until that point, the United States had no evidence against Manning. 
Manning’s own revelations returned her act to the interior of the legal 
geography of the state. Only when Manning spoke the crime did it materialize 
in a territorial sense.
107  See generally, Domscheit-Berg, Inside WikiLeaks (2011).
108  Id.
109  Id. at 160 (quoting Julian Assange as stating “I’m off to end a war” in relation to the 
Collateral Murder leak from the U.S. occupation of Iraq.)
110  Id. at 174–75, 137.
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The legal landscape of Cyberspace, as described above, is a multi-
dimensional geography that can rewrite the jurisdictional patterns established 
as accepted in international governance.  Multidimensionality is the result of 
the dual geography implicit in the layered architecture of the Internet.  This 
reveals why the layered model carries force as an explanatory tool:  through 
dissection of the network architecture, interconnected points of control can be 
identified and observed. The layered model facilitates “layered thinking,” 
which can reveal how the spatial characteristics of Cyberspace can ripple 
across the conceptual stack and change other geographies, as has been 
shown in relation to the legal geography addressed above.111 
The airport analogy that opened this chapter took us to an international 
frontier found in an airport’s international arrivals hall. There is another aspect 
of this room that should be noted before moving to the final chapter in Part I. 
If you listen while in the arrivals hall, you can hear the muffled, a-rhythmic 
beat of stamps hitting passports. As observed above, jurisdiction, or legal 
geography, is usually mapped across space using a state’s territorial borders 
as indicators of its limits.  These borders represent another notion as well.  In 
the airport arrivals hall, the border is as much about territory and law as it is 
about individual identity. The border is an expression of political identity, and 
passports are opened in order to check political identity.  The next chapter will 
take up this notion through examination of political geography.
111  Werbach, “Breaking the Ice” (2005) 69.
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4
Political Places
 
In the novel Midnight’s Children, Salman Rushdie interweaves his signature 
magical realism into the political geography of India surrounding the specific 
time, 12:00am 15 August 1947, that India came into existence as a nation 
state.1 Rushdie identifies this moment of national political identity as 
inseparably linked to individual identity.  In one of the many turns of the novel, 
the reader is presented with the sale of Methwold’s Estate. In the story, 
William Methwold sells his estate to an Indian family with the contractual 
stipulation that the family must continue to live exactly as the English 
inhabitants before them had until the moment of Indian independence, at 
which point the family could again live as Indians. The fictional contract 
imposes an English (read colonial/imperial/Western) geography over the 
estate being sold.   The contract extends a political identity as well by defining 
the identity of the inhabitants concurrently with the state’s political borders. 
The family lacked the possibility to live as and be Indian until the stroke of 
midnight, because until that point there was no such place to bound such an 
identity.  Borders are what Kamal Sadiq, borrowing Rushdie’s phrase, calls 
“midnight’s children.” Decolonization led to “[n]ew borders,” and “paths that 
were legal and customary became illegal overnight” forcing, through both 
inclusion and exclusion, new identities on the local inhabitants as the result of 
international geopolitical shifts.2 In Rushdie’s tale law enforces political 
identity congruent with state geography. At midnight, though, everything 
changes.  
In this example, we can see that the law (i.e. the contract) is the expression of 
political identity across a territory, rendering a condition in which “[l]ocation 
equals identity.”3  Rushdie illustrates that an individual’s location is a construct 
that can change without physical movement. In other words, “space changes 
1  Rushdie, Midnight’s Children (2006).
2  Sadiq, Paper Citizens (2010) 39. See also, Cooper, “What Is the Concept of 
Globalization Good For?” (2001) 206.
3  Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012) 141. See also, Clark & Landau, 
“Untangling Attribution” (2010) 25. 
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… meaning.”4  Political space is the space in which negotiations about how 
social rights and obligations will be allocated among the governed and the 
government. This negotiation itself gives identity to the participants in terms of 
membership, which legitimates their role in such negotiations. International 
borders, therefore, are expressions of legal geography mapped onto spatial 
geography through an expression of a political geography bounded by 
common community.5 As a result, legal arguments “presuppose spatial 
knowledge,” and human rights actions are “struggles for spatial normativity.”6 
These values structure public space in which discourse and deliberation take 
place. Of course, such uniform identification of individuals with political values 
compartmentalized by borders is a mythical construction, but it is the 
construction that underlies international space.7
Thus far in this research, Cyberspace has been described in terms of its 
spatial and legal geography. Legal space is not sui generis; it has origin and 
history.  Specifically, law is the product of negotiations that occur within the 
constructed public space of the state. Law is a mechanism used to articulate 
the parameters of public space as a reflection of the values negotiated by the 
political membership of the space.8 At the heart of the concept of legal 
jurisdiction are “fundamental questions of order and legitimacy,” which 
describe the political geography.9 
This chapter turns its attention to the project of identifying how values shape 
the political geography of Cyberspace through its code and architecture. If 
code is law, then the coder makes political “[c]hoices among values, choices 
about regulation, about control, choices about the definition of spaces of 
freedom.”10 This section argues that there are underlying values that organize 
Cyberspace as well as guide and legitimate power distribution in the 
governance of Cyberspace. First, this chapter will build a framework for 
understanding how constitutional values structure political space and 
legitimate action therein. Then, it will analyze how constitutional values were 
implemented into the open network architecture through a historical analysis 
of its design across the technical layers. The final section reflects on the 
4  Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 87.
5   Coicaud, Legitimacy and Politics (2002) 12.  See also Streck, “Pulling the Plug on 
Electronic Town Meetings” (1998) 39. 
6  Liste, “Transnational Human Rights Litigation and Territorialised Knowledge” (2014) 
1–19.
7  For instance, see Ferguson, Global Shadows (2006) 113–154.  See also, Clapham, 
“Degrees of Statehood” (1998) 154; Walzer, “The Moral Standing of States” (1980) 214; 
and Mattelart, Networking the World (2000) 1.
8  Coicaud, Legitimacy and Politics (2002) 83.
9  Post, “Against ‘Against Cyberanarchy’” (2002) 1387.
10  Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 78. 
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value of interoperability, arguing that it is the core organizing logic for the 
political geography of Cyberspace.
Code and Constitution
At the heart of modern governance is the idea of the constitution. 
Constitutions are legal documents that are foundational in scope. They serve 
as the blueprints for the construction of public space, and are distinct from the 
legal geography they deploy.11 Effective constitutions organize and distribute 
power among the actors within a governance space in such a way that a 
tenable imbalance of power is created between the citizen and the state.12 So 
for instance, Sajo argues that constitutions embody shared emotions and 
values of the political community that it organizes,13 and as such, 
constitutions can be seen to organize the “communicative conditions for a 
reasonable political will formation.”14 These value-laden “communicative 
conditions” are a political geography that structures public discourse and 
deliberation.  The flow of information and boundaries to its flow are connected 
to build the “public sphere” within which political identity is formed.15 
Constitutions set the limits of jurisdiction, meaning that they extend 
communicative conditions across space, and demarcate the limits of 
community as defined by values embedded through founding political 
practices.16 The constitution shapes the political geography in which “the 
process by which we reason about how things ought to be” takes place.17 
Political geography can be observed in the communicative conditions 
deployed by code.  Code when observed in the layered model constitutes 
both the spatial geography of Cyberspace (i.e. its architecture) and the legal 
geography of Cyberspace (i.e. its architecture). This compression is 
important.  In physical space law and politics are extended over and, thus, 
contiguous with territory.  In Cyberspace, space is extended by code, and 
11  Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971) 7.  See also, Habermas, The Postnational 
Constellation (2001) 116 and Noveck, “Designing Deliberative Democracy in 
Cyberspace” (2003) 11.
12  Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971) 28 and Clark, Legitimacy in International Society 
(2005) 19.
13  See generally, Sajó, Constitutional Sentiments (2011).
14  Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (2001) 117.
15  See generally, Kellner, “Intellectuals, the New Public Sphere, and Technopolitics” 
(1998) 147–86; Noveck, “Designing Deliberative Democracy in Cyberspace” (2003) 11; 
Clinton, “Internet Rights and Wrongs” (2011); and Jayakar, “Globalization and the 
Legitimacy” (1998) 713.
16  See, for example, Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (1967), 13 (“Law is 
both the engine for government, and a condition restraining government”). 
17  Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 78. 
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code is law. It should be no surprise then that code imposes communicative 
conditions as well, which requires probing the extent to which code functions 
as a constitutional force. This will reveal how values are architected directly 
into Cyberspace.  Code is of course not the same as a formal constitution, but 
code does perform many of the same functions as a constitution, which 
makes the analogy tenable.18 
The concept of legitimacy will be helpful in articulating the constitutional 
values that define a political geography. Legitimacy addresses the 
“justification of power” within a governance structure and is a “fundamental 
problem of politics.”19 It is a measure of the distribution of power that 
“concerns first and foremost the right to govern.”20 The right to govern is 
defined through a network of social values, laws, and founding principles that 
together define the critical “division that separates those individuals who 
command from those who obey.”21 In other words, legitimacy is articulated 
and observed at points that structure the division of power among entities that 
govern and entities that are governed.22 Societies use constitutionally 
constructed political institutions “to settle conflicts that threaten the 
cohesiveness of the community.”23 These institutions are the “guarantors of 
the public space” in which communicative conditions foster a “network of 
sociability.”24 Constitutions construct a political geography by bounding 
“exchanges to unfold in a fixed framework and under the form of reciprocity” 
that “tangl[es] together ... rights and duties.”25 The constitution expresses 
what it means to be a member of a political space by expressing the bounds 
of that space in terms of rights and obligations in an “unequal distribution of 
power.”26 The rights and obligations themselves, often expressed through law, 
institutionalize shared values of the community.27
Legitimacy, then, is fluid across space and time,28 but actors within a given 
political community will often invoke foundational or constitutional values in 
order to legitimate contemporary actions by framing them within the 
18  See Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 6–7, 275, 314 and Martin, “Using the US Constitution 
to Frame the Governance of Cyberspace” (2015) 24–26.
19  Wight, International Theory (1992) 99.
20  Coicaud, Legitimacy and Politics (2002) 10.
21  Id. at 26. 
22  Id. at 10.
23  Id. at 21. 
24  Id. at 11.
25  Id.
26  Id. at 31 
27  Id. at 32; Lessig refers to these as “framing values.” Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 316.
28  Coicaud, Legitimacy and Politics (2002) 207–08 and Power & Tobin, “Soft Law for 
the Internet” (2001) 39.
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communicative conditions.29 Constitutional values shape “rules of conduct 
[that] are indissociable from a historical context.”30 Legitimacy is not a 
universal norm, so each political geography must be examined in the context 
“of social facts  ... set within the ongoing flow of history.”31 Legitimacy, as the 
link between the power and values, is an analytic for examining the political 
geography deployed by code in Cyberspace.32  
Code is Politics
Technology as it progresses through its technical life span, from development 
to operations, is laden with politics.33 Technology, often advertised as of the 
future, is always a product of history.34  As a result, design decisions made in 
early stages of development entrench design values in a technology, and 
such decisions are often influenced by politics.35  Cyberspace is no different, 
and this section will use the history of its development as a tool to reveal 
foundational values embedded in its architecture that shape its political 
geography.36  
This historical inquiry focuses on the source of code: coders. As with any 
discussion of values, the ability to articulate them with specificity that also 
applies with generality is limited.37 This section will examine the political 
values that the coders designed into Cyberspace. In the same way that an 
American constitutional lawyer might consult the Federalist Papers to discern 
the values of the constitutional designers, this section will examine how these 
coders articulated the values they held into the code they designed.  
Making Space 
Cyberspace is a globally distributed phenomenon,38 but this is a relatively new 
29  Coicaud, Legitimacy and Politics (2002) 23 and Clark, Legitimacy in International 
Society (2005) 2.
30  Coicaud, Legitimacy and Politics (2002) 83.
31  Id. at 192; Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (2005) 13.
32  Tambini et al., Codifying Cyberspace (2008) 13 and Clark, Legitimacy in 
International Society (2005) 3.
33  See Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 24.
34  Coicaud, Legitimacy and Politics (2002) 199.
35  Fleischmann et al., “Thematic Analysis of Words That Invoke Values in the Net 
Neutrality Debate” (2015) 1. 
36  Walzer, “The Moral Standing of States” (1980) 211. See also Lipschutz, 
“Environmental History, Political Economy and Change” (2001) 73.
37  Coicaud, Legitimacy and Politics (2002) 138.
38  Castells, “Communication, Power and Counter-Power in the Network Society” 
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development in its history. Though the Internet went “public” in the mid 1990s, 
its first vestiges were established in 1965 when the TX-2 computer in 
Massachusetts was connected to the Q-32 in California creating the first 
“wide area computer network.”39 This was followed in 1969 by the 
establishment of the ARPANET, a US Department of Defense funded project 
to establish networked computer communications that eventually “grew into 
the Internet.”40 The first public demonstration of Internet technology was by 
Bob Kahn, one of the designers of the TCP/IP, in 1972, and that same year, 
email was developed.41
Early Cyberspace was inhabited by the people that were constructing it, 
meaning that “networking research incorporated both work on the underlying 
network and work on how to utilize the network.”42 In other words, the first 
individuals to set foot in Cyberspace were neither natives or explorers, they 
were architects. Cyberspace was not territory to be claimed in an imperial 
sense; it was a territory springing from a community. These individuals were 
forming the very rules that would bind them as they interacted in Cyberspace, 
and they were developing these rules as a community as was seen with the 
IETF and the W3C in the previous chapter. 
The Internet that they created “embodies a key underlying technical idea, 
namely that of open architecture networks.”43 As discussed in Chapter 2, this 
means that the overall network itself is not hindered by design choices of 
specific network operators as interoperability is facilitated through packet 
switching technologies. Packet switching is a design choice that results in 
there being “generally no constraints on the types of network that can be 
included or on their geographic scope.”44 Interoperability becomes a core 
communicative condition through the establishment of a common standard-
ized language, the use of which is the only prerequisite for membership in the 
network of networks.
Bob Kahn articulated “four ground rules” for open architecture networking.45 
First, each network connecting to the Internet “would have to stand on its 
own” and there could be no requirement of “internal changes” to such a 
network for connection.46  Second, the transmission of data packets would be 
(2007) 247.
39  Leiner et al., “A Brief History of the Internet” (2002).
40  Id.  
41  Id. 
42  Id.
43  Id.
44  Id.
45  Id.
46  Id.
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on a “best efforts basis,” meaning that if a node failed to transmit a packet it 
would have to be retransmitted from the source.47 Third, the gateways and 
routers (i.e. the physical layer) would serve transmission purposes only and 
retain no information about the packets being transmitted.48 And finally, “there 
would be no global control at the operations level.”49 These four principles, 
and especially the fourth principle, construct the limits of the public space 
through articulation of core values. They also reveal an interesting aspect of 
the Internet, namely that it is not a singular entity, but instead is an 
assemblage of technologies working together based on common rules or 
protocols. This technical design stood in contrast to the traditional 
telecommunication monopolies that were the norm during its development. 
The values that were entrenched can be observed in two distinct traditions in 
Cyberspace: in the egalitarian code that structures the logical layer and in 
libertarian code developed at the applications layers.  
Rights Space 
Open architecture networking is more than just a set of technical 
specifications.  It is code that embodies a set of political values embedded by 
its designers and reflects their specific historical situation.50 These designers 
were generally Americans working at research universities during the Cold 
War and the American Civil Rights Movement, among other historic events.51 
Their efforts established a particular type of network design that reflects the 
liberal values that pervaded the coding community at that time. In particular, 
the Internet’s Cold War origins shape this design in a uniquely American way 
– especially since it was funded by US Department of Defense at its 
inception.52  
As a result, the Internet is the product of a particular historical milieu that led 
its designers to seek to accompany the technology with “social conscience.”53 
The designers saw that “we have the free will to either place human rights 
and virtues – better distribution of wealth, free speech, human rights – in 
lockstep with technological advances or else suffer the consequences.”54 
47  Id.
48   Id.  and Post, In Search of Jefferson’s Moose (2012) 40.
49  Leiner et al, “A Brief History of the Internet” (2012).
50  Betz & Stevens, Cyberspace and the State (2011) 33.
51  Brate, Technomanifestos (2002) 85.
52  For example see Clinton, “Internet Rights and Wrongs” (2011). See also U. S. 
Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace” 
(2011); Martin, “Using the US Constitution to Frame the Governance of Cyberspace” 
(2015) 24–26; and Mattelart, Networking the World (2000) 1, 4.
53  Brate, Technomanifestos (2002) 26–27.
54  Id.
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These coders therefore incorporated a “rights culture” into the developing 
Internet.  Information theorists, like Norbert Wiener, argued that distributed 
flows of information would lead to open discourse “unbounded by geography 
or politics.”55 Such flows would be made manifest as computer scientists 
began to design the Internet.  Early Internet pioneer Douglas Engelbart 
focused his work on empowering the individual user of computing systems to 
help the collective good.56 Engelbart was a leader in the field of human 
computer interaction, and invented the computer mouse. Brate connects 
Engelbart’s ideology specifically to American politics at the time, including the 
Civil Rights Movement, and goes on to say that “Engelbart’s values and 
ethics would remain hardwired into the future of the technology.”57
Wiener, Engelbart, and others like them sought technological development 
that “intersected with efforts to promote and protect many human rights.”58 
The open architecture reflects these values as “technologies are imperfect 
and incomplete physical manifestations of the current political order.”59 As 
Americans, these designers would be acutely influenced by the First 
Amendment to the American Constitution and the public space that it 
formulates by delegitimizing government involvement in information 
exchanges. The five freedoms embodied in the First Amendment are all 
freedoms directly related to information transfer among non-governmental 
individuals and entities.60 Broadly, this can be referred to as the “freedom of 
expression.” It should be noted that the freedoms enumerated in the First 
Amendment are constructs:
When the claim to freedom of expression emerged, this presupposed that an 
originally small but critical mass shared their desire to express their views and 
receive information without censorship.  This desire and need were conceived 
and felt as something due, which in the emerging rights culture became a 
matter of strong expectation. This expectation grew stronger, to the point 
where any disregard of the expectation triggers a sense of injustice.61 
As a construct, this freedom developed along with historical processes, and 
the rights culture embedded in Cyberspace reflects this historical context.62 
The design itself embeds a historically contextualized freedom of expression 
55  Id. at 25.
56  Id. at 114–141.
57  Id. at 136.
58  Fidler, “The Internet, Human Rights, and U.S. Foreign Policy” (2012). 
59  Banks, “The Politics of Communications Technology” (2013).
60  U.S. Constitution, Amend. I.
61  Sajo, Constitutional Sentiments (2011) 27.
62  See generally, Rychlak, “Compassion, Hatred, and Free Expression” (2007) 407.
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that the designers would characterize as “free information.”63 The political 
geography of Cyberspace is one that places minimal restriction on the 
transfer of information and the autonomy of the individual user.64 The early 
Internet community maintained a “dominant ethos ... [of] altruism” with a 
“spirit of mutual aid.”65 The code was engineered to be “vehemently public 
sphere.”66
The value placed on free information would be heightened by the Internet’s 
historical links to higher education.67 Its use spread initially on college 
campuses and early Internet policy spread the Internet to all University 
users.68  In the United States, higher education holds freedom of expression – 
in terms of information sharing and inquiry – as a core egalitarian value. The 
majority of the population of Cyberspace for close to half of its technical life 
would be primarily found in higher education.69 The connection of the Internet 
to research is important, because “the network’s first role was sharing the 
information about its own design and operation.”70 This means that the 
information sharing values of the academic communities became part and 
parcel of the values being embedded in the political geography.
The historical context in which the Internet was being designed sheds light on 
how the values of open architecture networking emerged. The designers were 
working in the midst of the Cold War threat of the USSR from abroad and the 
upheaval of the Civil Rights Movement domestically. These events give 
context to the communicative conditions that were developed to support the 
right of free information. First, as a product of a specific time and place – and 
funded by the US DoD – Cyberspace reflects values shaped by the 
ideological conflict in the Cold War.71 The United States at that time empha-
sized openness as a way of counteracting the closed, centralized Soviet 
model,72 and as a result Cyberspace is designed as a “highly decentralized” 
network that stands in contrast to the Soviet model.73  The “iron curtain” was a 
63  Brate, Technomanifestos (2002) 29 and Betz & Stevens, Cyberspace and the State 
(2011) 18. 
64  See Held, Democracy and the Global Order (1995) 145–156 and Habermas, The 
Postnational Constellation (2001) 118.
65  Resnick, “Politics on the Internet” (1998) 51.
66  Tambini et al, Codifying Cyberspace (2008) 11.
67  Brate, Technomanifestos (2002) 98.
68  Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 2.
69  Leiner et al., “A Brief History of the Internet” (2012).
70  Id.
71  Brate, Technomanifestos (2002) 89–90.
72  For instance see Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men (1968) 201, 223–4.  See also 
Brate, Technomanifestos (2002) 48.
73  Spar, “The Public Face of Cyberspace” (1999) 345.
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descriptive term of a political geography that was locked and therefore not 
free.74 Vannevar Bush, head of the US Office for Scientific Research and 
Development during World War II – which oversaw the Manhattan Project, 
argued that freeing information would be a tool against totalitarianism.75 We 
see this reflected in the open network architecture’s underlying principle of 
“no global control at the operations level.” The decentralized and 
nonhierarchical network counters the Soviet model by moving power over 
information to the individuals using the network. 
At the same time, deep questions about political membership within the 
United States were being raised by the Civil Rights Movement.  Images of the 
era show African Americans claiming space in the political geography by 
invading the white-only spaces of the legal and spatial geography with 
marches and sit-ins. The Civil Rights Movement was pushing for identity 
within the political community for minorities. The severe inequalities that were 
revealed became part of a broader narrative of liberal activism throughout the 
1960s and the 1970s.76  Open network architecture through its emphasis on 
interoperability had the potential to “[enhance] the equal rights of participation 
for all members of society” by opening access to its political geography.77 The 
interoperability envisioned in the network reflects a concern of the coders for 
equality of access.78 This coding was “motivated by the drive to create a 
greater good through empowerment of the people.”79  The Internet is designed 
specifically not to discriminate among different types of information or users.  
The coders working on the design of the open network architecture 
implemented a version of the freedom of expression that is consistent with 
the egalitarian leanings of their particular historical context. These early 
designers were primarily concerned with the logical layer of the Internet, and 
their design was built to extend rights to users by constructing a space to 
facilitate interoperable communities.  The notions underlying this structure 
rest in the ideal that the “more information is shared, the freer society is, the 
greater the potential is for cooperation.”80 It is the transfer of information for 
the public good that underlies their project, and as we will see below, 
transfers power to the applications layer as a result. The network was 
designed to create an interoperable citizenry.
74  Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men (1968) 168.
75  Brate, Technomanifestos (2002) 48, 33. 
76  Brate, Technomanifestos (2002) 192–93. 
77  Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971) 224; Betz & Stevens, Cyberspace and the State 
(2011) 103; and Brate, Technomanifestos (2002) 104.
78  Brate, Technomanifestos (2002) 185–87.
79  Id. at 132–133.
80  Id. at 208.
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Liberation Space
The egalitarian bent of the open network architecture pushes power to the 
edges of the network as a way to incorporate individual power into the 
political geography. This has an interesting effect of not only facilitating 
communication, but giving users the ability to define the terms of their 
communication. The political geography extended by the logical layer allows 
for the development of political geography at the applications layer. This 
means that diverse political groups are able to create their own spaces 
through the use of applications.  Quite possibly the best example of this is the 
libertarian ideals that began to drive cryptographic code as a means of 
individual liberation.81 The logical layer created an opening in political space 
that promised “freedom without anarchy, control without government, 
consensus without power.”82 Libertarians saw the Internet as a place where 
individual rights would triumph over state control.  
This libertarian turn in the design and culture of Cyberspace was a powerful 
one and has a strong and lasting pedigree, and libertarian philosophy to 
some extent is responsible for many of the applications that redefine 
borders.83 The word hacker, today, is often used to describe criminals that 
wreak havoc in Cyberspace by stealing valuable information or defacing 
websites. Media accounts refer to hackers as the bad guys in Cyberspace 
that compromise networks and systems for fun and for profit.84 However, this 
use is a far cry from its origins in the tech community, wherein hackers are 
individuals “who enjoy exploring the details of programmable systems and 
how to stretch their capabilities.”85 Hackers maintained an “ethical code [that] 
was driven by the progress of computer code – it was wrong, almost evil, to 
keep code or programming resources to yourself.”86 Hackers, in the original 
sense, believe that “information sharing is a powerful-positive good,” which 
echoes the value of free information.87 Though hackers often resist political 
categorization,88 the hacker ethic of understanding how things work “is in one 
sense essentially apolitical and technically focused, while in another sense it 
81  Id. at 226, 227 and Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 2.
82  Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 2 and Brate, Technomanifestos (2002) 224. See also Betz 
& Stevens, Cyberspace and the State (2011) 56.
83  For example Elwell, Murphy, & Seitzinger, “Bitcoin” 1 (2013) (Bitcoin); DeNardis, 
Global War for Internet Governance (2014) 8 (Bitorrent); and Bearman, “The Untold 
Story of Silk Road” (2015) (The Silk Road).
84  Betz & Stevens, Cyberspace and the State (2011) 16.
85  Raymond, The New Hacker’s Dictionary (1996) 233.
86  Brate, Technomanifestos (2002) 243.
87  Raymond, The New Hacker’s Dictionary (1996) 234.
88  “A Tale of Many Hackers” (2015) 5.
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is subversive and profoundly ideological.”89 Hacking is a “way of knowing 
things”90 that emphasizes empowerment through knowledge of technical 
architecture. It easily adapts itself to libertarian rhetoric characterizing 
mainstream society as “being led” and “being fed.”91
The hacking ideology was extremely influential in Internet culture and groups 
such as the cypherpunks.92 A cypherpunk is an individual “interested in the 
uses of encryption via electronic ciphers for enhancing personal privacy and 
guarding against tyranny by centralized, authoritarian power structures, 
especially government.”93 Their political views are best described as anarcho-
libertarian.94 Using the motto “privacy for the weak, transparency for the 
powerful,” they recognized that the applications layer could give substantive 
meaning to their construction of freedom of expression.95
The central issue to the cryptographic community is that information flows 
unfettered by state interference, including chilling effects of extensive 
surveillance.96  Cypherpunks cast communicative conditions in terms of “what 
is public, and what is private.”97 Freedom of expression in this political 
geography rests on freedom of speech as emphasized in Western liberal 
democracies.98  So for instance, while giving a speech on WikiLeaks, Tor 
activist Jacob Appelbaum informs federal agents attending the speech that 
the only thing in his pockets is the Bill of Rights.99 The freedom of speech is 
linked to the freedom of expression found in international human rights 
regimes, but Cypherpunks redeploy the anti-totalitarianism sentiment from the 
89  Betz & Stevens, Cyberspace and the State (2011) 18 and Brate, Technomanifestos 
(2011) 243.
90  Kracht, “The Hacker Perspective” (2014) 26 and Brate, Technomanifestos (2002) 
251–252.
91  Kracht, “The Hacker Perspective” (2014) 26 and Prisoner #6, “The 21st Century 
Hacker Manifesto” (2014–2015) 50–51.
92  Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012) 94–134 and Assange et al., 
Cypherpunks (2012) 21–22. See also Domscheit-Berg, Inside WikiLeaks (2011) 
174–75.
93  Raymond, The New Hacker’s Dictionary (1996) 140
94  Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012).  For other examples see Id. at 
89–91, 122, 148, 150, 192–193, 227, 255; Domscheit-Berg, Inside WikiLeaks (2011) 4; 
Assange et al., Cypherpunks (2012) 29, 70–1, 76; and Tambini et al., Codifying 
Cyberspace (2008) 11.
95  Assange et al., Cypherpunks (2012) 7 and McIntosh & Cates, “Hard Travelin’” 
(1998) 86.
96  For instance, Snowden, “Testimony before the Parliament of the European Union” 
(2014) 1.
97  Domscheit-Berg, Inside WikiLeaks (2011) 50. 
98  Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971) 197 and US Constitution, Amend. 1.
99  Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012) 167, 150.
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Cold War against all power structures. 
As a result, these coders deploy code that hides the individual from power 
structures, including the state. Cryptographic code facilitates a political 
geography with equal distribution of power over information as a way to 
reallocate power and wealth. Cypherpunks work to reclaim information 
technology from being “the privileged technology of neoliberalism.”100  As an 
example, Appelbaum endorses the dispersion of power “to people who are 
not simply the ones who make the decisions” through what Barlow would call 
a “renegotiation of power.”101  Similarly, Domscheit-Berg describes WikiLeaks 
as a project to shift political geography:
In the world we dreamed of there would be no more bosses or 
hierarchies, and no one could achieve power by withholding 
from the others the knowledge needed to act as an equal 
player. That was the idea for which we fought.102 
To anarcho-libertarians, Cyberspace’s open architecture reflects their own 
value in individual liberty through rights, which explains the pervasive 
libertarian tone in the tech world.103 Libertarian code uses digital cryptography 
to recode communicative conditions imposed on the individual and to rewrite 
political geography. They use their code “to prove that technology not 
pretension would define the nature of identity on the Internet.”104 
Interoperability
Cyberspace contains lots of values. Any visit to a social networking website, 
such as Facebook, will quickly display numerous different value sets.  These 
value sets are not the values of Cyberspace, but the variety and scope of 
them are indicative of the political geography of Cyberspace. As Lessig 
observes, the space that is constructed “depends entirely on the values that 
guide development of that place.”105 As discussed above, the principles of 
open network architecture are constitutional, and these principles create a 
political geography built around interoperability. The abundance of divergent 
100  Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (2009) 159; Assange et al., Cypherpunks 
(2012) 27; and Bearman, “The Untold Story of Silk Road” (2015).
101  Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012) 176, 255.
102  Domscheit-Berg, Inside WikiLeaks (2011) 4.
103  Spar, “The Public Face of Cyberspace” (1999) 347. See also Tambini et al., 
Codifying Cyberspace (2008) 11; Sunstein, Republic. Com 2.0 (2007) 111–12; and 
Bearman, “The Untold Story of Silk Road” (2015).
104  Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012) 115.
105  Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 70. 
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views that are expressed in Cyberspace is a result of the interoperability 
value.
Interoperability pervades Cyberspace and organizes its geography. More than 
just technical design, interoperability can be seen as the value given 
constitutional force in the code. It addresses concerns about closed political 
space and opens up the possibility of the expansion of political space through 
the applications layer. Interoperability is the operationalization of “information 
wants to be free.” It recognizes that information freedom rests in the ability for 
information to be communicated among as many individuals as possible.  
As the core value in Cyberspace, interoperability facilitates direct commun-
ication by devices, and therefore it can be seen as facilitating interoperability 
among individuals as well. Interoperability uses three mechanisms to shape 
political geography. First, it decentralizes communications.  Second, it creates 
free access through openness. Third, it creates equality on the network 
through peering. Critically these mechanisms shift the division between ruler 
and ruled and fosters participation by opening up political membership. 
Interoperability means that participation is no longer subject to specific central 
authority; instead, participation is self-authenticating through the adoption of a 
standard protocol.    
The networkification of the world pushes this principle to world-scale and 
makes geography interoperable. Networked geography is no longer bounded 
in terms of exclusion. Instead, its limits are understood in terms of inclusion 
and accessibility. This means that the bounds of the political geography of 
Cyberspace are not territorial, rather the bounds are the digital divide 
between those with access and those without.
---
The layered model is a conceptual stack that serves as a framework for 
understanding the complex technical architecture of Cyberspace. By 
delineating different functions, the layers model allows for the categorization 
of technologies to understand their discrete functions and features. The 
layered model, though, sometimes obscures the fact that these technologies 
are not always discrete, and that Cyberspace is an assemblage of these 
layers.
Similarly, thus far the geography of Cyberspace has been described as 
layered: a spatial geography layered with a legal geography that is layered 
with a political geography. The problem is that all these geographies happen 
at once. When an individual looks at the state of their nationality on a map, 
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they do not see the drawn borders and deconstruct the state into spatial, 
legal, and political units. Instead, the borders represent a compression of 
those concepts into a single understandable geography.  While one cannot 
see Cyberspace in terms of borders, Cyberspace functions such that 
individuals experience the same compression of concepts, possibly more so. 
In real space it is much easier to disaggregate physical geography, such as a 
mountain, from the other geographies of the state. In the geography of the 
state, the mountain stays the same while the legal and political geographies 
that encompass it can change, sometimes literally, at the stroke of midnight. 
In Cyberspace the geography can change at a keystroke. 
The geographic compression in code is an extension of Lessig’s principle: 
code is geography. Cyberspace does not have nature; it only has code and as 
such code is central to its organization. Part I has described Cyberspace in 
insular terms.  This is a view of Cyberspace from within Cyberspace, which is 
not without its limitations. This exercise will prove essential in examining how 
Cyberspace as an alternative geography interacts with international space.
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Interlude
“Obviously, when an old world sees a new world arise beside it, it is 
challenged dialectically and is no longer old in the same sense.”
David Berlinski
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The Nomos of Cyberspace
In 1543 Copernicus first published his theory of a heliocentric universe, a 
theologically controversial idea that would play out in the early 1600s when 
the Catholic Church placed Galileo on trial for supporting such views.  The 
Church, in 1616, banned books that supported a Copernican map of the solar 
system and only recently recanted its position in the Galileo matter.1 
Scientifically, the work of these two scholars cannot be overstated as the 
heliocentric model is fundamental to human understanding of the solar 
system, but it is the Church’s reaction to the Copernican map that shows the 
true impact of Copernican thinking. The Catholic Church at the time was 
trying to maintain dominance in Western Europe, and its claim to legitimacy 
and power was rooted in the space of Christendom. This sphere of Christ, 
oriented towards the central divine authority of the Pope, was experiencing 
growing pains as kings and princes made claims to similar authority. In the 
wake of the English Reformation and on the eve of Westphalia, the 
Copernican map literally changed Western human orientation within the 
geography of the universe.2  The map presented by the Catholic Church was 
one that depended on the Church being at the center of the Universe making 
it the natural focal point for the heavenly gaze.  The legitimating principle of 
divine right depended on the centralization of that right to a single point 
importance.3  Copernican thinking destroyed “a world in which the spatial 
structure embodied a hierarchy of values” and replaced it with “a universe of 
indefinite proportions.”4 This fragmented the map of Christendom by 
diminishing the importance of its chief spatial indicators: Rome was no longer 
the literal center of the Universe.  Indeed, the human society was displaced to 
the periphery.    
Now, move the clock forward 400 years to 2016 and transport to a New York 
City street (or any street in any big city or medium sized city or, quite possibly, 
1  Cowell, “After 350 Years, Vatican Says Galileo Was Right” (1992).
2  Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth (2003) 86.
3  Id. at 112.
4  Coicaud, Legitimacy and Politics (2002) 98.
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any street, anywhere).  If you look around you will likely see someone looking 
at a map on a digital device. A map that conveniently centers on that 
individual’s location at the touch of a button. The power in Copernicus’ idea, 
has in a sense been lost. Humans have found their way back to the center of 
the map.  More precisely, the digital device has found its way to the center of 
the map, which reveals the user’s location, and the gap between device and 
user is shrinking.5 These maps choose their centers dynamically, imparting 
importance on the device and the user as both move through space and time, 
and as a result the user experience is such that they become part of the map 
as space extends out from them both virtually and physically.
This idea that humans are at the center of the map again, is more than just a 
quippy metaphor.  Maps, at their most basic, display the relative location of 
various geographic epistemic units. As a representation of the world, maps 
are human constructions of orientation, and as such maps construct how 
humans experience the world.6 The lesson from Galileo is that the choice of 
where to center a map is a choice of relative importance.7 As a result, a world 
map made for a U.S. middle school social studies class during the Cold War 
might center on the United States thereby dividing the Soviet Union into two 
parts.  Even the seemingly neutral choice to place the Prime Meridian at the 
center of some world maps embeds Western primacy by entrenching the 
Atlantic Worldview. A further example is Buckminster Fuller’s Dymaxion map, 
which projects the world on an icosahedron that can be unfolded in multiple 
ways to reveal the connections and disconnections in the world. Fuller’s 
projection was intended as a counter narrative to politically conceived maps 
by challenging the boilerplate nature of the traditional world map by 
diminishing the importance of its center and taking away conceived notions of 
up and down produced by cardinal directions. 8 Fuller’s map embraces the 
idea that geographic understandings can and do change, and these 
understandings change how individuals and societies understand the world.
Since maps signify space, then control of maps is linked to control of space. 
As a result, many states have strict mapping laws. For example, China’s 
State Secrets Law places geographic information under the control of the 
Central Government.9 Such control of space by the state is not without its 
complications. The Google Maps tool has repeatedly been at the center of 
5  For example see Lessig, Code 2.0. (2006); Riley v. California, No. 13–132 (2014) 
18; and Streck, “Pulling the Plug on Electronic Town Meetings” (1996) 25. See also, the 
literature on transhumanism, e.g. Robinson, “Addressing the Legal Status of Evolving 
‘Envoys of Mankind’” (2011) 470–475.
6  Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth (2003) 86.
7  See Id. at 51.
8   Buckminster Fuller Institute, “The Dymaxion Map” (n.d.).
9  Hille, “China Cracks Down on Online Maps” (2010).
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controversies on how borders are drawn in its mapping software.10 Borders 
are important because they set limits: spatial, legal, and political. The center 
of the map, chosen for importance, is limited by borders, which show the 
limits of the central power. In terms of the state, for instance, the map shows 
a star as the central capital, and solid dividing lines as the borders of both the 
values and law that flows from the star.    
Chapters 2–4 describe the geography of Cyberspace from within Cyberspace. 
This choice of perspective purposely centers Cyberspace in terms of 
importance and diminishes territory in terms of borders.11 It would of course 
be disingenuous to argue that Cyberspace is not linked to territory, as the 
physical layer clearly reveals the territorial links. Thus, Goldsmith’s claim still 
rings true, Cyberspace only exists as a result of human enterprise in a 
physical world, therefore Cyberspace cannot be separated from the physical 
world in any real sense. Virtual reality is, after all, still virtual.12  This chapter 
takes the presented geography of Cyberspace and argues that it presents 
social actors with an alternative geography that “detach[es] social and 
political reality from the world of sovereign states.”13  The alternate geography 
is not a separate place as envisaged by Barlow, instead it is a way of knowing 
and conceptualizing space that rewires the way we experience the primary 
geography of the world.  It follows then that Cyberspace changes the way in 
which individuals experience and approach the space they inhabit.  This shift 
in geography does not nullify borders, but it changes their content and 
meaning, which in turn causes shifts in the underlying governance structures 
that support such borders. In essence, the argument here is that Cyberspace 
transforms geography and governance from the international into the 
interoperable global. The first section will explore the concept of borders and 
their changing meanings. The second section will argue that Cyberspace re-
codes borders and changes their geographic content. The final section will 
use the concept of nomos to argue that the re-coding of borders is changing 
world order.
Borderless Worlds
The spatial narrative introduced in Chapter 2 is based on clichés that have 
taken root in the descriptions of Cyberspace. One of the most popular of 
10  See generally Fenlon, “Did Google Maps Cause an International Border Dispute?” 
(2011); “India Google Maps Controversy Is Modern Drama” (2014); and Taylor, “The 
Simple Way Google Maps Could Side-Step Its Crimea Controversy” (2014).
11  See Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) xii.
12  But see Ferguson & Mansbach, Globalization (2012) 136.
13  Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) xi–xii and Bowman, “Thinking Outside 
the Border” (2007) 221–22.
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these clichés references the Internet and Cyberspace as “borderless” in 
scope.14 As part of the spatial narrative, borderlessness is associated with the 
free transfer of information across national frontiers. Designating a space 
without containment or limits, “borderless” is used specifically to invoke a 
counter narrative to international space in terms of spatial, legal, and political 
geography.15  
A realist response to assertions of borderlessness is obvious: each physical 
component and user has location within territory and is subject to the lex loci 
of that place.16  There is ample evidence to support such claims.  China 
controls the Internet at nine locations that house physical international 
telecommunications links.17 North Korea also keeps tight control over physical 
entry points for the Internet, and sharply controls individuals’ access within its 
physical geography.18 Iran has plans to create a “halal Internet” that exists 
exclusively within its borders.19 The US and UK’s ability to engage in mass 
surveillance is based on the physical location of infrastructure in the United 
States and the United Kingdom.20 Egypt turned the Internet off during the 
Arab Spring.21  Realists, both legal and political, have a plethora of evidence 
to support the claim that the Internet exists within state borders, and that 
states pursue their national interests in that arena just as they did when 
railroads were the transformative technology. To some extent, the realist is 
correct: borders remain an important feature of our experience of the world 
and they remain important in the organization of law and politics at a global 
level.
Both the “borderless” rhetoric and the realist argument have a central flaw. 
They both attempt to describe Cyberspace in terms of the state. The rhetoric 
miscalculates the level of integration of Cyberspace into the fiber of the state, 
and the realist miscalculates the lack of control that the state has over that 
integration. The realist view tends to react to the narrative of Cyberspace as 
14  See generally Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 71 and Martin, “Using the US Constitution to 
Frame the Governance of Cyberspace” (2015) 24. 
15  Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) 2. See also, Schmitt, The Nomos of the 
Earth (2003) 96.  
16  Goldsmith, “Against Cyberanarchy” (2014) 7. See also Sofaer et al., “Cyber Security 
and International Agreements” (2010) 190 and Yannakogeorgos & Lowther, “The 
Prospects for Cyber Deterrence” (2013) 50.
17  Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) 109–10.
18  Sparkes, “Internet in North Korea: Everything You Need to Know” (2014).
19  Bernard, “Iran’s Next Step in Building a ‘Halal’ Internet” (2015).
20  Greenwald & MacAskill, “NSA PRISM Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, 
Google and Others” (2013) and Gellman & Poitras, “U.S., British Intelligence Mining 
Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program” (2013).
21  Richtel, “Egypt Cuts Off Most Internet and Cellphone Service” (2011).
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counterfactual to the state system by focusing on discrete layers of 
functionality. In the realist critique, Cyberspace is a thing, and things are the 
subject of territorial authority. This externalization of Cyberspace is natural for 
a variety of reasons, but it insufficiently theorizes Cyberspace and ignores the 
endogenous nature of Cyberspace that shapes the space in which law and 
politics unfold.
Cyberspace is not a counterfactual to the state. Cyberspace is a part of 
everyday human life in almost every aspect: leisure, business, commercial, 
political, even romantic.22 It is no longer exogenous to social interaction, it has 
become an “endogenous and political”23 factor “embedded in the material 
condition” of the world.24  Geographically speaking, Cyberspace is more river 
than highway. It is a part of the landscape, and it is difficult to control.   Maybe 
one of the best examples of this can be found in one of the central realist 
institutions: the military.  Militaries around the globe now include Cyberspace 
as one of the domains in which they operate.25  By joining Cyberspace with 
land, sea, air, and space, there is an explicit spatial recognition of Cyber-
space as a space in which military operations can take place. This is more 
than just rhetorical, it is acknowledgement that Cyberspace constitutes a new 
locus for borders.26 National defense is an act of protecting borders and 
Cyberspace as a domain of military operations spatializes Cyberspace as 
another place that intersects and influences the space of the state.27 Military 
doctrine adopts Cyberspace not as a thing to be controlled, but instead as an 
endogenous medium with a geography that shapes the most realist of 
activities.  
What then is to be made of the maps still inscribed with the borders of 
international space? The borderless rhetoric seems empty in the face of a 
clearly depicted international system, because borderlessness asserts an 
anarchic counterfactual that is not experienced by the user.28 A better term 
would be re-bordered which implicates not just the location of borders, but 
their content as well. Users still experience the borders that appear on a 
22  Liu et al., “Cybersecurity” (2012) 1. See also Council of the European Union, “EU 
Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and Offline” (2014) I.D.33 
and Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) ix. 
23  Fritsch, “Technology and Global Affairs” (2011) 28.
24  Luke, “The Politics of Digital Inequality” (1996) 120.
25  Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) 67; US Department of Defense, 
“Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace” (2011); and Hayden, 
“The Future of Things Cyber” (2013) 3–8.
26  US Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in 
Cyberspace” (2011) 8. 
27  Id. at 5.
28  Johnson & Post, “Law and Borders” (1996) 1389.
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political map of the world.  These borders represent national frontiers many of 
which, if visited, might even be demarcated by walls, fences, or other physical 
divisions. Physical borders are often, quite literally, legal lines drawn in the 
sand. They demarcate jurisdiction as deployed across space by political 
processes. National borders demarcate people into discrete political units of 
difference, at least in theory. Borders are then inscribed on maps, and are 
often inscribed physically on the Earth’s surface as states build physical 
barriers along the lines of political demarcation.29 These barriers “draw on the 
easy legitimacy of sovereign border control even as they aim to function more 
as prophylactics against postnational, transnational, or subnational forces that 
do not align neatly with nation-states or their boundaries.”30 To states, and 
thus to realists, borders still matter. 
These physical landmarks are not fortifications against other states, but 
against the ideas of other space.31 The fortifications are attempts to construct 
the meaning and content of national borders in the public mind, but “[s]tate 
borders are certainly not comparable to fortifications” despite this physical 
architecture.32  This function of borders is not new and has historically been 
implicated with information technologies. Vannever Bush in 1949 wrote that 
“[i]ron curtains are not new inventions; yet they are now harder to maintain.”33 
Bush’s evaluation in the wake of WWII taps into a familiar logic of 
transparency and liberation driven by free flow of information.  Bush, though, 
pushes this narrative further by observing that the “same technical advances 
that sustain in mystery the distant emperor ... also tend to penetrate the 
barriers to ideas that he must maintain for his continued sway.”34 This 
observation places technology as central to the transformation of space 
through social experience. Thus, while borders maintain a “physical obdurate 
premodern signature,” the power they contain “is networked virtually” and the 
people they contain are “hybridized.”35 Interoperability renders standards as 
“non-tariff barrier[s]” which eases interaction across these fortifications.36
Just as Copernicus started a process of changing the way in which humans 
29  Brown, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty (2010) 7–20.
30  Id. at 32.  See also Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (2001) 80–81. 
31  See Bigo, “The Emergence of a Consensus” (2008) 76–94.  Compare with 
Domscheit-Berg, Inside WikiLeaks (2011) 131. 
32  Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (2001) 66.
33  Bush, Modern Arms & Free Men (1968) 168.
34  Id. See also Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012) 128 and Assange, 
“Conspiracy as Governance” (2006). But see Morozov, “Political Repression 2.0” 
(2011); Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 53; and Wittes, “The Intelligence Legitimacy Paradox” 
(2014).
35  Brown, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty (2010) 80.
36  Jayakar, “Globalization and the Legitimacy” (1998) 716.
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orient themselves to the world, the technology of Cyberspace is causing shifts 
in human orientation to the world. Copernicus did not change the borders of 
territories, he simply reoriented those territories drawing into question the 
content of their borders. Cyberspace does the same. As a decentralized, 
interoperable network, Cyberspace presents an alternate geography that is 
increasingly networked into the social consciousness. It is this non-
Copernican conception of the world that allows for the social construction and 
experience of global space by “destroying notions of traditional borders.”37 
Such construction and experience happens on the other side of “a legally 
significant border between Cyberspace and the ‘real world.’”38  The technical 
design of Cyberspace, the architecture itself, is reprogramming the content 
layer of geography by recoding borders.
Re-coding Borders
To understand this process of re-coding borders, it would be helpful to have a 
map of Cyberspace.39 A map would help to uphold the claim of cyber-
geography made throughout this book. There is rich work on mapping 
Cyberspace that reveals a variety of aspects. These maps show the world as 
disaggregated networks. Borders in the traditional sense are not visible 
despite the state’s claim to the physical layer.40 One of the reasons for this 
separation is that the “cost and speed of message transmission on the Net is 
almost entirely independent of physical location.”41 Instead, these often 
beautiful maps reveal network connections in the shape of a decentralized 
and distributed network and display the vast opportunities for inter-
operability.42 Cyberspace is depicted as the sum of its endpoints, making its 
true external border the digital divide.43 Indeed, in most maps of the Internet, 
geographic features – the traditional features represented on maps – are the 
exact feature that are obscured.44 Instead, these maps show the configuration 
of the network from a variety of different perspectives.  
Maps of Cyberspace are not Copernican maps, with humans at the edges 
circling around a central power source.  These maps show the connections 
37  Spar, “The Public Face of Cyberspace” (1999) 347.
38  Johnson & Post, “Law and Borders” (1996) 1378.
39  Post, Jefferson’s Moose (2012) 24.
40  See generally, Dodge & Kitchin, “Ways to Map Cyberspace” (2001) and Post, 
Jefferson’s Moose (2012) 23–30.
41  Johnson & Post, “Law and Borders” (1996) 1370.
42  Post, Jefferson’s Moose (2012) 23–28 and Leiner et al., “A Brief History of the 
Internet” (2012).
43  Luke, “The Politics of Digital Inequality” (1998) 133 and Cooper, “What Is the 
Concept of Globalization Good For?” (2001) 190.
44  Post, Jefferson’s Moose (2012) 28.
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among humans on a global scale, and these connections are strikingly 
decentralized.45 In fact there is often no discernible center at all, meaning that 
these maps are dynamically configurable to allow for understanding of the 
interactions they chart. Cyberspace maps reflect spatial characteristics in 
terms of devices and users, placing devices and users as the external 
boundaries of its legal and political geography and reflecting the inter-
operability of open architecture networking.46 These visualizations depict an 
alternative geography in which the “power to control activity in Cyberspace 
has only the most tenuous connections to physical geography.”47 The idea of 
the border is unhinged from territory, which calls for reconsideration of spatial, 
legal, and political geography.48
What we are left with is a dual geography in which the conceptual separation 
of Cyberspace from real space becomes increasingly untenable as there is 
dissonance between an observed physical reality of borders and an 
experienced spatial reality in which these borders do not exist.49  This can be 
seen in the sociological debate between “digital dualism” and “augmented 
reality.” These two sociological concepts are used to describe the effect of the 
human absorption of Cyberspace. Digital dualism suggests two selves: one 
online and one offline. Whereas augmented reality posits a cyber-experience 
that augments the perception in the real world,50 digital dualism keeps 
separate the “virtual” and the “real” and augmented reality argues that “the 
digital and the physical are increasingly meshed” as Cyberspace “implodes 
atoms and bits.”51 This debate centers on how the social mind reconciles two 
different maps of the world. Augmented reality allows such a reconciliation to 
be achieved through the development of new understandings of geography. 
This need for reconciliation is important in broader terms as well since it 
requires a reconciliation of the international with the global. International 
governance is structured around territorial, international assumptions as 
opposed to global assumptions.52 At the root of the international is the 
assumption of national space as a stack of spatial, legal, and political 
geography compressed into concurrent territorial space.53 Changes in the 
45  Id.
46  Leiner et al., “A Brief History of the Internet” (2012).
47  Johnson & Post, “Law and Borders” (1996) 1371.
48  Leiner et al., “A Brief History of the Internet” (2012) and Cooper, “What Is the 
Concept of Globalization Good For?” (2001) 191.
49  Gourley, “Cyber Sovereignty” (2013) 277–78.
50  Jurgenson, “Digital Dualism versus Augmented Reality” (2011).
51  Id.
52  See Kulesza, International Internet Law (2013) 30.
53  See Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (2001) 60, 63 and Sassen, Territory, 
Authority, Rights (2006) 40. See also Johnson & Post, “Law and Borders” (1996) 1369 
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international system are generally understood in terms of changes in borders. 
These lines of geographic understandings that serve as focal points for 
scholars of world order.  This is why Westphalia is a central inquiry for many 
scholars, as it serves as a fulcrum point for observing transitions in the variety 
of geographic compressions.54 There is recognition that changes in how 
territory is divided are critical to understanding the structure of the 
international system. Territory is the threshold question of all international 
legal and political issues.  
This link between law and spatial organization is what Schmitt refers to as 
nomos, which explicitly ties the subdivision of the Earth’s land territory to the 
development of law.55 Nomos, as used by Schmitt, naturalizes law in the 
sense that law flows from terra firma due to a human need to divide the Earth 
with lines ranging from furrows in a field to national frontiers.56 He claims that 
“the great primeval acts of law [are] terrestrial orientations: appropriating land, 
founding cities, and establishing colonies.”57 International law then is the 
result of how humans draw lines on the Earth, and Schmitt’s analysis focuses 
on transitions that reconstitute those borders and, importantly, how 
understandings of space change.  In other words, Schmitt’s account is tied to 
the land.58 Schmitt’s central observation that spatial conceptualization is 
inherently linked to governance is salient, but in a networked world it must be 
understood as being linked not to land but to geography as mapped by 
human understanding of the spatial condition.
Schmitt’s analysis thus falls short in that it fails to contemplate the opening of 
new space with any real depth.59 His idea that “[l]aw is bound to the land” 
recenters the Earth’s territory in terms of legal geography with the Earth 
“contain[ing] law,” “manifest[ing] law upon” itself, and “sustain[ing] law above 
itself.”60 He flirts with alternative geographies when he discusses how 
technology can push forward a “global image,” but his analysis is always 
constrained by the ends of the Earth.61 Specifically, he argues that his idea of 
nomos is not applicable to the sea, because it is not divisible in the same way 
that territory in the form of land is. There is, in his estimation, no nomos of the 
sea, because the seas defy subdivision, and can only be understood as an 
adjacency to the land. Any law applicable to the sea flows from its adjacency 
and Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights (2006) 20. 
54  Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (2005) 35
55  Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth (2003) 70.
56  Id. at 42.
57  Id. at 44.
58  Id. at 42.
59  See Id. at 351–355.
60  Id. at 42
61  Id. at 86.
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to land.  The sea is a global commons except in its liminal spaces where it is 
sufficiently attached to territory.62 For Schmitt, non-land can only be defined 
through its proximity to land. 
This ignores the idea that the experience of territory itself is shaped by non-
land areas. The ocean can rise up and take territory, thus individuals living on 
an island likely understand territory differently from individuals in a land-
locked area.63 Schmitt’s theoretical limitations are exposed by the 
contemporaneous dawning of the space age in which humans were first able 
to see the planet Earth as a globe.64  Pictures from the early days of space 
exploration reflect a concurrent change in the spatialization of the Earth’s 
surface.  The ability to visualize the Earth not as a map but as a photographic 
image, literalizing Schmitt’s “global image,” coincided with major shifts in 
international governance that began with the process of reconstructing 
international space in the wake of World War II. This reorganization, though 
ultimately based on the “territorial integrity and political independence” of the 
state, would for the first time include human rights as part of the organizing 
logic for international society.65 Images of Earth from outer space, such as the 
Blue Marble, allow for and necessitate reflection on assumptions about the 
meaning of borders.66  The photographic medium itself can be seen as closer 
to experience than a map, which encodes experience and embeds design 
choice.  
Cyberspace has a similar, arguably, stronger effect.  Cyberspace architecture 
allows users to experience borders differently thereby reconstituting the social 
understanding of those borders.67 It “cut[s] across territorial borders” and 
“[undermines] the feasibility – and legitimacy – of laws based on geographic 
boundaries.”68 While individuals may still feel physically contained by those 
borders, they are no longer metaphysically contained as well. They instead 
can import ideas and communications at will across those borders.69 The 
human conscience is extended into a global domain.70 Tied to the values 
embedded by the coders of Cyberspace, this means that nations are “now 
62  Id. at 183.
63  For example Carrington, “The Maldives Is the Extreme Test Case for Climate 
Change Action” (2013).
64  Major, “This Is the Very First Photo of Earth From Space” (2014). 
65  UN Charter (1945) Art. 1–2.
66  NASA, “Blue Marble – Image of the Earth from Apollo 17” (2015). See also 
Featherstone, “Genealogies of the Global” (2006) 387.
67  See Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (2001) 42.
68  Johnson & Post, “Law and Borders” (1996) 1367.
69  Id. at 1372.
70  Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (2001) 39. See also Coicaud, Legitimacy 
and Politics (2002) 136 and Betz & Stevens, Cyberspace and the State (2011) 106.
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wired ... with an architecture of communication that builds a far stronger First 
Amendment than [American] ideology ever advanced.”71 As argued in Chapter 
4, this “stronger First Amendment” is really a freedom of expression as 
envisioned by the designers of the Internet and its applications.
Cyberspace is not like the global commons as portrayed by Schmitt.  Schmitt 
claims that the “sea is free” and that “[o]n the open sea there were no limits, 
no boundaries, no consecrated sites, no sacred orientations, no law, and no 
property.”72 Schmitt is asserting that the governance structure of global 
commons excludes these spaces for their lack of geography.73 This is why the 
‘borderless world’ rhetoric is a poor description of Cyberspace.  It deprives it 
of geography. Cyberspace does not lack “sacred orientations.” Quite the 
opposite, Cyberspace is increasingly becoming a waymarker for individuals 
moving in real space. Such waymarkers include phrases like “Google it”; the 
use of Twitter as a locus for action in traditional news coverage; and, possibly 
most starkly, the proliferation of printed QR codes that serve as physical 
doors to places in Cyberspace (see Fig 5.1).
Fig. 5.3: QR codes are images that users can 
scan with a device such as a phone in order to 
gain information.  Such codes can be printed 
and placed in real space to give users entry into 
Cyberspace. The QR code pictured opens a 
hyperlink to http://space.blountsfolly.com
 
71  Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 236.
72  Schmitt, Nomos of the Earth (2003) 43.
73  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) Art. 2; Antarctic Treaty 
(1959) Art. IV(2); and Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 
(1967) Art. II.
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Another reason to distinguish Cyberspace from the global commons is that 
the sea, like other global commons (namely Antarctica and Outer Space), is 
uninhabitable. While there is vocabulary for transient seafarers, there is no 
corresponding concept of a permanent seakind.74 As was argued in Chapter 
2, Cyberspace has population. It has transitory surfers, but it also has 
permanent netizens, many of whom are digital natives. Schmitt’s thesis 
requires inhabitability, because spatial division is entangled with the 
demarcation of inhabitation. Implicit to Schmitt’s theory is the idea that there 
is a community of inhabitants that inscribe borders onto land.75  However, the 
digital native represents “a more mobile kind of legal person.”76 
Cyberspace has inhabitants and communities that exist within its borders.77 
This forces consideration of legal concepts such as self-determination and 
human rights, because “for there to be principles and practices of legitimacy, 
there needs to be a community/society.”78 The important implication of a 
group of “digital natives” is that the world’s population will be increasingly 
dominated by users who have always understood space as shaped by 
Cyberspace. Digital natives will not experience Cyberspace as an alternative 
geography any more than Native Americans experienced the Americas as a 
“new world.” Digital natives understand Cyberspace as part and parcel of 
their geography. The implication is that there is a shift happening in how the 
world is spatialized; a shift that is deeply implicated with interoperability.  
Nomos
Schmitt’s object is to prove that international law itself is based on the basic 
question of spatial division. It is “a primary criterion embodying all subsequent 
criteria,”79 and ‘nomos’ is the immediate form in which the political and social 
order of a people becomes spatially visible.”80 Schmitt compresses spatial 
and legal geography into a single layer.81 In conjunction with his Concept of 
the Political, which compresses legal geography and political geography, 
Schmitt reads territory as an essential agent of law and politics. Here, 
Schmitt’s analysis is chosen for critique due to this asserted essentialness, 
because it is the question of territory that sits at the heart of the debate on the 
74  A Google search returned no pages discussing any notion of seakind.  There is, 
however, a corresponding notion of spacekind.  See generally Robinson, “Astronauts 
and a Unique Jurisprudence” (1983–1984) 483.
75  Schmitt, Nomos of the Earth (2003) 42.
76  Johnson & Post, “Law and Borders” (1996) 1400.
77  Assange et al., Cypherpunks (2012) 155.
78  Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (2005) 6, 149.
79  Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth (2003) 45.
80  Id. at 70.
81   Id. at 45, 70.
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nature of Cyberspace. Schmitt’s “terrestrial fundament” presents a fulcrum 
point from which to base conceptualization, because to understand 
Cyberspace as an alternative geography, we must first accept the enduring 
and historically constructed nature of our own physical boundedness.82 The 
task is not necessarily one of debunking Schmitt or of supporting Schmitt, but 
instead seeking an understanding of Cyberspace that resolves the 
dissonance in the perceptions of geography and alternate geography by 
articulating them as a single networked geography. This requires investigation 
into how the nomos of Cyberspace shapes the nomos of the Earth. Or, in 
other words, how does Cyberspace re-inscribe borders and transform 
geography on a world-scale. If nomos is to be understood as the “form in 
which the political and social order of a people becomes spatially visible,” 
then a nomos of Cyberspace should be visible.83 
The analysis in The Nomos of the Earth is one that is concerned with change. 
While Schmitt ties territory to law, he recognizes that a diversity of spatial 
orders can orient that space. The essential link between territory and law is 
not to be confused with an argument that the state is the natural unit for 
global organization. Schmitt clearly recognizes that “new spatial pheno-
menon” can change the spatial order, and he notes that human extension into 
airspace means that “firm land and the free sea are being altered drastically, 
both in and of themselves and in relation to each other.”84 He observes that 
this technology is not just changing the “efficacy and velocity of the means of 
human power, transport, and information” but the “content of this effectivity.”85 
Technology, in his account, can have a transformative effect on the 
organization of law, and not as an external factor. Technology becomes an 
endogenous factor that shapes the content of the spatial order itself.
Observing this phenomenon, however, proves more elusive as Cyberspace is 
complex and expansive. Its networked nature means that it is a system with 
no exact size or shape. Additionally, it pervades social interaction at a scale 
that makes generalizations about transactions in Cyberspace severely limited. 
A natural place to observe border re-coding is at the geographic borders: 
spatial, legal, and political. Those borders can reveal how Cyberspace 
pushes up against the international as its territorial geography thins and runs 
out, and it is these places of abutment and intersection that exhibit the fault 
lines from which global space is emerging. 
The geographic categories used in Part I correlate to the components that 
82  Id. at 47.
83  Id. at 70
84  Id. at 48. 
85  Id. 
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Sassen argues are “assembled” into governance structures. She argues that 
world organizing logic can be understood through the assemblage of territory, 
authority, and rights, and that across history global systems are constructed 
and reconstructed as assemblages of these three components.86 These 
components serve as points of analysis from which to observe the particular 
conditions within a world-scale system of governance.87 While Schmitt and 
Sassen would likely not see eye-to-eye in substance, their arguments both 
embrace an understanding that international space is capable of being 
reconceptualized. 
International space is constructed around a myth of Copernican-esque 
systems: territories with centralized governments that hold authority are the 
building blocks of international space. States are actors and subjects within 
this space, and they are given rights based on an organizing logic that aligns 
high degrees of legitimacy with the occupation of territorial space. Pre-1945 
states were the rights bearers in international law.  Post Nuremberg and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, individuals became limited rights 
bearers in the international order.88 This reallocation of rights is reflected in 
the noble mission of the UN, but events such as the Rwandan genocide serve 
as grim reminders of the concentration of state power over territory despite 
the 1945 reallocation of rights. Scholarship in international legitimacy portrays 
these allocations in terms of rightful membership.89 This scholarship has 
traced a growing trend in international legitimacy of placing increasing 
emphasis on rightful action by the state. This shifts the gaze of international 
governance from the border to the interior of the state by allocating 
international rights to citizens. Despite this re-allocation the state remains the 
primary arbiter of human rights within a given territory as a result of low 
degrees of enforcement despite strong international rhetoric. 
If Cyberspace is indeed opening up global geography, then it should be 
observable in international space through the reallocation of territory, 
authority, and rights in the international assemblage. There should be 
observable points where the geography of the international runs out and 
borders Cyberspace.  When the geography of Cyberspace is layered onto the 
geography of international space it should reveal a networked space which 
“[runs] in many dimensions.”90 As Habermas observes, “‘[n]etwork’ has 
86  Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights (2006) 18.
87  Id. at 32.
88  See Donnelly, “Human Rights” (1998) 14.
89  Coicaud, “Deconstructing International Legitimacy” (2009) 37; Donnelly, “Human 
Rights” (1998) 2; Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (2005) 2; and Menon, “Pious 
Words, Puny Deeds” (2009) 237.
90  Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (2001) 66.
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emerged as a key term.”91 Space ordered through the network constitutes a 
“new spatial phenomenon,” which should be observable in the key institutions 
of the international order. To continue the cartographic metaphor adopted in 
the beginning of this chapter, by layering cybergeography onto international 
geography, we should be able to observe the distortions in the projection of 
the world.
New assemblages often incorporate aspects of historical predecessors 
embedding these into the construction of new assemblages.92  Cyberspace is 
a paradigm shift, but despite this, much of the international system remains 
intact and will continue to remain intact. Cyberspace, as an alternative 
geography, is still “filtered through local languages and meaning systems.”93 
This means that the international will remain a powerful force despite the 
spatial shift.  International space, as a geography, can also be understood to 
be “filtered” through the languages and meaning systems of Cyberspace.  
Part II of this research will take the geography described in Part I and use it 
as a conceptual map that can be juxtaposed to the geography offered by the 
international system.  These geographies will be layered together to explain 
observable points where Cyberspace changes the geography of international 
space. Using Sassen’s vocabulary of territory, authority, and rights, the 
thematic case studies presented in the following chapters will analyze how 
geographies in real space are warping as they come into contact with Cyber-
space. Chapter 6, will approach territory from the perspective of transnational 
cyber conflict, and will examine the idea of “territorial integrity” in terms of the 
cyber use of force. Chapter 7 will investigate how Cyberspace redistributes 
authority through an examination of IOs, IGCs, and corporations that make 
architecture decisions in Cyberspace. This chapter will show that the concept 
of global multistakeholder governance shifts a great deal of authority outside 
the borders of the international. Finally, Chapter 8 will explore how 
Cyberspace transforms the individual’s rights in relation to the state. This 
chapter will use cryptography and surveillance to illustrate how rights have 
been reallocated in the context of Cyberspace. These three case studies 
taken together will show the contours of re-coded borders as they unfold in 
Cyberspace. 
91  Id. 
92  Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights (2005) 3–6. See also Ferguson & Mansbach, 
Globalization (2012) 69 and Burbank & Cooper, Empires (2010) 8.
93  Ferguson & Mansbach, Globalization (2012) 205.
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Part II
Encounters with the Digital
“I think I never before quite realized the place of the fence in civilization.”
W.E.B. Du Bois
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6
Conflicting Territories
In May of 2013, Cody Wilson printed a working gun with a 3D printer and fired 
it.1  Shortly thereafter he made the computer file, that is a set of instructions 
for a 3D printer to print what he called the Liberator, available online for 
download. It was downloaded more than 100,000 times before Wilson 
removed the file.2 Little did Wilson know that he was running afoul of the 
United States’ International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). These 
regulations prohibit the export of “defense items” – in other words, weapons – 
found on the United States Munitions List (USML) without authorization from 
the government.3 ITAR also, significantly, prohibits the export of “technical 
data” on these items, which is data that would assist the manufacturing of the 
prohibited item.4 Wilson’s file was in a standard language that would allow 
anyone with an Internet connection to download it and use a 3D printer to 
manufacture a gun.  The file, since it was on the Internet, was downloadable 
anywhere in the world, and Wilson removed the file from his website when 
confronted by the U.S. Government.5
Three years later Wilson’s file is still online and freely available through 
sources like the Pirate Bay.6 Wilson started a company called Defense 
Distributed, which now manufactures a product called the Ghost Gunner.7 
This desktop CNC mill will take a block of aluminum and mill a lower 
1  Silverman, “A Gun, a Printer, an Ideology” (2013).
2  Cadwalladr, “Meet Cody Wilson, Creator of the 3D-Gun, Anarchist, Libertarian” 
(2014).
3  22 C.F.R. 120 (2019).
4  22. C.F.R. 120.6 (2019).
5  Cadwalladr, “Meet Cody Wilson, Creator of the 3D-Gun, Anarchist, Libertarian” 
(2014). See also Feuer, “Cody Wilson, Who Posted Gun Instructions Online, Sues 
State Department” (2015).
6  Greenberg, “I Made an Untraceable AR-15 ‘Ghost Gun’ in My Office—And It Was 
Easy” (2015).
7  Id.
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receiver for an AR-15.8 Wilson’s product cannot be exported, and the 
computer file is sold only to United States citizens to keep this product from 
running afoul of ITAR.  Yet this product still effectively digitizes a gun, which 
lowers barriers to access. The gun that it creates is of high quality, and is a 
gun that is outside of the regulatory loop; it is an untraceable “ghost gun.”9 
And while Wilson is keeping tight control over the “technical data” in the .cad 
files that allow the machine to manufacture the part, he has open sourced the 
machine itself so that the plans for the hardware and the software that runs it 
are freely downloadable.10  Anyone with these files can develop new design 
files for the Ghost Gunner, and enable it to make a variety of guns and other 
items.  Defense has been distributed, digitally.
The Ghost Gunner is interesting because it shows the capacity of the state to 
lose control over violence in two ways. First, it lowers the barriers to the 
production of the means of violence, which weakens government control over 
violence.  It is legal under U.S. federal law for an individual to manufacture a 
lower receiver, but it was a time-consuming process and required a high level 
of skill.11 The Ghost Gunner makes gunsmithing a plug-and-play venture. 
Second, and important to the discussion below, it shows that the state no 
longer has control over the spread of violence at its borders. ITAR is 
specifically meant to help maintain international peace and security by 
restricting the export of munitions to countries or persons that might use them 
for ill.  ITAR is directly related to the international project of bracketing war, by 
cutting off the supply of armaments, and ITAR correlates to regimes such as 
the Wassenaar Arrangement12 and the Arms Trade Treaty.13  These initiatives 
are mechanisms used to stop the flow of armaments across their borders, 
which was easy when armaments needed to be carried on trucks. Ghost guns 
are digitized, just as lethal, and save on the shipping cost.  
This chapter investigates how Cyberspace changes the nature of territory by 
examining how Cyberspace changes international conflict. Schmitt’s claim 
“that law and peace originally rested on enclosures in the spatial sense” is 
particularly salient here as it highlights the role of borders in conflict 
prevention.14 In Schmitt’s territory-centric conception of international law, war 
is “bracketed” to locations such that it does not “disturb” the spatial order.15 
8  Guns are made up of many parts.  The lower receiver is the component that is 
regulated under the US law. Id.
9  Id.
10  Defense Distributed, “Downloads” (2016).
11  Andy Greenberg, “I Made an Untraceable AR-15 ‘Ghost Gun’ in My Office” (2015).
12  Wassenaar Arrangement, “About Us” (2016). 
13  Arms Trade Treaty (2014).
14  Schmitt, Nomos of the Earth (2003).
15  Id. at 186.
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This chapter will probe this bracketing of war, and illustrate the diminished 
importance of the border in constructing the space of conflict. 
The argument here is not meant to be a “dethroning of Clausewitz,” but it 
does argue that Cyberspace dramatically changes the context of international 
conflict through the subversion of territorial borders.16  In short, it argues that 
armed conflict as conceived in the international system is tied to territorial 
geographies, and that international governance mechanisms that are meant 
to minimize international armed conflict are structured around this link. The 
chapter then shows how the concept of cyberwar dislodges conflict from 
these territorial linkages, which makes the application of norms meant to 
control international violence ineffective at bracketing it. Section one of this 
Chapter will use the Stuxnet attack on Iran’s centrifuges to analyze how 
international law has traditionally dealt with war as well as some of the 
observable gaps in that regime. This section will show how Cyberspace 
dislodges territory from the governance of international armed conflict.  The 
second section will analyze the role of the international concepts of 
disarmament and deterrence in limiting cyber conflicts, and it will show that 
these mechanisms are ill equipped for placing substantive limitations on 
cyberweapons.  Finally, it will use the North Korean Sony hack to show how 
international politics becomes de-territorialized and distributed in Cyberspace, 
which means that international conflicts processed through Cyberspace 
become de-territorialized as well.  
Territorial Integrity
At the heart of the post-1945 settlement is the UN charter’s Article 2(4), which 
prohibits “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state.”17  This article sought for the first time to create a 
legal prohibition against interstate armed conflict.18  Article 2(4) and the UN 
Charter in general were transformative for international law as it enshrined 
the state as “the arena within which self-determination is worked out and from 
which, therefore, foreign armies have to be excluded.”19  For the first time the 
resort to war, characterized in the Charter as the “use of force,” was legally 
prohibited outside of a few exceptions.20 Article 2(4) compartmentalizes 
violence within the borders of a state and gives the state sovereignty over 
16  Betz, “Clausewitz and Connectivity” (2013). See also Betz & Stevens, Cyberspace 
and the State (2011) 12.
17  UN Charter (1945) 2(4).
18  See generally, Pompe, Aggressive War – An International Crime (1953) 12, 
160–64.
19  Walzer, “The Moral Standing of States” (1980) 210.
20  For those exceptions see UN Charter (1945) Art. 42 & 51.
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violence within its borders. This compartmentalization, or “bracketing” as 
Schmitt would call it, is not a new process. The bracketing of war is an act of 
delineating order from chaos, and Schmitt’s project is to show how the 
international spatial order emerged from the externalization of war. For 
instance, he notes that during the age of European empires violence was 
pushed to the peripheries of empires by conceptualizing newly found 
territories as existing outside of the Western-centric international legal 
system.21 Article 2(4) represents a new bracketing of war by conceptualizing 
every state as an inviolate territory of order. States in this new spatialization 
were connected to law both internally and, importantly, externally in a legal 
dynamic between de facto control and external recognition.22  
Art. 2(4) did not change extant borders in a way that was perceptible on a 
map. Nonetheless, Art. 2(4) did change the content of those borders, and in a 
very dramatic way. By giving all states an obligation to contain violence within 
their borders, it also gave all states the right to be free of chaos from outside 
their borders. Article 2(4) underpins the entire international legal regime, 
which seeks to contain international armed conflict. The Art. 2(4) prohibition 
on force is central to jus ad bellum, and its goals are further advanced 
through the jus in bello and international disarmament efforts.  Cyberspace by 
recoding borders changes international law’s ability to bracket digitized war 
affecting the nature of international peace and security.
The best place to start to unravel this problem is Stuxnet. Stuxnet presents a 
clear case for the application and analysis of the law of the use of force in the 
cyber arena. In 2010, researchers uncovered a computer virus that was 
propagating itself on computers in Iran.23 The virus, now known as Stuxnet, 
was a carefully developed computer program that made its way into 
computers in the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran. Once there, the malware 
attacked industrial control systems and executed a program that sped up 
uranium enrichment centrifuges to damage and destroy them before the end 
of their expected lifetime. The program itself “displayed a level of technical 
sophistication and integration never before seen in malware,”24 and it has 
been referred to as the ”world’s first digital weapon.”25 The sophistication of 
Stuxnet was such that it incorporated four zero-day exploits, and was able to 
jump an air gap that separated Natanz from the Internet.26 The program was 
reportedly developed and released by the United States and Israel as a way 
21  Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth (2003) 101–125.
22  See generally Coicaud, “Deconstructing International Legitimacy” (2009) 29–86.
23  See generally, Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day (2014) Chap. 1.
24  Oliver, “Stuxnet” (2013) 129.
25  Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day (2014) 3.
26  Oliver, “Stuxnet” (2013) 143.
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to slow the Iranian nuclear program.27 For the purposes of the discussion 
below, it is assumed that this is a state on state act, placing it firmly within the 
realm of the international system, making international law the controlling 
governance mechanism. This raises the “principle intellectual challenge in the 
law of information conflict ... deciding which areas can be covered by a mere 
extension of conventional legal principles to cyberspace by analogy, and 
which require whole new methodologies.”28
The first question to be asked is whether there has been a violation of Article 
2(4). If the United States or Israel had flown a plane across the border and 
bombed the plant, as Israel did to a Syrian facility in 2007, then there would 
clearly be a violation of Article 2(4).29 In this case there was no physical 
violence in a ballistic sense, however, violence was achieved in a kinetic 
sense in that the centrifuges themselves were physically manipulated in order 
to destroy them. The centrifuges were attacked, but it is unclear whether this 
amounts to a use of force under Article 2(4).30 The Tallinn Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, Rule 11, states that “[a] cyber 
operation constitutes a use of force when its scale and effects are 
comparable to non-cyber operations rising to the level of a use of force.”31 
The Tallinn Manual is an attempt by a NATO group of experts to identify “the 
law currently governing cyber conflict,”32 but it notes that “the lack of agreed-
upon definitions, criteria, and thresholds for application creates uncertainty 
when applying the jus ad bellum.”33 When compared to a statement by a U.S. 
defense official on the United States Cyber Strategy, who stated “If you shut 
down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your 
smokestacks,” it seems as if at least one of the parties has characterized 
attacks such as Stuxnet as a use of force.34 The Tallinn Manual experts 
themselves agreed unanimously that Stuxnet was a use of force that violated 
international law, but they “split ... on whether it constituted an armed 
attack.”35 This split illustrates the disjuncture that occurs when international 
law is de-territorialized. The separation of “use of force” from “armed attack,” 
27  Broad, Markoff, & Sanger, “Stuxnet Worm Used Against Iran Was Tested in Israel” 
(2011).
28  Wingfield, “Legal Aspects of Offensive Information Operations in Space” (1998) 1.
29  Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day (2014) 192, 215–216.
30  See Kallberg & Burk, “Cyberdefense as Environmental Protection” (2013) 265–75.
31  Schmitt, ed., Tallinn Manual (2013) 45.
32  Id. at 5.
33  Id. at 42. See also Libicki, “Two Maybe Three Cheers for Ambiguity” (2013) 30 and 
Dipert, “The Essential Features of an Ontology for Cyberwarfare” (2013) 35–48.
34  Gorman & Barnes, “Cyber Combat” (2011). See also Sanger & Bumiller, “Pentagon 
to Consider Cyberattacks Acts of War” (2011) and Friedman & Preble, “A Military 
Response to Cyberattacks Is Preposterous” (2011). 
35  Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day (2014) 402.
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categories that were previously substantially concurrent due to the nature of 
violence, is indicative of the encounter between international and cyber 
geographies.
Interestingly, Iran never made any complaint to the relevant UN bodies, and 
instead opted to maintain a high degree of silence on the matter.  Iran’s 
silence is related to its own interests in keeping its nuclear program secret, 
but it also points to one of the key lessons from Natanz: everyone knows that 
the United States and Israel were responsible for Stuxnet, but no one can 
prove it definitively. This is dissimilar from, for instance, U.S. covert 
involvement in Nicaragua, which the ICJ deemed a use of force.36 In that 
case, there were physical border crossings by the U.S. and its warfighting 
capacity that were observed by witnesses to physical attacks.37  In the case of 
Stuxnet, no one saw the attack, yet there is ample evidence pointing the 
finger at the United States and Israel, e.g. the complexity of programming, the 
target of the attack, the use of high value zero-day vulnerabilities, and 
anonymous sources informing journalists. There is, however, no definitive 
evidence of that fact, and the United States has officially made no statement 
confirming its involvement resting on the plausible deniability that Cyberspace 
provides.38  
Digital computing enables the ability to encrypt communications and to hide 
the source of cyberattacks. Even if a cyberattack were to be traced to an IP 
address within a state, that state can claim that it is the victim of a hacker 
using it as a digital hiding spot or that one of its own citizens is the malefactor 
for which there is limited responsibility. US DoD acknowledges this potential 
by noting that “low barriers of entry ... means that an individual or small 
groups of determined cyber actors can potentially cause significant 
damage.”39 In the case of Stuxnet, the virus was feeding information back to 
servers located around the world.40 Attribution is a core concept in 
international law, and for there to be an internationally wrongful act the act 
must be attributable to a state.41 The Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
state that “conduct directed or controlled” by a state is attributable to it, but 
this requires the establishment of a definitive link that proves such. In 
Cyberspace such links are hidden by veils of government secrecy, including 
36  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America) (1986) 14. 
37  Id. at para. 22.
38  McDermott, “Decision Making Under Uncertainty” (2010) 234 and Edward 
Snowden, “Testimony before the Parliament of the European Union” (2014) 4.
39  US DoD, “Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace” (2011) 3.
40  Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day (2014) 27.
41  Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) 
Art. 2.
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secrecy classification systems and digital veils  of encryption making it difficult 
to attribute an act to the territory of a state and to the state itself.42 Attribution 
is a necessary precondition in international law, but attribution “is an enduring 
problem” in Cyberspace.43 The attack, though initiated from some specific 
geographic point, is experienced as coming from Cyberspace. Cyberspace as 
an origin for an attack is supported by the military adoption of Cyberspace as 
a fifth domain.44
This fifth domain remains outside of international space, and it obscures the 
geographic links to the use of force.45 This creates an obvious problem for 
stability built around the centrality of a sovereign’s territorial integrity in the 
international system, since international borders no longer separate order 
from chaos when anonymized weapons can pierce borders and affect 
physical infrastructure. The plausible deniability enabled by Cyberspace 
means that states are, in part, relying on the prevalence of non-state actors 
dispersed around the globe to create noise that covers their tracks.  National 
defense is distributed among a network of indistinguishable actors.
Before moving on from Stuxnet, it is worth noting how this incident reflects on 
the jus ad bellum’s counterpart – jus in bello.  Jus in bello, or international 
humanitarian law (IHL), is not without problems of application, but it does 
seem that it is more adaptable to cyber conflicts.46 This is primarily because 
IHL is not centered on questions of territory. Instead, IHL focuses on 
humanitarian concerns such as the limitation of pain and suffering for civilians 
and combatants. It is a lex specialis that only applies within the space and 
time of an international armed conflict.47 As such, IHL principles are a bit more 
adaptable to Cyberspace, but they are not without gaps.
For instance, in the case of Stuxnet, it is unclear whether there was an 
ongoing state of armed conflict that would trigger IHL. Though the attacks 
occurred over the course of several months, Iran was unaware, and when it 
became aware it did not respond with force nor through any official channels. 
Despite the lack of clarity as to whether the rules had been triggered, there is 
evidence that the programmers of Stuxnet worked hard to make sure that it 
42  See generally Clark & Landau, “Untangling Attribution” (2010).
43  Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day (2014) 64. See generally Allan, “Attribution Issues in 
Cyberspace” (2013) 55–201.
44  US DoD, “Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace” (2011) 5.
45  Id. at 8 and Department of the Army, “FM 3-38: Cyber Electromagnetic Activities” 
(2014) 1–4.
46  Dunlap, “Perspectives for Cyberstrategists on Cyberlaw for Cyberwar” (2013) 212.  
See also Department of the Army, “FM 3-38: Cyber Electromagnetic Activities” (2014).
47  Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict 
(2004) 1–16.
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fell within the legal limits of a weapon.  States when developing new weapons 
technologies are required to give the weapon a legal review to ensure that it 
is a weapon that can be used lawfully.48  This review must assess whether the 
weapon is capable of being targeted at a specific target such that its effects, 
in terms of collateral damage to civilians, are limited in proportion with the 
military advantage gained49 and whether the weapon causes unnecessary 
suffering.50 The first thing to note is that this review cannot be done in terms 
of “cyber-weapons” as a class any more than it can be done of “ballistic 
weapons” as a class.  Instead, the analysis is capability by capability, which is 
confirmed by a US Air Force Instruction on the legal review of cyber 
capabilities.51  What Stuxnet’s code revealed is that the programmers went to 
great lengths to infect only specific computers. Stuxnet was equipped with a 
kill switch that deleted it if the computer did not match very specific 
conditions.52 The “missile” portion of the program replicated itself across 
computers, but was designed to only release its payload, which targeted 
industrial control boxes, in the Natanz facility.53 Though the weapon was 
released through attacks on networks of private Iranian companies, the 
damage caused minimal threat to human life or civilian property.54 The 
weapon itself was designed to work with precision, but it must be 
remembered that generally “[c]ollateral damage in Cyberspace has a longer 
reach than in the physical realm.”55 There are other complications with the 
application of IHL, many of these are simply that: complications. They change 
the context of humanitarian principles and make the issues more complicated, 
but IHL would have means of filling the gaps since the regulatory focus is on 
human lives. For instance, the issue of who constitutes a combatant becomes 
more complicated but is a problem that is solvable within the imagination of 
the IHL framework.  
Other rifts are deeper.  A critical concern for IHL is the military use of civilian 
objects. All Cyberspace attacks will depend on the use of civilian 
infrastructure, but Stuxnet illustrates that state cyberattacks will often do more 
48  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (1977) Art. 36. 
See also Blount, “The Preoperational Legal Review of Cyber Capabilities: Ensuring the 
Legality of Cyber Weapons” (2012) 11–20.
49  Gompert & Saunders, Paradox of Power (2012) 126
50  See generally Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International 
Armed Conflict (2004) 80–82.
51  United States Air Force, Legal Reviews of Weapons and Cyber Capabilities, A.F. 
Instruction 51–402 (2011).
52  Kim Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day (2014) 59.
53  Id. at 52.
54  Id. at 388.
55  Id. at 382. 352. On targeting in cyberspace see Department of the Army, “FM 3-38: 
Cyber Electromagnetic Activities” (2014) 3–12.
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than just transit commercial networks.  In order for Stuxnet to work, it had to 
take advantage of zero-days. These are vulnerabilities in software that are 
unknown to the programmer and as a result are not patched.56 When an 
individual discovers a zero-day, he or she has a few choices of what to do 
with that information. Some companies have a bounty system in place to buy 
zero-days; there is a healthy black market for zero-days; and governments 
will also buy them.57 Stuxnet had an unprecedented number of zero-days in 
its programming.58 This means that a government left open vulnerabilities in 
commercial software with the potential to put a multitude of devices at risk. 
Stuxnet also used fake security certificates that marked it as genuine, so the 
software would be accepted by the systems on which it installed itself.59 
These digital certificates are issued by companies that rely on strong 
encryption in order to verify that a piece of software is from a trusted source. 
Stuxnet exploited these mechanisms damaging the trust system used to 
verify software across the Internet.60  This means that these weapons rely on 
the maintenance and exploitation of vulnerabilities in the commercial 
infrastructure that underpins Cyberspace at a global level.61 While Stuxnet 
limited the effects of its attack, another state or entity using similar 
vulnerabilities might not limit such an attack, a point sharpened when it is 
recognized that computers similar to those found in Natanz are used to run a 
great deal of critical infrastructure such as power grids and dams.62  
Stuxnet is a powerful portent for the international system,63 and, though some 
authors wisely note the limitations of cyberwar,64 Stuxnet is a well-
documented example of a computer attack that was used to manipulate and 
destroy a physical object from afar.  What is striking about Stuxnet is the 
difficulty of placing it squarely within the international legal system. This is 
because weapons like Stuxnet defy the spatial geography of states. These 
weapons instead allow states to project force through the alternate geography 
of Cyberspace, allowing them to skirt around borders as well as the legal 
regime that supports those borders.
Stuxnet displays vulnerabilities in the Cyberspace infrastructure that 
56  Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day (2014) 6.
57  Id.  at 13.
58  Oliver, “Stuxnet” (2013) 129.
59  Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day (2014) 13.
60  Id. and DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (2014) 95.
61  Gompert & Saunders, Paradox of Power (2012) 142; Taylor & Carter, “Cyberspace 
Superiority Considerations” (2013) 14.
62  Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day (2014) 61–62
63  Oliver, “Stuxnet” (2013) 128. See also Zetter, “Everything We Know About Ukraine’s 
Power Plant Hack” (2016).
64  Lee & Rid, “OMG Cyber!” (2014) 4–12.
104Conflicting Territories
individuals rely on globally.  With other weapons of this sort (i.e. those that 
are legal but have global implications such as strategic nuclear weapons) 
states have turned to methods of disarmament and deterrence as a way to 
manage international peace and security. These mechanisms, which are 
meant to lower the risk of an Article 2(4) violation, are the subject of the next 
section.
Ghost Guns
The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima near the end of WWII ushered in a 
new age of warfare driven by technological advances that far outpaced 
previous innovation blooms. Nuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic 
missile delivery systems, long-range stealth bombers, and military satellite 
systems all widened the ability of states to project force into the territory of 
other states.  States found themselves in a classic security paradox in which 
the only way to be more secure is to have more and better weapons than 
one’s adversary leading both parties to actively incentivize their own 
insecurity.65  To decrease the risk caused by such paradoxes, states turned to 
disarmament and deterrence mechanisms in order to implement systems of 
“reciprocal restraint.”66 As discussed above, ITAR is a domestic implemen-
tation of such measures.
Disarmament mechanisms usually come in the form of international agree-
ments that ban the development and use of certain weapons, or limit the 
number of a particular type of weapon that a state may have.67  Disarmament 
mechanisms are underpinned by verification. Verification is the act of verifying 
whether or not a party is complying with an agreement. The importance of 
verification to disarmament can be seen in Reagan’s signature quip: “trust, 
but verify.”68  Without verification, disarmament agreements tend to be weak 
and difficult to negotiate.  States have traditionally relied on national technical 
means (NTM) in these agreements as a form of verification, which consist of 
satellite observation in addition to other types of remote sensing.69 NTM was 
an excellent way to verify nuclear disarmament agreements, and the US and 
USSR were able to rely on satellite observation as a mechanism for 
verification since nuclear armaments were by their nature quite large. As a 
65  Gompert & Saunders, Paradox of Power (2012) 1–12.
66  Id. at 115.
67  Disarmament mechanisms are not always necessarily “legal” documents.  
Transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) that facilitate information 
sharing among states, such as the Hague Code of Conduct on Ballistic Missile 
Activities, also serve the project of disarmament. See generally Hague Code of 
Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (2002).
68  Harrison, Space and Verification, Volume I (2007).
69  Morgan, “Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space” (2010) 9–11.
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result, NTM worked well in forging compromises between the two states as 
they sought to securely reduce their nuclear stockpiles. It should be noted 
that “[b]ecause disarmament treaties go to the heart of national and 
international security, states are wary of frivolously embarking on new ones 
that might constrain their options.”70
Deterrence is a companion to disarmament.  Whereas disarmament seeks to 
reduce the munitions through reciprocal restraint, deterrence is a method of 
reducing the risk that a state might use those weapons. 71 It is a policy 
designed to “discourag[e] an adversary from doing something it might 
otherwise choose to do by manipulating its calculation of cost and benefit.”72 
For example, China’s current policy of no first use of nuclear weapons is 
coupled with a stockpile of weapons that would not assure success in a 
nuclear conflict, but would be able to survive first strike and inflict unaccep-
table losses on an adversary thereby deterring an attack.73 Deterrence can 
also be attained through international agreements. The Anti-ballistic Missile 
Treaty (ABM Treaty) was an example of such an agreement.74 The US and 
the USSR, unable to compromise on the reduction of strategic offensive 
nuclear weapons agreed on a disarmament treaty that reduced the 
deployment of defensive systems. The ABM Treaty ensured mutually assured 
destruction (MAD), a concept that restrains states from engaging in an attack 
because any such attack will result in their own demise.  Thus, the ABM 
Treaty is an agreement that imposes disarmament in order to achieve mutual 
deterrence.
Traditionally, disarmament and deterrence have been the primary 
mechanisms for stemming armed conflict before it happens by placing limits 
on a state’s recourse to force. Unsurprisingly, numerous commentators have 
turned to these concepts as a way to reduce the threat posed by cyber-
attacks and cyber-weapons. Gompert and Saunders argue that there are 
lessons from nuclear deterrence that could be deployed to foster “mutual 
restraint” in Cyberspace.75 Yannakogeorgos and Lowther argue that US policy 
“suffers from a misperception that cyberspace is a virtual environment and as 
such, eliminates discussion of territory and sovereignty.”76 They argue that 
international norms can be developed to solve the attribution problem by 
holding states culpable for cyberattacks “originating in or transiting 
70  Findlay, “Why Treaties Work, Don’t Work and What to Do About It?” (2006).
71  Morgan, “Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space” (2010) 23.
72  Id. at 24.
73  Gompert & Saunders, Paradox of Power (2012) 39–67.
74  Treaty Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on The Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) (1972).
75  Gompert & Saunders, Paradox of Power (2012) 115–150.
76  Yannakogeorgos & Lowther, “The Prospects for Cyber Deterrence” (2013) 50
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information systems within their borders,” but they give no indication of why 
states would agree to such an extraordinary norm.77  
The problem with these approaches is that they ignore the inherently 
ambiguous nature of Cyberspace in which weapons are “in essence an 
algorithm.”78  As an anonymous hacker put it: “The new global arms race is no 
longer about who controls the most atomic bombs.  It is about who controls/
owns the most hackers, botnets, and exploits.”79 Zetter claims that just such a 
“digital arms race” was launched by Stuxnet.80  Modern disarmament and 
deterrence were developed by states to deal with weapons of great 
magnitude, which have traditionally been rather large. NTM, thus, was an 
acceptable form of verification, because it gave states a tool through which 
they could peer into the borders of another state and literally see what that 
state was doing.81
NTM was an effective tool when addressing physical weapons, because it 
allowed states to maintain their borders, but it is useless in Cyberspace arms 
control.82 Cyberspace diminishes “the horrors and costs of war ... tempting” 
countries to resort to the anonymity of a Cyberattack.83 The weapons, if 
designed properly, are meant to be invisible and non-detectable so that “the 
origins of the attack is almost always unclear.”84 In the case of Stuxnet, 
discussed above, the programmers went to great lengths to make the 
program hide itself from the users of the targeted systems.  This undermines 
verification, which is a reason for treaty failure.”85 The immaterial nature of 
cyberweapons means that states can avoid having an attack attributed to 
them, which is a significant reason that states would resort to cyberweapons. 
The attribution problem is further complicated by the trend of “privatised 
intelligence and information warfare.”86 As former Director of the NSA, 
Michael Hayden notes, “applying well-known concepts of physical space like 
deterrence, where attribution is assumed, to cyberspace where attribution is 
frequently the problem, is recipe for failure.”87
77  Id. at 51.  
78  Dipert, “The Essential Features of an Ontology for Cyberwarfare” (2013) 36.  See 
also Rowe et al., “Challenges in Monitoring Cyberarms Compliance” (2013) 81.
79  Prisoner #6, “The 21st Century Hacker Manifesto” (2014–2015) 50. See also 
Department of the Army, “FM 3-38: Cyber Electromagnetic Activities” (2014) 3–11
80  Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day (2014) 370.
81  Sanger & Bumiller, “Pentagon to Consider Cyberattacks Acts of War” (2011).
82  Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day (2014) 400.
83  Id. at 375.
84  Sanger & Bumiller, “Pentagon to Consider Cyberattacks Acts of War” (2011).
85  Findlay, “Why Treaties Work, Don’t Work and What to Do About It?” (2006) 4.
86  Singer, Corporate Warriors, 99 (2011) 101. See also Scahill, Blackwater (2007) 415. 
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Cyber-weapons are by nature covert. They are designed to take advantage of 
unknown vulnerabilities in computer software and are meant to be deniable 
by the country that uses them. Stuxnet used security certificates from 
Taiwanese companies, and the virus reported the data it collected to servers 
located in a variety of global locations.88 In fact, it may not have been 
discovered except for the fact that it caused a malfunction in some non-
targeted computers in Iran.89 As a result, the U.S. and Israel have never 
acknowledged their involvement in the attack. For all useful purposes, Iran 
was struck by a ghost gun – an untraceable weapon that lacks materiality.
The problem with these digital ghost guns is that they defy location, and as a 
result they defy control. For example, cyber-weapons make use of botnets, 
which are a geographically distributed network of infected computers known 
as bots that are under the control of a single “bot master.”90 Botnets are 
employed in a variety of nefarious undertakings in Cyberspace as they give 
the bot master distributed computing power and relative anonymity. Botnets 
cannot be understood to exist within the bounds of a single state, despite the 
fact that they act as a unitary whole. International governance, a system 
structured around the national border, is ill equipped to develop disarmament 
and deterrence mechanisms to control weapons and activities that ignore 
these borders. Because Cyberspace is everywhere, cyber-weapons 
“transform […] a limited physical battlefield to a global battlefield.”91 
Disarmament and deterrence, as mechanisms are meant to create less 
ambiguity in international security by creating information about armaments 
that states can act on. As Gompert and Saunders note, “the complexity of 
computer networks, their myriad uses, and the many ways of interfering with 
them could make reciprocal restraint in cyberspace markedly more difficult 
than in the nuclear and space domain.”92 Cyber-weapons simply do not fit 
into these mechanisms for a number of reasons.
First, these weapons are immaterial, making any sort of verification system 
difficult and any sort of deterrence ineffective. These weapons can fit on a 
thumb drive and can spread through the Internet with the same ease as a 
viral meme. This makes verification virtually impossible as the weapon itself is 
not tied to any sort of infrastructure and is freely portable. Deterrence, on the 
other hand, which often works on the availability of data about a state’s 
weapons systems, is also precluded.  Cyber-weapons rely on vulnerabilities 
in systems that have not been patched. While disclosing the number and 
the Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace” (2013) 6.
88  Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day (2014) 28.
89  Id. at 7–8.
90  See generally Maurushat, “Zombie Botnets” (2010) 370–83.
91  Department of the Army, “FM 3-38: Cyber Electromagnetic Activities” (2014) 1–5.
92  Gompert & Saunders, Paradox of Power (2012) 115.
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nature of nuclear munitions can have an effect on the strategic maneuvers of 
other states, the disclosure of a cyber-weapon would lead to a software patch 
that could render the weapon useless. States developing these weapons are 
incentivized to keep them covert due to the nature of the technology, and this 
means that international disarmament and deterrence are not capable of 
encompassing such technologies. 
Second, the plausible deniability that accompanies cyber-attacks is an 
important limitation on a state’s ability to comply with disarmament agree-
ments. The nature of the technology that underlies previous disarmament and 
deterrence mechanisms is such that the state could effectively maintain 
control over those technologies. While history is not without examples of 
individuals attempting to build nuclear reactors in their garages,93 the 
technology was of such complexity and scope that states were able to detect 
such operations and maintain control over the development and deployment 
of these technologies. Cyberspace is a technological space that is built 
around fostering innovation. As a result, this means that “lone hackers” are 
empowered to develop new technologies built on the logical layer making it 
“largely the realm of nonstate entities.”94 Innovation is not always a good 
thing; it has made the “network attack ... literally a cottage industry.”95 The 
same innovative open door that has pushed numerous startups, boosts “the 
power potential of non-state actors.”96 Indeed, one might argue that the only 
difference between a computer virus and a cyber-weapon is the intent of the 
user.  While commentators have argued that states should be responsible for 
curbing the activities of their own citizens, this gives little answer to the 
plausible deniability problem.97
Last and certainly not least, cyber-weapons are weapons that subvert territory 
in a way that other weapons do not. Other weapons must physically cross an 
international border and exert force or violence after having crossed that 
border. Cyber-weapons can enter from anywhere and attack physical 
infrastructure far outside the territory of the attacking state.  States lack legal 
mechanisms for restricting armaments that are ephemeral and locationless, 
and as a result disarmament and deterrence as mechanisms for slowing the 
spread of armaments are ineffectual because they are dependent on the 
assumption that states have control over their borders and the mechanisms of 
physical violence within those borders. 
93  For example Aaronson, “The DIY Engineer Who Built a Nuclear Reactor in His 
Basement” (2014).
94  Gompert & Saunders, Paradox of Power (2014) 131, 117.
95  Id. at 133.
96  Betz & Stevens, Cyberspace and the State (2011) 11.
97  See for example Gompert & Saunders, Paradox of Power (2014) 117 and Sofaer et 
al., “Cyber Security and International Agreements” (2010) 190.
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Cyber-weapons create uncertainty, and uncertainty stands in contrast to 
verification. Indeed, as seen above with Stuxnet, “the very point of a 
cyberattack, at least in part, is to increase uncertainty.”98 These weapons 
render the border ineffectual as a geographic indicator both in their control, as 
seen here, and their use, as seen with Stuxnet. This means that states are 
able to exceed their own geography through Cyberspace, giving them more 
options through which to pursue politics and conflict.  The final section of this 
chapter will address how cyber conflict functions to dislodge international 
politics from their terrestrial bonds. 
Conflict in Black
In May of 2014, the U.S Department of Justice (USDoJ) filed an indictment 
against what it alleged were five cybercriminals. This in and of itself was not a 
necessarily novel event, but the individuals charged were novel.  The 
indictment was against five members of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) who notably operated and resided in China.99 The USDoJ asserted that 
these individuals were guilty of economic espionage in Cyberspace. The 
indictment itself marked a fever pitch in the bickering between the U.S. and 
China over the limits of online espionage. In this diplomatic impasse, the U.S. 
argued that China was violating international law by spying on companies for 
economic advantage and stealing intellectual property.100  While the U.S. was 
pressing its concerns, though, Edward Snowden leaked a multitude of 
documents that revealed the United States’ own espionage efforts.101  When 
China cried foul, the U.S. drew a line between diplomatic espionage and 
economic espionage.102 The indictment from USDoJ was meant to reinforce 
the international norm that the U.S. was endorsing.
Contrary to the intentions of the U.S., the indictment served to reinforce the 
vast uncertainties about state action in the Cyberspace. The criminal 
sanctions, first and foremost, show the inability of the U.S. to stop such 
actions. While meant more as a diplomatic exclamation point, it must be 
noted that unless one of the indicted individuals sets foot into the U.S., it is 
powerless to enforce the law it is invoking. Indeed, the indictment, far from 
emphasizing a point, seems to reveal the anxiety of the U.S. over its inability 
98  McDermott, “Decision Making Under Uncertainty” (2010) 229.
99  U.S. v. Wang et al. – Indictment (W.D. Penn. 2014).
100  See also, Brenner, “Gray Matter” (2013) and U.S. v. Wang (2014) para. 5.
101  See Carroll, “Barack Obama and Xi Jinping Meet as Cyber-Scandals Swirl” (2013); 
White House, “PPD-20: U.S. Cyber Operations” (2013); and Zetter, Countdown to Zero 
Day (2014) 369.
102  Spying, for national security reasons, is generally considered legal under 
international law. Gompert & Saunders, Paradox of Power (2012) 140–141. But see 
Snowden, “Testimony before the Parliament of the European Union” (2014) 8.
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to ebb the flow of information to Chinese hackers.  It also revealed the 
morphing nature of diplomacy, espionage, and conflict.103  Were these military 
operations? Espionage? Or were they simply criminal acts?  
The murkiness caused by state action online results from the attribution 
issues noted above. The ability of states to effectively conceal their cyber 
operations gives them great leeway to act in that realm, which is coupled with 
a low cost of entry.104 This is important to contemplate because it changes the 
space in which international politics unfold by changing the territory of war.  In 
simplified terms, states may pursue their goals in international fora through 
diplomacy (here meant to mean anything that is not war including things like 
sanctions) or armed conflict. International law serves as a mechanism to keep 
states pursuing their interests within the confines of diplomatic action, which 
is why Art. 2(4) strikes the balance at the heart of international law by 
focusing on violence that crosses internationally agreed upon boundaries. 
Cyberspace short-circuits that balance by removing the obstacle of the border 
and the corresponding risk of identification. States now have a third option of 
engaging through the geography of Cyberspace to achieve their goals.  This 
third option is marked by the possibility of at once using force and refraining 
from armed conflict.  International politics, as a result, can now be mediated 
through the geography of Cyberspace.
This can be seen in the hack of Sony Pictures that was first revealed in 
November 2014.105 The sophisticated hack affected most of Sony Pictures 
internal network and the company’s internal information (including items such 
personnel records, e-mails, and unreleased movies) began to be leaked to 
the public.106 The attack was soon linked to the upcoming release of the 
movie The Interview, a comedic parody about two Americans assassinating 
Kim Jong-un, and the attack was assumed to have North Korean ties. When 
Sony was defiant about releasing The Interview, the hack was coupled with 
threats of terrorism that resulted in Sony pulling the release, though it was 
subsequently released online and in several theaters.107 Two days later, on 19 
December, the FBI announced that it was attributing the attack to North 
Korea, though there has been great speculation as to the validity of this 
attribution.108 President Obama, on 2 January 2015, imposed sanctions on 
103  Lucas, “Can There Be an Ethical Cyber War?” (2013) 201.
104  US DoD, “Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace,” (2011) 3.
105  Weisman, “A Timeline of the Crazy Events in the Sony Hacking Scandal” (2014).
106  Id.
107  Richardson, “Sony kills ‘The Interview’ after North Korea hack, terror threat” (2014).
108  FBI Press Office, “Update on the Sony Investigation” (2014). But see Lee, “The 
Feds Got the Sony Hack Right, But the Way They’re Framing It Is Dangerous” (2015); 
Schneier, “Attributing the Sony Attack” (2015); Goldsmith, “The Sony Hack” (2014); and 
Sexton, “Accurately Attributing the Sony Hack Is More Important than Retaliating” 
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North Korea, which is the first time sanctions have been used in direct 
response to a cyber-attack.109  Throughout this ordeal, the nature and scope of 
the attack made it a multidimensional threat that challenged the accepted 
nature of coercive action within the realm of the international.
The initial hack was credited to The Guardians of Peace (GOP) hacker 
group.110 This attack was initially seen as a cybercrime against a corporation 
meaning that the core security concern was the security of Sony’s network.111 
As a crime, the criminal is answerable to the state, but the focus is on the 
private network itself.  At first, the hack of Sony did look criminal in nature as 
the hackers attempted to extort individual employees to keep their personal 
information from becoming public.112 However, soon after this, security 
researchers began to find hints, such as Korean language packs, that linked 
the hack to North Korea.  In a somewhat controversial move, the U.S., and 
specifically the FBI, attributed the attack to North Korea thus moving the hack 
into the national security narrative.  It also moves the act out of the spectrum 
of a crime and into the spectrum of international relations, and as a result the 
U.S. issued sanctions against the North Korean regime.
Superficially, US action in this incident may seem like business as usual in the 
context of international governance, but a close reading reveals a number of 
the uncertainties that show how borders are being recoded with new content. 
As noted above the FBI’s attribution was hotly contested by security 
researchers, but a number of revelations show that even if North Korea was 
the master puppeteer, the cast of characters taking part in the hack was a 
globally distributed group of non-state actors.  For instance, the Lizard Squad 
hacker organization may have been involved in the hack as North Korean 
hired cyber contractors or, possibly, mercenaries.113 The attribution question 
leads into a maze where the source of international conflict can no longer be 
pinpointed to a single site in terms of territory. The capabilities or weapons 
used are distributed, digital ghost guns making response difficult when the 
geographic source of the attack is territorially different from the attack, in this 
case North Korea and Cyberspace, respectively.
A second ambiguity is the nature of the attack. The attack on its face is novel, 
making it an interesting touchpoint for understanding how Cyberspace 
(2015).
109  White House, Executive Order – Imposing Additional Sanctions with Respect to 
North Korea (2015).
110  Weisman, “A Timeline of the Crazy Events in the Sony Hacking Scandal” (2014).
111  Id.
112  Id.  
113  Diaconescu, “Inside Job” (2014).
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changes international space.  North Korea bought technology that allowed it 
to attack a private U.S. entertainment company in an attempt to halt the 
release of a film within the territory of the U.S., and the attack garnered a 
response at the executive level in the U.S. In terms of international 
governance, the attack on Sony raises difficult questions of classification.  If 
the source of the attack was indeed North Korea, it is safe to say that their 
military was involved, so one might think that this case would resemble the 
PLA case noted above.  Personal information of employees and corporate 
information and intellectual property were stolen and released online. This 
has all the trappings of the economic espionage charged in the PLA 
indictment. The U.S., however, chose a different response, which indicates 
that they intended to classify this cyber incident in a different category that 
goes beyond that of domestic criminal law, which is the usual mechanism 
states use against espionage within their territorial borders. The use of a 
presidential order for sanctions against North Korea indicates a heightened 
concern for U.S. national security.  Indeed, the president’s order states that
provocative, destabilizing, and repressive actions and policies 
of the Government of North Korea, including its destructive, 
coercive cyber-related actions during November and 
December 2014, actions in violation of UNSCRs 1718, 1874, 
2087, and 2094, and commission of serious human rights 
abuses, constitute a continuing threat to the national security, 
foreign policy, and economy of the United States114
There are two factors that heightened the U.S. response in this incident. The 
first is that the North Korean actions were targeted at denying freedom of 
speech, a fundamental human right in the view of the U.S., and the second is 
the additional threats of acts of physical terrorism against theaters that show 
the movie.115  
What might be an even more interesting question though, would be how the 
North Korean authorities envisioned their actions. The regime is notoriously 
opaque, so ever having a full understanding of the logic that went into these 
actions is unlikely.  North Korea’s actions do show how Cyberspace changes 
the content of international action. Without cyber, North Korea’s options would 
have been to choose diplomacy or conflict. If they choose diplomacy, they 
have a variety of peaceful options including negotiating with the U.S., placing 
sanctions on the U.S., or placing sanctions on Sony the company.  These 
options seek to coerce change in another country through indirect action that 
114  White House, Executive Order – Imposing Additional Sanctions with Respect to 
North Korea (2015).
115  Sneed, “Sony Hack Takes Darker Turn” (2014).
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stays outside of that country’s territorial borders.  In this case, North Korea 
could see that these options would be ineffectual due to its relative power in 
the international community. It could also see that taking action in the form of 
direct action, i.e. conflict, within the borders of the U.S. is also not an 
available option due to its relative military power.116 Cyberspace allowed North 
Korea to bypass this decision, by giving it the power to take a third path 
through the geography of Cyberspace. The similarities to Stuxnet as a 
coercive action should not be ignored. The Sony hack illustrates a second 
situation wherein a state was able to take direct actions that interfere with a 
state’s “political independence” without the telltale violations of its “territorial 
integrity.”117  
Similar to Stuxnet, the Sony hack raises questions about thresholds for self-
defense under Article 51 and the application of IHL.118 These regimes are 
meant to limit state action to the realm of diplomacy but are dependent on the 
inherent territoriality seen in past conflict. The third path of action allows 
states the option to exceed their territory and directly encounter the space of 
an adversary state without geographic movement. The Sony-North Korea 
hack is one of a growing number of examples that demonstrate how the 
spatial context in which the international unfolds is being transformed by the 
imposition of alternate geographies, and it highlights how the nature of 
Cyberspace challenges underlying assumptions that shape the international 
space.  
---
This chapter has shown how the governance system built around the physical 
territorial space of the state is being reshaped through the introduction of 
Cyberspace. This argument is built on illustrating how territorial borders no 
longer “bracket war” as envisioned in Art. 2(4). The international system, in 
other words, is ill equipped to create regulatory mechanisms that inhibit and 
control state action in Cyberspace, much less the myriad other actors that 
can wield such violence. 
This theme of shifting international space will be extended in the next two 
chapters that address legal and political space. A number of subthemes will 
become evident as well and are worth noting as the analysis moves forward. 
First, the role of U.S. action will be used as an explanatory mechanism 
throughout these chapters. The reason for this is twofold. First, the U.S. was 
where the Internet originated, and it harbors a bulk of the physical, 
116  For example Fish, “Could North Koreans Ever Really Invade America?” (2012).
117  UN Charter (1945) Art. 2(4). 
118  See generally Schmitt, “Cyber Operations in International Law” (2010) 151.
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application, and content layers of the Internet. As such, it is of particular value 
in examining norm creation, or lack thereof, in Cyberspace. Second, it is 
hoped that the comparison of various U.S. actions reveals a certain 
schizophrenia in U.S. policy that indicates an understanding of Cyberspace 
as something extraterritorial, but an inability to coherently develop an 
international policy due to its own territoriality.
A second theme is that of attribution. The ability to trace an action back to an 
actor will recur throughout these chapters. The technology that allows for the 
concealment of identity will be addressed specifically in Chapter 8’s 
exploration of encryption technologies. Attribution or lack thereof is critical in 
understanding how Cyberspace allows individuals and entities to transcend 
their own geographies and take part in other geographies.
Finally, a theme hinted at here that will become more evident in the next two 
chapters is the role and variety of non-state actors and their ability to contend 
directly with states in the geography of Cyberspace. This chapter highlighted 
a state’s ability to blend in with the noise of non-state actors. Moving forward 
this theme will be addressed in terms of the ability of non-state actors to 
engage globally outside the strictures of the international arena.
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Standardizing Authority
In 1975, the United States and the USSR launched a space mission to dock 
an Apollo module with a Soyuz module.119 The mission was a carefully 
orchestrated scientific mission that was intended to show how science for 
peaceful purposes could bridge ideological gaps and to further détente 
between the two nations.  The effectiveness of the mission in political terms is 
a story for another day. The object here is to draw an insight from a small 
sidebar of the narrative surrounding the mission. The two states both had 
their respective docking systems. Each relied on, technically speaking, a 
female side which received the male side of the docking apparatus, much like 
a headphone jack.  In the tense political atmosphere, neither side wanted to 
become the female side of the other’s docking system. As a result, the two 
countries developed an androgynous docking system that was interoperable 
with itself.120
The point here is not to highlight the misogyny inherent in these terms and 
Cold War politics, which is a continuation of an international relations 
discourse that often characterizes dominance as male.121  Instead, it is to point 
out that the standardized docking mechanism, which is purely a technical 
specification, holds a great deal of political content. The standardization 
creates technical interoperability, but the technical standard is the mediator of 
state-to-state communication.  In the Apollo-Soyuz mission, it was a question 
of technical connection that defined the parity of the states involved as they 
brought their quasi-territories into proximity.
Usually, questions of standardization occur when states are already in 
proximity, and international telecommunication has a long history of 
international governance mechanisms to develop such standards.122 The ITU 
119   See Battaglia, “Arresting Hospitality” (2012) S76–S89.
120  Id. at S82. See also International Docking System Standard, Interface Definition 
Document, Revision D (2015).  
121  See generally Charlotte Hooper, Manly States (2001).
122  See generally Jayakar, “Globalization and the Legitimacy” (1998) 721–722.
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as the world’s oldest international organization represents a legacy of 
international cooperation and coordination on telecommunications standards. 
It also charts a unique history through which international law was developed 
in such a way that it avoided sticky issues of content by favoring 
interconnection over interoperability. States’ ongoing ability to negotiate and 
adopt law in the realm of telecommunications would arguably make the 
international governance regime well prepared to regulate the Internet and 
Cyberspace, but this has not been the case. This chapter will investigate this 
phenomenon and argue that the development of Cyberspace governance has 
served to delegitimize the state as the central governance actor within the 
sphere.  It will also argue that an important part of this delegitimization is the 
undermining of consent as envisioned in international law.
To construct these arguments, this chapter will proceed first by examining the 
nature of the ITU’s power to make law and regulation concerning international 
telecommunications. This section will give a historical overview of the ITU and 
then investigate the most recent effort by states to extend the ITU’s authority 
over the Internet. The next section will examine the development of global 
multistakeholder governance through an examination of the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN). The final section will examine the trend of 
corporate intermediaries in Cyberspace and their capacity as governance 
bodies. 
Harmful Interference
The need to facilitate interconnection among states through telecommun-
ication is as old as the telegraph, and the ITU dates to this period having first 
been established as the International Telegraph Union.1 The utility of 
telegraph technology was immediately apparent, but states wanted to ensure 
that they controlled the technology as it crossed their borders. As a result, the 
ITU began as an organization that developed standards and rules for cross-
border telecommunications, which allowed for interconnection among 
countries. This regime gave states primary control over telecommunications 
at the nodes where physical infrastructure crossed their borders. Today, the 
mission of the ITU is “facilitating peaceful relations, international cooperation 
among peoples and economic and social development by means of efficient 
telecommunications services.”2
This strategy worked well with lined communications such as telegraph and 
telephone, but broadcast brought on new challenges, because radio waves 
1  Codding, “The International Telecommunications Union” (1994) 501.
2   Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union (2010) preamble.
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do not conform to state borders. There was, as a result, much debate in the 
international community on the nature of international responsibility for 
content crossing borders on radio waves. This can be seen in the Soviet 
complaints about radio propaganda during the Cold War3 as well as in the 
UN General Assembly’s controversial adoption of the Direct Broadcasting 
Principles.4  The ITU again avoided coming into contact with the issue of 
content by adopting a policy of coordinating international usage of 
electromagnetic frequencies by nations so as to prevent harmful interference 
between broadcasts.5 More recently, there was a movement in the ITU to 
give developing states more access to international telecommunications 
development resources.6  Of course, in the realm of international relations a 
state’s disbursement of aid is highly attenuated by a state’s political goals. 
The ITU again avoided questions of content by developing a division that 
advocated for such development, but left the legal substance to bilateral or 
regional agreements.7 Held argues that technical international organizations 
such as the ITU “have been sharply delimited” in order to make them 
“politically unexceptionable.”8 In the case of the ITU, its actions have been 
delimited to facilitating interconnection and coordinating usage.
Two key observations need to be made here.  First, the ITU is a body made 
up of states as the basic unit of the body politic,9 and the ITUs legitimacy, like 
that of other international organizations, springs from “state sovereignty.”10 
Votes in the ITU are allocated one to one, and while non-governmental actors 
are given access to participate in deliberations,11 the state is the primary 
power holder in the ITU forum for international coordination, meaning that the 
rules that it adopts are manifested through the “filter of domestic structures 
and domestic norms.”12  The ITU is a treaty-based organization, and as such 
it springs from within the logic of international governance, which reifies an 
international conceptualization of the world.   
Second, the ITU makes international law and policy. The ITU’s outputs consist 
of a variety of law and policy documents. As the international body that 
3  Eppenstein & Aisenberg, “Radio Propaganda” (1979) 154.
4  See Lyall & Larsen, Space Law (2009) 256–269 and UNGA, Res. 37/92 (1982).
5  Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union (2010) Art. 1.2(b), Art. 45 
and Eppenstein & Aisenberg, “Radio Propaganda” (1979) 154.
6  Codding, “The International Telecommunications Union” (1994) 505.
7  See Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union (2010) Art. 21.
8  Held, Democracy and the Global Order (1995) 109.
9  Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union (2010) Art. 2
10  Jayakar, “Globalization and the Legitimacy” (1998) 717.
11  Id. at  728–729. DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (2014) 33.
12  Finnemore & Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change” (1998) 
893.
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adopts the rules of international telecommunication, the ITU adopts 
resolutions that chart its own course in addressing the issues raised by 
telecommunication technologies. More importantly, the ITU meets regularly to 
update the rules that make up the Radio Regulations. The Radio Regulations 
is a treaty of technical standards that is negotiated among members and sets 
out the regime for coordination of international radiotelecommunication. The 
Radio Regulations create international obligations that apply to states, not 
telecommunication providers, directly. In effect, the ITU depends on the 
member states to make its rules operable through national regulation binding 
upon domestic actors.  Regulation as a result relies on consent of the state 
parties to the adopted rules.
As an international lawmaking body with the competency and a proven record 
for coordinating international telecommunication activities, it would seem that 
the ITU would be well situated to extend its hand of governance over the 
Internet, which fits easily within the definition of international tele-
communication, which is “[a]ny transmission, emission or reception of signs, 
signals, writings, images and sounds or intelligence of any nature by wire, 
radio, optical or other electromagnetic systems.”13 The technology involved is 
exactly the type of technology that the ITU was developed to coordinate 
across borders, but the ITU has been unable to exert direct control within the 
sphere of Cyberspace. It has, instead, taken on a role more akin to a 
stakeholder within Cyberspace governance. This is in part due to the 
historical conditions that led to the governance of information technologies 
being “dominated” by other organizations.14 
This inability of the ITU to effectively extend its competency can be seen in 
the results of its Plenipotentiary Conference held in Busan, Korea in 2014 
(PP-14).  This meeting was preluded by media chatter warning of an ITU 
takeover over the Internet, which taps into an established “media narrative ... 
about a possible Internet governance takeover” by the UN.15  These headlines 
were prompted by the position being taken by the Russian Federation and 
other states that the ITU should have more control over the Internet.16 The 
position of this bloc of states was widely interpreted as a threat to a free and 
open Internet. For instance, the U.S. characterized the proposals as 
mechanisms “that could have provided a mandate for the ITU in surveillance 
or privacy issues; inhibited the free flow of data; regulated Internet content 
and service companies; undermined the multistakeholder process; or called 
13  Radio Regulations (2012) Art. 1.3
14  Jayakar, “Globalization and the Legitimacy” (1998) 719.
15  DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (2014) 33.
16  Dickinson, “How Will Internet Governance Change after the ITU Conference?” 
(2014).
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on the ITU to develop international regulations on these issues.”17 There was 
more to this than just rote suspicion of the UN.  As a product of international 
law, the ITU would need to extend the logic of international governance to 
Cyberspace to effectively regulate its mechanisms. This would mean adopting 
measures that allow for cross border interconnection while avoiding 
embroiling itself into disputes over the content of communications. This would 
give states the ability to adopt, through the ITU forum, technical standards 
that facilitate national content controls. Such standards would increase state 
power to censor, monitor, or treat with deference communications entering 
their borders.
In Busan, the moves to extend the ITU’s competency were defeated through 
the work of the U.S., which “built a broad consensus that led to success on 
Internet and cybersecurity issues keeping the ITU’s work focused on its 
current mandate.”18 These efforts served “to mitigate and remove proposed 
language from resolutions that would have improperly expanded the scope of 
ITU.”19 The results of the negotiations are a handful of nonbinding resolutions 
that resemble policy statements.20 So, for instance, Resolution 2 calls for a 
global framework to exchange information on such technologies to “support 
the harmonious development of telecommunication services.”21 More 
strikingly, Resolution 101 gives direct recognition to IGCs by “requesting” the 
Standardization Sector to continue “collaborative activities on IP-based 
networks with ISOC/IETF and other relevant recognized organizations.”22 
The ITU further adopted Resolution 102, which states that “management of 
the Internet is a subject of valid international interest and must flow from full 
international and multistakeholder cooperation.”23 This resolution seemingly 
cedes power to an ambiguously defined “multistakeholder” system which 
exists outside the bounds of international legal geography.
17  United States Department of State, “Outcomes from the International 
Telecommunication Union 2014 Plenipotentiary Conference” (2014).
18  Id. See also Dickinson, “How Will Internet Governance Change after the ITU 
Conference?” (2014).
19  United States Department of State, “Outcomes” (2014).
20  See also ITU, “Resolution 133 (Rev. Busan, 2014) Role of Administrations of 
Member States in the Management of Internationalized (Multilingual Domain Names”; 
ITU, “Resolution 140 (Rev. Busan, 2014) ITU’s Role in Implementing the Outcomes of 
the World Summit on the Information Society and in the Overall Review by United 
Nations General Assembly of Their Implementation”; and ITU, “Resolution 180 (Rev. 
Busan, 2014) Facilitating the Transition from IPv4 to IPv6.”
21  ITU, “Resolution 2 (Rev. Busan, 2014) World Telecommunication/Information and 
Communication Technology Policy Forum.”
22  ITU, “Resolution 101 (Rev. Busan, 2014) Internet Protocol-Based Networks.”
23  ITU, “Resolution 102 (Rev. Busan, 2014) ITU’s Role with Regard to International 
Public Policy Issues Pertaining to the Internet and the Management of Internet 
Resources, Including Domain Names and Addresses.”
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Trading off coordination for content is, of course, the status quo of 
international telecommunications regulation, which raises the question of why 
Internet technology has resisted the encroachment of international law from 
the exact international body charged with regulating that type of technology. 
A simple answer would be that states simply do not want to extend 
international law to govern Cyberspace, and to some extent this is true. 
However, it seems odd that Cyberspace has such a prominent role in social 
life at the global level, and that international law remains largely silent on the 
matter.  To be clear, it is not that states are disinterested in the Internet – it is 
clearly an item on the agenda of the international community. Yet, it is one 
that international governance is at a loss to comprehensively address. A more 
satisfying answer can be found in the geography of Cyberspace that exists 
outside the logic of international geography. Critically, the legal geography of 
Cyberspace is built around code which is both content and medium. As a 
result, the “sharply delimited” functions of the ITU are ill equipped to expand 
to control a medium that is concurrently content. The state is not deprived of 
jurisdiction completely, as should be obvious from existing domestic laws, but 
those laws can only extend to the layers of Cyberspace that intersect national 
space. As a result, international governance has lost significant control over 
transnational communication, which no longer conforms to the bordered 
assumptions that underlie international governance.
This does not mean that Cyberspace is without authority. It means that the 
state becomes one of many stakeholders in a multistakeholder legal 
geography. The next two sections will investigate the trend of global 
multistakeholder governance by first examining the technical bodies that 
govern the logical layer of the Internet and then through analysis of corporate 
and commercial interests that extend governance over the Internet. These 
sections together reveal a world-scale legal geography that is not dominated 
by the state. It is most certainly not devoid of the state, but the state is no 
longer the central node of authority and need not consent to these 
governance mechanisms. This is a critical problem for international govern-
ance since it is based on a model in which the state is the primary authority.
Rejecting Kings
“We reject kings, presidents and voting” is a phrase worthy of most fringe 
political manifestos. Though dripping with anti-authoritarian angst, the phrase 
is not from The Anarchist Cookbook. Instead, it is found in the central 
document, “The Tao of the IETF,” that explains the workings of the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF).24 This is the technical body that adopts 
standards that govern the logical layer of the Internet. The statement is more 
24  IETF, “Tao of the IETF” (2012).
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than one of personal rejection of the authority; it is a community rejection of 
state authority over the methods and means of communication, specifically 
within the geography of Cyberspace.
The rejection of kings has strong roots in the anarcho-libertarian tradition of 
many coders who were instrumental in developing the Internet as discussed 
in Chapter 4. While the rhetoric used is anarcho-libertarian, this statement is 
not a simple denial of state authority.  It is in practice an assertion of authority 
beyond states, which is consistent with the ITU’s inability to extend its own 
mandate.  Multistakeholder governance structures remove the state’s ability 
to dominate regulatory decisions by removing the state’s ability to consent to 
governance. Consent to the law by states is a bedrock principle in the 
international legal system.  States, however, do not have the ability to consent 
to new standards in Cyberspace.  In the multistakeholder model “[t]here is no 
geographically localized set of constituents” with a claim to legitimacy to 
deploy power.25 Legitimacy, as a function of consent, has been redistributed 
from communities defined by borders to “the participants themselves,” and 
they could be anywhere.26  The borders of the state do not define the political 
community of Cyberspace, which disaggregates the core unit of international 
geography.27 The legal geography of Cyberspace is not bordered. It is coded, 
and code is law.28
The IGCs discussed briefly in Chapter 2 are representative of the 
multistakeholder governance that diminishes a state’s power to consent to 
law. The IETF serves as a perfect example and its actions can be seen to 
push its authority over states. This multistakeholder body adopts and 
maintains the standards that make the Internet work, including the TCP/IP, 
and it has the “largest influence on the technologies used to build the 
Internet.”29 TCP/IP is exactly the type of code that rejects kings, and it gives 
the IETF “a powerful seat of authority.”30 These protocols move activity to 
devices at the edges of the networks, which gives the user any freedom that 
he or she can program into Cyberspace. The state’s bordered control points 
become null when data can move through any connection, thereby jumping 
those borders.  Importantly, states never consented to this, whereas they did 
consent to telephone lines crossing their borders and to the standards for 
interconnection promulgated by the ITU and to the frequency allocations 
25  Johnson & Post, “Law and Borders” (1996) 1375.
26  Id..
27  Walzer, “The Moral Standing of States” (1980) 211 and Clark, Legitimacy and 
International Society (2005) 6.
28  Power & Tobin, “Soft Law for the Internet” (2011) 41.
29  Alvestrand & Lie, “Development of Core Internet Standards” (2009) 126 and 
DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (2014) 36.
30  DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (2014) 65–66.
122Standardizing Authority
governing terrestrial and space-based broadcast technologies. They even 
agreed over how postal services will be exchanged between them. However, 
they never agreed on the TCP/IP, which transforms other telecommunication 
technologies. The natural choke point found at the border fragments when 
information fragments through packet switching.  Even physical gaps are 
becoming less effective as can be seen by Stuxnet, which jumped an air gap, 
as well as in projects that seek to get electronic devices across the border of 
states like North Korea.31  
The IETF evolved out of the historical development of the Internet in which 
the computer scientists using the Internet were also making decision about 
how that space would be constructed.32 As a result, decision making evolved 
from group conversations among the coders. The IETF was born from these 
conversations, which were extraneous to the state, and thus states were 
never admitted to the decision-making process. As the Internet grew, so too 
did the IETF. It eventually opened its membership to anyone that wanted to 
join and take part in that decision-making process. It was community 
governance built on “rough consensus and running code.”33 This form of 
decision-making added decisional value to the functionality of code in addition 
to the value of consensus. This is important because for standards to be 
effective they must be widely accepted.”34 States may have agents join to 
represent their respective interests, but these individuals are on equal footing 
with a variety of others including corporate agents and civic minded netizens. 
This removes the state from the dominant position it holds in international 
governance. The IETF’s open and transparent process creates inter-
operability standards that shape the “modern public sphere and 
broader conditions of political speech.”35 This means that the IETF structures 
the discursive space within states and without their consent.
The IETF makes decisions on how data will travel across borders outside the 
scope of the state, but significantly, it “has no formal authority over anything 
but its own publishing process,”36 and its status is further complicated by the 
fact that it has “no formal membership.”37 The decisions that it takes construct 
the logical layer of the Internet, and state power in that decision process is 
limited to the ability to send representatives.  The state, in the formal sense, 
31  Halvorssen & Lloyd, “We Hacked North Korea With Balloons and USB Drives” 
(2014).
32  See Leiner et al., “A Brief History of the Internet” (2012) and Power & Tobin, “Soft 
Law for the Internet” (2011) 41.
33  IETF, “Tao of the IETF” (2012).
34  Jayakar, “Globalization and the Legitimacy” (1998) 736.
35  DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (2014) 77.
36  Alvestrand & Lie, “Development of Core Internet Standards” (2009) 126.
37  DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (2014) 69.
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is never consulted on IETF decisions, which erodes the state’s ability to 
consent to rules governing transnational communications. This is a significant 
development in governance at a world-scale and should not be downplayed. 
The spatial settlement premised on sovereign equality is, in essence, 
challenged by a set of rules that recode borders in such a way that states 
lose significant control over the flow of information across them.  This is 
further confirmed by the IETF’s lack of legal personality.38 This feature means 
the IETF exists outside of the jurisdiction of any state. The IETF’s 
organizational nebulousness resists clear classification within the space of 
international legal geography.
The IETF is not the only entity that exerts this type of multistakeholder 
control.  Both the Internet Society (ISOC) and the W3C (see Chapter 3) as 
Internet governance communities share attributes with the IETF, though the 
IETF is the most extreme in its extra-stateness. While these are both 
interesting cases, the warping of international legal geography is observed 
better in a case with different attributes. Such a case can be found in the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which 
currently exists as a non-profit corporation under the laws of the U.S.  
ICANN was also a product of the ad hoc historical processes through which 
computer scientists pieced together Internet governance. In the 1970s, Jon 
Postel began the work that would later be known as the Internet Assigned 
Names and Numbers Authority (IANA). Postel’s work would eventually 
develop into a regime for managing the DNS, described above in Chapter 2. 
At this point in time, the Internet was largely made up of U.S. government and 
University networks. The U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) was the 
lead government agency, and it left governance of Internet architecture up to 
the coders and engineers that were making the technical decisions on how to 
best foster interoperability on the network.  Postel emerged as a one-man 
show at the University of Southern California, and he managed the root file of 
the DNS through an NSF contract.39  The U.S. government’s policy during the 
1990s was to leave the development of the Internet to “private sector 
leadership” in hopes of privatizing the network of networks.40 The U.S. federal 
government, though, soon stepped in as a reaction to various proposals for 
privatization of the IANA function that began to arise in 1994.41  This action 
resulted in ICANN “[a]s an alternative to government.”42 ICANN was created 
by Postel to take over the IANA function, and it signed its first Memorandum 
38  Alvestrand & Lie, “Development of Core Internet Standards” (2009) 126. 
39  Mueller & Thompson, “ICANN and INTELSAT” (2004) 66–67.
40  Id. at 63.
41  Id. at 67–68.
42  Id. at 63.
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of Understanding with the U.S. Department of Commerce in November of 
1998.43 ICANN is “a private nonprofit corporation created to manage policy 
and technical features” of the DNS.44 The corporation itself functioned with 
oversight by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
(NTIA),45 which maintained a “back door authority”46 that it used to “very rarely 
reject” ICANN action.47 This oversight does play an “important role in ensuring 
that proper processes are followed.”48
Three things of significance should be noted here. First, ICANN has 
personality under U.S. law making it subject to the law of the United States. 
Second, despite the fact that ICANN extends from U.S. government 
involvement in the development of the Internet, there was never any sort of 
lawmaking procedure, other than a contract, that gave ICANN its authority.49 
It administers a significant governance regime that developed outside the 
realm of lawmaking in the domestic and international arenas.50  Third, despite 
this extra legality, ICANN is subject to special government intervention 
through NTIA oversight function.51 Thus on its face, ICANN fits into the state’s 
governance structure and seems dissimilar from organizations like the IETF.  
However, in 2014, the NTIA “unexpectedly” announced its intention to transfer 
the IANA functions of ICANN to a multistakeholder regime.52 This serves as 
an interesting example of a state relinquishing control of an Internet 
governance body, but the relinquishment is not to the international community 
as might be expected. The announcement stated that the NTIA would 
“transition key Internet domain name functions to the global multistakeholder 
community.”53 Notably, the announcement employs the word ‘global’ as 
43  Id. at 68.
44  Rosenzweig et al., “Protecting Internet Freedom and American Interests” (2014) 1; 
Zalnieriute & Schneider, “ICANN’s Procedures and Policies in the Light of Human 
Rights, Fundamental Freedoms and Democratic Values” (2014) 9; Partridge & Lonardo, 
“ICANN Can or Can It?” (2009) 24; and DeNardis, The Global War for Internet 
Governance (2014) 48–49.
45  See generally Krattenmaker, Telecommunications Law and Policy (1998) 21.
46  Mueller & Thompson, “ICANN and INTELSAT” (2004) 70.
47  Rosenzweig et al., “Protecting Internet Freedom and American Interests” (2014) 3.
48  Id.
49  Mueller & Thompson, “ICANN and INTELSAT” (2004) 65, 69.
50  Mueller & Thompson, “ICANN and INTELSAT” (2004) 63 and DeNardis, The Global 
War for Internet Governance (2014) 46. But see Rosenzweig et al., “Protecting Internet 
Freedom and American Interests” (2014) 4.
51  Partridge & Lonardo, “ICANN Can or Can It?” (2009) 24.
52  Rosenzweig et al., “Protecting Internet Freedom and American Interests” (2014) 
1–2.
53  NTIA, “NTIA Announces Intent to Transition Key Internet Domain Name Functions” 
(2014).
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opposed to ‘international.’ In fact, the word ‘international’ only appears one 
time in the announcement compared to ‘global’s’ six.54 This indicates an intent 
to not turn IANA over to an international organization. Instead, the 
announcement posits a new form of governance body, a global 
multistakeholder community, that is undefined in international law. The NTIA 
announcement came shortly before the NETmundial conference held in Brazil 
in April of 2014. This civil society conference adopted a Statement on 
Multistakeholder Governance, which helps to shed light on the idea of a 
“global multistakeholder community.” It states that:
Internet governance should be built on democratic, 
multistakeholder processes, ensuring the meaningful and 
accountable participation of all stakeholders, including 
governments, the private sector, civil society, the technical 
community, the academic community and users. The 
respective roles and responsibilities of stakeholders should be 
interpreted in a flexible manner with reference to the issue 
under discussion.55
An obvious implication in this statement is that the state is just one of 
numerous stakeholders, and the NTIA announcement proximity to this highly 
publicized meeting indicates a conscious decision of the NTIA in choosing the 
term ‘multistakeholder.’  
The NTIA contract with ICANN ended on 1 October 2016.  The technical and 
operational aspects of IANA was transferred to Public Technical Identifiers 
(PTI), which is an affiliate of ICANN. Though the transition can be seen as a 
reaction to controversies over ICANN’s “legitimacy and ties to the U.S. 
Government,”56 the contract between ICANN and PTI requires that PTI be 
located in the U.S., giving the U.S. some amount of leverage over the 
operational mission of PTI.57 Despite this PTI maintains that it “aim[s] to not 
directly set policy by which [it] operate[s].”58 That policy comes from ICANN 
supported forums meaning that “policy development for domain name 
operations and IP addressing is arrived at by many different stakeholders.”59 
In multistakeholder governance states are just “one type of stakeholder,” 
which removes them from their usual place of dominance in world-scale 
54  Id.
55  NETmundial, NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement (2014). 
56  Partridge & Lonardo, “ICANN Can or Can It?” (2009) 24 and DeNardis, The Global 
War for Internet Governance (2014) 61–62.
57  ICANN-PTI, IANA Naming Function Contract (2016) Sec. 4.2.
58  IANA.org, “About Us” (n.d.).
59  Id.
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governance.60  The state as a result is functioning in a new legal geography 
which differs from that of international governance.
The IANA functions administered by ICANN are a “global regulatory regime.”61 
The numbers they control are referred to as “critical internet resources,” and 
these numbers define what devices are on the Internet and, thus, who is in 
Cyberspace.62 ICANN also manages domain name dispute resolution 
administering a nonjudicial arbitration system, the Uniform Dispute Resolution 
Policy (UDRP), through which intellectual property disputes can be resolved.63 
ICANN manages these property rights in Cyberspace, specifically, because 
the state has limited ability to do so. Interoperability on the Internet 
necessitates a uniform root file.  If two states were to resolve a domain name 
dispute differently, this could result in either an inability of one of these states 
to enforce its judgement or a fragmenting of the root file and thus the Internet. 
At the moment, parties can pursue domain name disputes in U.S. Federal 
Court, because it has jurisdiction over ICANN and PTI. This same 
jurisdictional authority allows U.S. law enforcement to seize domains 
associated with criminal activities.64 The power of the state is still a real one, 
but the U.S. lacks the ability to consent on how the DNS regime and its 
regulatory aspects develop.
States are just one voice in multistakeholder governance, and their consent 
to be bound is not a necessary precursor for the adoption of a rule.65 These 
Internet governance communities change the dynamic of a state’s authority 
over transnational communications, and this is a new development in world-
scale government.  IGCs are not the only entities changing authority. Private 
corporations are also taking a seat at the multistakeholder table, and they 
perform a number of governance functions in Cyberspace.  
Corporate Governance
As addressed in the first section of this chapter, states have traditionally 
maintained control over information at their borders. Their ability and right to 
control information at their borders was based on their ability and right to 
60  Hurwitz, “A New Normal?” (2013) 239.
61  Mueller & Thompson, “ICANN and INTELSAT” (2004) 77.
62  Denardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (2014) 57–58 and Mueller & 
Thompson, “ICANN and INTELSAT” (2004) 77.
63  Partridge & Lonardo, “ICANN Can or Can It?” (2009) 24–29.
64  DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (2014) 184–189; Gallagher, “Silk 
Road, Other Tor ‘darknet’ Sites May Have Been ‘decloaked’ through DDoS [Updated]” 
(2014); and Mueller & Thompson, “ICANN and INTELSAT” (2004) 81.
65  Leiner et al., “A Brief History of the Internet” (2012).
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control information within their borders, a right that flowed from sovereignty as 
recognized in the international system.  This is why states may have laws that 
set the extent to which citizen speech is protected, as well as why states have 
legal controls over intellectual property. In this system, citizens rely on the 
state to protect their speech rights and companies must rely on states to 
protect their intellectual property.66  But digitization has changed the nature of 
both speech and property, making both difficult for the state to regulate 
effectively by exponentially multiplying the sites where such interactions 
occur. 
Digitization makes information super-portable. Media of all sorts can be 
digitized and sent across the Internet. This means that a song, for instance, 
can be encoded as an MP3, attached to an email, and sent to a friend. This is 
the basic concept for one of the early business ventures on the Internet: 
Napster. Napster allowed individuals to share files with other users of the 
program by enabling peer-to-peer connections. This proved to be wildly 
popular with college students using high bandwidth connections to share 
music. While this was a great boon for individuals looking for digital files of 
their favorite songs, record companies were predictably concerned with such 
technologies, because the technologies enabled the copying and distribution 
of their copyrighted intellectual property.
As the Napster case foretold, intellectual property would become, and still is, 
one of the most heated battlegrounds in Internet law and policy. Though 
Napster’s business model was stopped by the US legal system, a number of 
services filled its space with different technical specifications meant to subvert 
the law that was used to shut down Napster.67 Copyright is not the only area 
of intellectual property that has been affected by Cyberspace, though it may 
be the most prominent.  Trademark, as noted above, has been one of the 
biggest issues in ICANN’s management of the DNS,68 and patent has been 
implicated as corporations have attempted to protect the code that they use in 
Cyberspace.69
The reason that intellectual property has become such a contentious issue in 
Cyberspace is twofold. First, digitization makes sharing of intellectual property 
easy. Intellectual property can be perfectly copied and transmitted across the 
Internet with ease.70 The MP3 files that made Napster a phenomenon could 
be easily copied without generational degradation associated with analog 
66  For example US Constitution, Art. 1.8.8, 1st Amend.
67  Lessig, Free Culture (2004) 73–74.
68  See generally Partridge & Lonardo, “ICANN Can or Can It?” (2009).
69  See generally Vera Ranieri, “EFFecting Digital Freedom” (2014–2015).
70  Lessig, Free Culture (2004) 62–79.
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media. This means that digital files, such as a copyrighted song, can be 
perfectly copied and shared on massive scales when users are able to 
connect using peer-to-peer using technologies such as BitTorrent.71 The 
means of efficient copying have been combined with the means of efficient 
distribution.
The second issue fueling this debate is linked to the competing business 
models in Cyberspace. In analog media space, while there is a black market 
for intellectual property, content owners are generally responsible for the 
production and distribution of their property.  Record companies, for instance, 
copy the songs they own onto CDs and sell them at record stores. They 
control the physical copying and distribution in such a way that it diminishes 
the ability of others to copy and share that information. In a digital 
environment, intellectual property holders have the same goals: to make a 
profit from the sale or use of their intellectual property, but the structure of the 
environment in which they pursue these goals is dramatically different in 
Cyberspace. Users no longer enter record stores to buy music; they enter 
search terms. The results of that search might send them to the record 
company or a licensed distributor to buy the music, but it is just as likely to 
send the user to a third party that is distributing free copies of the file. 
Cyberspace creates a gap in interests between the content owner and the 
content distributor, the Internet Content Provider (ICP).
To see this gap in action, one merely needs to visit YouTube, an online video 
sharing website owned by Google. YouTube’s business model is based on 
user generated videos spawning web traffic to the site, which nets YouTube 
profits through revenues from ads served to users that visit the site. In basic 
terms, YouTube’s business interest is in having as much content as possible 
available through its servers. More content brings in more viewers. An ICP’s 
business goals are often in direct conflict with intellectual property owners 
that want to control the dissemination of their content. This has created a 
clash between content owners and ICPs that has played out across a number 
of fora and has been the subject of domestic lawmaking, but an important 
trend can be traced as these intellectual property disputes have proliferated. 
There has been a ceding of power to commercial entities who control the 
content available in Cyberspace. This power is often exerted without recourse 
to formal legal procedures contained within the legal geography of the state.   
In the case of intellectual property, this can be seen in the notice and take 
down procedures deployed in numerous states to balance the competing 
interests of content owners and ICPs who host user uploaded content. Under 
these regimes, content owners must give notice to the ICP that it is hosting 
71  DeNardis, Global War for Internet Governance (2014) 63–65.
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protected content on its website. In return, the ICP is granted a ‘safe harbor’ 
from legal liability by promptly taking down the content. The user is then given 
notice that the content has been removed. In the US context this is often 
referred to as being ‘DCMAed,’ a reference to the U.S. Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA), the law that enacted the US regime for notice and 
takedown.72 While the equities between the content owner and the ICP seem 
fair here, many scholars have noted that these regimes result in a burden 
being shifted to the user.  So, for instance, going back to YouTube, if Warner 
Bros. identifies a clip from one of its films, then it fills out an online form which 
notifies YouTube. The clip is removed, and the user is sent an email 
notification informing them of the takedown. The user is then given the option 
to send a counter notification if they think the takedown has been in error. 
The information page on the counter notification process informs the user that 
his or her personal information will be revealed and that the “claimant may 
use this information to file a lawsuit against you.”73 Users are left with the 
decision of whether they want to pursue a claim in which they are most likely 
out-gunned. This burden shift means that corporations can over protect their 
content and block potentially valid uses such as parody or fair use based on 
the odds stacked against the user.74
Notice and takedown turns corporations and the technology they deploy into 
mediators of speech. Such mediation also takes place in the realm of self-
regulation where corporations agree amongst themselves on how to best 
conduct their business. Self-regulation in the sphere of content standards in 
the domestic context has been a feature of broadcast telecommunications 
that has been widely adopted in the context of Cyberspace.75 Self-regulation 
of content within an interoperable arena is vastly different from broadcast and 
raises novel questions as to the extent that private companies should be able 
to control speech online. As DeNardis and Hackl note, private actors are 
increasingly implementing technical architectures that mediate what speech is 
acceptable and what speech is not.76
In the context of particular social media sites this seems to be just the sort of 
community governance contemplated by early netficianados such as Barlow. 
It also reveals a startling removal of the state from the regulation of the 
political space in which speech takes place. It shifts power away from the 
individual by removing the court from between the individual and those that 
would suppress expression. In the place of the court are corporations that are 
72  Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105–304 (1998). See also Lessig, Free 
Culture (2004) 157.
73  YouTube, “Copyright Counter Notification Basics” (2019).
74  See Goodman, “Media Policy and Free Speech” (2007) 1233.
75  See generally Tambini et al., Codifying Cyberspace (2008).
76  DeNardis & Hackl, “Internet Governance by Social Media Platforms” (2015).
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seeking to maximize profits, rather than protect user rights. Laws like the 
DMCA, incentivize both intellectual property owners and ICPs to over protect 
data. This means that on the Internet “the rules of copyright law, as 
interpreted by the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers 
copyright content.”77 As a result, Cyberspace has “revealed the nexus 
between copyright and communications law, and the impact of both on 
speech.”78
While mechanisms such as user agreements are a natural way to govern 
speech within the “walled gardens” of user experiences, the debate over net 
neutrality reveals a more troubling implication of corporate governance. Net 
neutrality, discussed in Chapter 2, centers on whether an ISP may legally 
favor some data or disfavor other data.79 So, for instance, an ISP could enter 
a contractual agreement with a video streaming service for its data to move 
faster or to block data from a competitor’s server or to slow certain types of 
data. ISPs say that they need this capability to efficiently manage their 
bandwidth, but those in opposition claim that if net neutrality erodes then ISPs 
will effectively control the content that users receive.80 This means that “[e]ven 
routine technologies of bandwidth management are value-laden.”81 Media 
companies now must fight for the attention of viewers amidst a din of 
competition, and these same media companies have converged along with 
the technologies on which they operate, meaning that intellectual property 
owners are often ISPs as well. For instance, two of the largest broadband 
providers in the United States, Comcast and Time Warner, also function as 
ICPs and intellectual property owners. 
From these examples, a few key features of corporate governance can be 
observed. First, there is a severe lack of transparency when a corporate actor 
takes action against speech on the Internet, as there are no accepted 
procedures for such action. Second, this puts a severe burden on the 
individual to enforce his or her speech rights as there is a large imbalance of 
power between the corporate entity and the individual. Third, individuals may 
not even know whether their speech or access to information has been limited 
due to the nature of technical architecture. Finally, and most importantly, the 
state is passing these powers to the corporations involved to enforce directly. 
Notice and takedown is a statutory process, but it is one that removes the 
state as the central mediator of rights making it a peripheral entity in the 
process.  
77  Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture (2004) 148.
78  Goodman, “Media Policy and Free Speech” (2007) 1212.
79  DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (2014) 131–32.
80  Verizon v. FCC (2014) 6.
81  DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (2014) 8.
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Other such mechanisms exist as well. The Copyright Alert System is the 
result of an agreement between ISPs and major copyright holders in which 
ISPs agree to use a tiered system to discourage copyright violators.82 Under 
the agreement repeat violators can have their access to the Internet through 
the ISP eliminated.83 Another example is the European ‘right to be forgotten’ 
which allows individuals to demand content about themselves to be removed 
from ICPs.84 The right to be forgotten also suffers from the burden shifting that 
occurs with notice and takedown schemes for intellectual property.85 
Similarly, Maurushat and Shachtman both argue that ISPs are in the best 
position to regulate cybercrime.86 These examples all point to a trend in which 
“the determination of conditions of participation in the public sphere is 
increasingly privatized.”87
The governance mechanisms “delegated” to “private intermediaries” are not 
just economic in their effects.88 For example, Tambini et al. note that self-
governance by corporations implicates them as the mediator of the right to 
expression.89 Relatedly, Sunstein notes the effects of how commercial forums 
can be tailored into echo chambers that restrict deliberative democracy.90 
Finally, Lessig implicates corporate governance of intellectual property with 
the production of culture itself.91 This means that corporations now “play a key 
role in ensuring and enabling” a number of human rights, especially “when an 
operator is dominant.”92 As a result, a Council of Europe report argues that 
Internet governance should be maintained in a way that “avoids 
predominance of particular deep-pocketed organizations that function as 
gatekeepers for online content.”93
82  Center for Copyright Information, “FAQ’s on The Center for Copyright Information 
And Copyright Alert System” (2011) and Kravets, “ISPs to Disrupt Internet Access of 
Copyright Scofflaws” (2011).
83  Id.
84  See generally Rosen, “The Right to Be Forgotten” (2012) 88.
85  Id. at 91–92.
86  Maurashat, “Zombie Botnets” (2010) 379 and Shachtman, “Pirates of the ISPs” 
(2011).
87  DeNardis & Hackl, “Internet Governance by Social Media Platforms” (2015) 6.
88  DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (2014) 13.
89  Tambini et al., Codifying Cyberspace (2009) 275. See also DeNardis, The Global 
War for Internet Governance (2014) 157.
90  Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0 (2007).
91  Lessig, Free Culture (2004) 28–30.  See generally Serageldin, “Cultural Heritage as 
a Public Good” (1999) 240–63.
92  Council of the EU, “EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online 
and Offline” (2014) I.D.34.
93  Zalnieriute & Schneider, “ICANN’s Procedures and Policies in the Light of Human 
Rights” (2014) 16.
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This is not to say that governance by corporations is a particularly new 
innovation. Many European empires of the 18–19th centuries were essentially 
corporations licensed to go out and govern, and neoliberal processes are 
premised upon MNCs effectively wielding power.94 In fact, the rise of the 
Internet as a global force can be traced to a U.S. preference for “private, and 
avowedly economically rational, mechanisms of self-regulation.”95 There is, 
however, something distinctive about this in the context of Cyberspace, since 
“[f]unctionalist and technologist concerns regarding security, encryption, and 
domain name allocation become increasingly difficult to separate from the 
individual rights concerns regarding privacy, freedom of expression and public 
governance of the commons.”96 MNCs in this context are mediating the rights 
of individuals regardless of their location. A platform like Twitter, which is often 
mentioned in the same sentence with phrases like “global public sphere,” can 
implement regulations that are effective globally and without any sort of public 
debate over these regulatory changes. In Cyberspace code is law, and this 
means that those who control code have authority. While states have the 
ability to regulate the code that will be implemented in their borders, for 
instance China’s Great Firewall, corporations still maintain large areas of 
authority over users traversing their networks – and that authority often 
extends non-concurrently with the jurisdictional borders of the state from 
which the corporation is working from.
---
The international governance system is designed to allocate authority in a 
particular legal geography, in which the sovereign territorial state is the core 
political unit from which authority is to flow. This authority flows in two 
directions: it makes the state the sole holder of authority within the bounds of 
its territory, and it makes the states the holders of authority to take part in 
international governance processes. This is why the international community 
has had such a difficult time dealing with mass atrocities.  In order for the 
international community to stop such atrocities happening within the borders 
of a state, it must undermine its own spatial ordering.  
Cyberspace presents a different legal geography that saps authority away 
from the state as a holder of international rights. Authority in this new legal 
geography is vested in those that control the development, the adoption, and 
the deployment of code that operates at a global level. The ITU’s regime for 
governing telecommunications is focused on physical phenomena that clearly 
occur at borders. Cyber-technologies, in particular the logical layer of the 
94  See generally Burbank & Cooper, Empires (2010) 149–184.
95 Tambini et al., Codifying Cyberspace (2009) 15.
96  Id.
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Internet, are ubiquitous, and regulation tied to the physical and legal 
geography of borders has proved to be ill suited for governing these 
technologies. Cyberspace wields its own authority, which is embedded deep 
within the code that architects its geography.  The next and final chapter in 
this section will explore how this change in authority affects the rights of the 
individual engaging in the public sphere of Cyberspac. It will specifically 
engage with how changed territoriality and changed authority have 
reallocated the relationship between the individual and the state by 
introducing new ways of mediating rights.
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Unbordered Rights
At the end of World War I, states gathered together to negotiate a structure 
for international governance intended to prevent conflicts like the one they 
had just experienced. The result of this negotiation was the Covenant of the 
League of Nations, an international organization that failed to live up to that 
promise.97 While the League of Nations was primarily concerned with 
ensuring peace, there was an emerging theme in international governance 
endorsing the right of the self-determination of peoples. This was fueled in 
part by Point V of US President Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points, which called for 
an “adjustment of colonial claims” that weighed the “interests of the 
populations concerned” equally with the interests of colonial powers.98 As the 
League of Nations was being formed, numerous activists courted Wilson and 
others in an attempt to move the role of human rights to the fore of the 
emerging international system.99 Human rights, however, did not make the cut 
in the final covenant.
The call for self-determination would be ignored until 1945, when the world 
was again reeling from a world-scale conflict coupled with the horror of the 
Holocaust. The newly negotiated UN Charter established a new international 
organization, the United Nations, which would serve as the central 
international fora in which states could interact. The UN Charter also 
implemented a role for human rights in the system of international 
governance. While the prevention of conflict maintained priority,100  Article 1(2) 
of the Charter says that states are to have “respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples.”101 This was a sea change moment 
in the development of international law in that it made human rights part of 
the political geography of states. While the Charter has many gaps that keep 
the UN from directly enforcing those rights, it made human rights a valid 
97  Covenant of the League of Nations (1919).
98  Woodrow Wilson, “Fourteen Points” (1918).
99  Manela, The Wilsonian Moment (2007) 59–60.
100  UN Charter (1945) Art 1(1).
101  Id. at Art. 1(2).
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inquiry for international governance. Article 1(2) was followed by a bevy of 
documents that supported this new international identity for the individual, 
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Genocide 
Convention, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Covenant on 
Economic and Social Rights. This expansion of political geography also 
included the slow development of international criminal law used to hold 
perpetrators of international crimes individually criminally liable for acts that 
violated international law.1
This post-WWII expansion was important, but it was soon evident that the 
primary place that the sovereign state holds in international governance made 
the state the primary entity through which rights flowed to the individual. Due 
to the jurisdictional “claw back provisions” in the Charter, the state was the 
primary provider and impediment to human rights.2 This resulted in human 
rights documents, negotiated by states, defining human rights in general, 
non-specific terms giving states leeway in their interpretation of the content of 
those rights. So, for instance, while the US was actively endorsing UDHR, it 
was actively violating many of the rights of African Americans within its 
borders. This tendency of states to define rights to conform with their political 
geography can be seen very clearly in the universality of the acknowle-
dgement of the freedom of speech compared to its very uneven application 
across the globe.3 So, while the individual was given identity in the 
international legal geography, that identity is subservient to its national 
identity as the state remains the dominant source of rights.
Notwithstanding a few important regional human rights bodies, individuals 
have for the most part been unable to assert rights outside of the context of 
the political geography of the state in which they exist. The geography of 
Cyberspace is such, though, that it allows the individual to take part in a 
political geography that is not defined by territorial borders.  Cyberspace 
gives the individual identity in an alternate political geography and allows 
individuals to be the mediator of their own rights. This chapter will investigate 
how Cyberspace changes international political geography by examining how 
Cyberspace reallocates rights through the reallocation of identity. Legal 
structures give “primacy to entitlements” and “release the entitled person from 
moral precepts and other prescriptions in a carefully circumscribed manner.”4 
Such legal structures are shown here to be diminishing in importance as the 
“spatio-temporal location” of individuals is no longer a controlling condition for 
1  See generally Pompe, Aggressive War (1953) and Cassese, International Criminal 
Law (2003). 
2  Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World (2005) 191–192.
3  For example compare US Constitution, Amend. 1 with Korea (Democratic People’s 
Republic of)’s Constitution of 1972 with Amendments through 1998, Art. 67. 
4  Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (2001) 114.
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gaining the “artificial status of bearers of individual rights.”5
This chapter will first address how encryption technologies enable individuals 
to mediate their own speech and associational rights in the space of 
Cyberspace. This section will investigate how digitized networks diminish a 
state’s ability to constrain individual action. Spatial changes though do not 
simply empower individuals against states, they often empower states against 
individuals. The second section will examine the use of mass surveillance 
technologies by states as a way of mediating the rights of individuals in 
extraterritorially, which causes a fissure in the usual understanding of the 
political space of the state. The final section will use the phenomenon of 
hacktivism to show how this reallocation of rights rewrites international 
political space and gives it global complexity.
The Encrypted Self
Modern cryptography was born in Bletchley Park, England during WWII under 
the hand of Alan Turing.6 The elite group that Turing led was tasked with 
cracking the encrypted messages sent through the German Enigma Machine. 
This complex electro-mechanical machine had over 150 trillion possible 
combinations with which to encrypt a message, and the German military reset 
the combination each day. This meant that though the Allies could intercept 
the encrypted messages each day, it was physically impossible to manually 
decrypt the messages by running all possible combinations. Turing was a 
mathematician whose work had already described a theoretical machine, 
which came to be known as a Turing machine, that was foundational to the 
development of the modern computer.7 At Bletchley Park, Turing worked to 
build a physical machine that would quickly move through the possible 
combinations of the Enigma Machine in search of that day’s combination.  His 
work can be credited with changing the tide of the war for the Allies.
Cryptography today is a digital game. The Enigma Machine was based on the 
number of combinations for encrypting a text, and this number was a result of 
the physical settings that could be produced by its rotors and plug board. It 
was strong encryption until a machine was built that worked faster. An Enigma 
Machine would be no match for a smart phone, much less a military grade 
computer, due to the comparatively massive amounts of processing power on 
modern devices. This same processing power can be leveraged to create 
5  Id.
6  On Turing see generally Brate, Technomanifestos (2002) 53–84.  For fictionalized 
accounts see The Imitation Game (Black Bear Pictures/Bristol Automotive 2014) and 
Stephenson, Cryptonomicon (1999).
7  See Berlinski, The Advent of the Algorithm (2000) 187.
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powerful encryption that is difficult for computers to break. To crack digital 
encryption users must either have a key or have a computer powerful enough 
to do the math in reverse. Many encryption techniques are premised on the 
inability of contemporary computers to do such math, and it is often stated 
that the fastest way to decrypt some digital messages is to wait until 
computer technology has advanced to the point that it can do the functions 
necessary to decrypt the message.
Encryption may seem esoteric to the individual user, but most people use 
some sort of encryption technology on the Internet daily. In fact, encryption 
technologies form the bedrock that commerce on the Internet relies on.8 The 
ability to exchange data securely is paramount to the various trust systems 
implemented on the Internet. As an example, if an online business such as 
Amazon cannot ensure that a customer’s credit card information will be 
secure then it is likely that that business will not have any customers at all. 
Encryption is foundational to trust on the Internet.
Encryption, though, is not just a commercial or military technology. 
Individuals have long used encryption to keep their messages or identities 
secret, and modern computing has opened up the ability of individual users to 
gain access to advanced encryption technologies. The example of PGP, 
found in Chapter 3, is indicative of this. PGP was classified by the US as a 
munition, and the US sought to stop the export of the technology to foreign 
countries.  However, the nature of the Internet was such that the US was 
unable to stop the spread of the program across digital networks. The result 
being that individuals worldwide had access to military grade digital 
encryption. The effect of this was to spread the freedom of expression 
embedded in the code (Chapter 4 above) rendering it “no local ordinance.”9
Encryption technologies do two primary things.  First, like the Enigma 
Machine they can encrypt the contents of a communication. Second, and 
unlike the Enigma they can hide the identity of the communicator by hiding 
the device’s IP address thereby concealing the device’s location.10 As 
examples, PGP does the former, and the Tor web browser does the latter.11 
Encryption enables a spectrum of activities, but this section will examine two. 
The first of these activities is the much touted use of encryption by political 
8  DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (2014) 93.
9  Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 236.
10  Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012) 65 and Davis, “The Internet As a 
Source of Political Change in Egypt and Saudi Arabia” (2008) 35.
11  Tor is an “onion routing” network that conceals the IP addresses of individuals using 
the software.  See generally Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012) 135–168.
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dissidents in oppressive regimes.12  The Internet itself offered the benefits of 
“cost, speed, and ease of use” to social movements and political dissidents.13 
Encryption enhances these benefits by allowing dissidents to organize and 
communicate in places where such rights are not guaranteed under the local 
law.14  
As discussed in Chapter 4, Encryption technologies are closely tied to the 
anarcho-libertarian tradition in Cyberspace and specifically the Cypherpunks. 
This tradition frames cryptography as anti-authoritarian and pro-democratic. 
Encryption is a means with which to attack dominance and power of the 
state.15 Specifically they attack the dominance of the state through a technical 
renegotiation of identity. Cypherpunks argue that power structures maintain 
control on power by controlling the information that is necessary to a 
deliberative democracy.16 As an example, Julian Assange, the founder of 
WikiLeaks, wrote a file encryption program “designed for activists in 
repressive regimes” and named it “Rubber Hose.”17 The name is a reference 
to the physical violence that the state would need to inflict in order to gain 
access to the contents of the encrypted files. Political dissidents are obviously 
criminals within their own state, but encryption allows them to remove 
themselves from the political geography constructed within a given territory. 
Greenberg casts this freedom in terms of physical geography noting that 
cryptography can free the individual from “governments that don’t hesitate to 
knock down doors and haul away political enemies.”18 The individual escapes 
being identified by escaping their own location and thus escaping the political 
identity imposed on them through state mechanisms.  
The criminal nature of political expression in some states leads us to a 
second activity that is polarized from political dissent: cybercrime. While the 
uses of encryption by political dissidents is important, cybercrime activities 
make up a substantial amount of the encrypted bandwidth used.19 This is 
crime of all sorts: extortion and fraud schemes, child pornography, identity 
12  See generally Fielder, “The Internet and Dissent in Authoritarian States” (2013) 
161–91 and Castells, “Communication, Power and Counter-Power in the Network 
Society” (2007).
13  Fielder, “The Internet and Dissent in Authoritarian States” (2013) 162.
14  See, for example, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “Freedom 
of Expression on the Internet” (2011).
15  Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012) 148; Domscheit-Berg, Inside 
WikiLeaks (2011) 189; and Assange, Cypherpunks (2012) 1.
16  Id.
17  Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012) 126–27.
18  Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012) 136, 3.
19  For example Moore & Rid, “Cryptopolitik and the Darknet” (2016) 21–25.
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theft, and terrorism.20  Similar to dissidents, encryption allows criminals to 
step outside of their geographic strictures and escape the power of the state. 
However, only in the former instance can we say that the individual is 
expanding their rights to escape domestic political geography.  Cybercriminals 
usually engage in activities that are criminal within both their and their victim’s 
jurisdiction – meaning that they are only escaping their legal geography. 
Encryption protects both from the power of the state, but it allows dissidents 
to expand their political rights while it allows criminals to subvert their legal 
obligations.  The extension of self beyond the state and its implications for 
political geography may best be seen in the role of encryption in terrorism. 
After the Paris and San Bernardino attacks of 2015,21 a public debate erupted 
over whether the government should have a back door to commercial 
encryption technologies in order to combat terrorism.22 This debate was 
primed by revelations in the Snowden Leaks, which will be discussed in the 
context of state surveillance below. Here, though, the emphasis will be on 
how terrorist networks are able to extend themselves beyond their territorial 
confines to influence “world opinion.”23 Terrorists are seemingly both political 
actors and criminal actors.  Indeed, it is uncontested that post 9/11 there are 
a number of terrorist organizations that now qualify as global political actors in 
an “‘open source’ anarchy.”24 Terrorist networks use the Internet for 
propaganda and recruiting as well as to communicate via encrypted networks. 
These technologies have allowed terrorist organizations to step beyond their 
territorial geography and subvert international geography through cyber-
geography.
In fact, it could be argued that terrorists have organized themselves around a 
decentralized logic similar to the Internet’s, and Bergen and Hoffman argue 
that the terrorist networks have a very specific strategy of diversifying the 
threat that they pose.25 This means that threat innovates along with 
technological innovation.26  By decentralizing, these organizations are able to 
20  See generally National Center for Justice and the Rule of Law, Combating Cyber 
Crime (2007).
21  See generally “Paris Attacks: What Happened on the Night” (2015) and “Everything 
We Know about the San Bernardino Terror Attack Investigation so Far” (2015).
22  For example Gallagher, “NSA’s Director Says Paris Attacks ‘would Not Have 
Happened’ without Crypto” (2016); O’Neil, “Edward Snowden and Spread of Encryption 
Blamed after Paris Terror Attacks” (2015); and Knight, “Controlling Encryption Will Not 
Stop Terrorists” (2016).
23  Lewis, The Crisis of Islam (2004) 147.
24  Princeton Project on National Security, “Report of the Working Group on State 
Security and Transnational Threats” (2008) 10–11.
25  Bergen & Hoffman, Assessing the Terrorist Threat (2010).
26  Stewart & Mueller, “Cost-Benefit Analysis of Advanced Imaging Technology Full 
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recruit operatives within the territorial geography of the target country and the 
digital connection to the recruit serves as a medium to wield power in that 
state. Cyberspace gives terrorists political identity and allows terrorist 
organizations to function as “quasi-states” that push subversive political 
ideology through violence.27 This is not to say that encryption causes 
terrorism nor to say that it changes the content of the political message of 
terrorism.  Instead, the argument is that encryption changes the political 
geography that surrounds the terrorist.  It facilitates the strategy of allowing 
potentially anyone to become a global political actor by taking up the terrorist 
cause.
Of course, terrorism is an extreme case and there are many documented 
legitimate uses of encryption technology to challenge political regimes.28 The 
point here is not to choose a side in the debate over encryption. It is instead 
to show how it extends the political reach of the individual by “shift[ing] the 
balance of power from those with a monopoly on violence to those who 
comprehend mathematics and security design.”29 Encryption extends 
increased autonomy to the individual to assert rights denied within 
territorialized political geography.30 As noted earlier, there is a current debate 
over whether the government should be able to require a back door into 
encryption programs. The U.S. government could certainly require this 
through legislation, but to some extent it would be a futile move.31 This is 
because, as we see from PGP, anyone can code and release an encryption 
program, and as we see from the Liberator 3D-printed gun in Chapter 6, it is 
very easy to distribute code in contravention to U.S. law.  The result is that 
states lose exclusive control over the communicative conditions of their own 
political geography.32
Encryption enables the individual to have a “choice” in the “medium through 
which citizens exercise their political autonomy,” where before that choice 
was lacking.33 Encryption allows the individual to gain access to a political 
geography and participate on terms that are different from those produced by 
compressed territorial, legal, and political geographies. If the Internet is 
indeed the “public space of the 21st century,” then encryption technologies 
Body Scanners for Airline Passenger Security Screening” (2011) 2.
27  Clapham, “Degrees of Statehood” (1998) 150. 
28  See also Clinton, “Internet Rights and Wrongs” (2011) and Dunn, “Unplugging a 
Nation” (2011) 15.
29  Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012) 154
30  Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (2001) 118.
31  See Berkman Center, Don’t Panic Making Progress on the “Going Dark” Debate 
(2016).
32  Cohen, “Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure” (2008) 200.
33  Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (2001) 17.
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can be seen as marking the limits of its political geography.34
Taming the Masses
Adolph Eichmann, a former Nazi leader, was kidnapped by the State of Israel 
from his home in Argentina to whence he escaped at the end of World War II. 
He was then secreted out of the country and into the jurisdiction of Israel 
where he stood trial for his role in the Holocaust.35 It was generally agreed 
that Israel violated the sovereignty of Argentina in this extraordinary event,36 
but the two later signed an agreement settling the matter. The violation 
occurred because in international law territorial jurisdiction reigns supreme, or 
in other words, international governance favors Argentina’s border over 
Israel’s interest in justice. This is why states use extradition treaties to govern 
the transfer of individuals within their territorial jurisdiction to other states that 
may have jurisdiction over a criminal act. In the usual scenario, Israel would 
be forced to concede to Argentina’s dominance over its own territory and 
request that Argentina relinquish Eichmann.  
Eichmann illustrates an important feature of the 1945 spatial settlement, 
which is that states are generally prohibited from mediating the rights of 
individuals extraterritorially. The right to self-determination is expressed 
internationally through “political independence” of the state.37 States 
depended on territorial integrity to ensure that they maintained supreme 
authority within a given geography. In the wake of 9/11 however, states – or at 
least the US – have begun to conceive of themselves as having mutable 
borders that can be extended at will.38 Cyberspace is an instrumental tool in 
their conception of themselves in this manner.  States now routinely mediate 
the rights of individuals in other countries through digital surveillance and 
other cybertechnologies.39
Essentially, the same features that enable individuals to extend their rights 
through Cyberspace, also enable governments to use Cyberspace to surveil 
the individual. Despite the fact that encryption technologies are freely 
available, the bulk of Cyberspace communications happen on commercially 
encrypted networks. The networks collect vast quantities of data about 
individuals in a phenomenon known as “big data.” As Lessig notes “everything 
34  Clinton, “Internet Rights and Wrongs” (2011).
35  See generally Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963).
36  United Nations Security Council, S/RES/138 Question relating to the case of Adolf 
Eichmann (1960).
37  UN Charter (1945) Art. 1(2), 2(4).
38  For example Bowman, “Thinking Outside the Border” (2007) 189–251.
39  Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 209.
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you do on the Net produces data” that “is in aggregate extremely valuable.”40 
For instance, an ISP would have a record of IP addresses connected to by a 
user that would reveal interests, shopping habits, and professional and 
private associations. Beyond IP addresses bevies more information are held 
on computers, and as the US Supreme Court noted the “sum of an 
individual’s private life can be reconstructed” from the data on a cell phone.41 
A government’s ability to access this information reveals much more about an 
individual that traditional surveillance would.42
This type of data is collected for commercial purposes not for a single 
individual but for all users.  As noted in Chapter 2, Cyberspace is a ubiquitous 
medium, meaning that if governments can tap into the commercial entities 
they can gather profiles of information on individuals worldwide.43 It is this sort 
of activity that Edward Snowden revealed when he leaked a large trove of 
documents he collected as a National Security Agency (NSA) contractor.44 
These documents revealed a hidden legal and technical infrastructure 
implemented by the US and its allies in the wake of 9/11 to intercept 
communications.  The documents gave an “unparalleled first-hand look at the 
details of how the surveillance system actually operates.”45 Central to the 
public discourse on the Snowden Documents were their legality under US law 
in respect to US citizens, which is an important and interesting legal debate. 
The inquiry here though will not be into the legality of the US actions, it will 
instead focus on how these actions reshaped international political 
geography.  Specifically, it argues that the Snowden leaks reveal how the US 
reshaped the political geography of individuals it identified as “foreign.” 
PRISM serves as an excellent example of this US capability for mass global 
surveillance.  First revealed in June of 2013, PRISM is a secret program that 
received direct feeds of data from a number of commercial companies such 
as Microsoft and Google that collectively “cover the vast majority of online 
email, search, video and communications networks.”46  This program required 
40  Id. at 216.
41  Riley v. California (2014) 18.
42  See US v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (Sotomayor concurring) (2012).
43  Lessig, Free Culture (2004) 278.
44  Greenwald, “NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily” 
(2013). 
45  Greenwald, No Place to Hide (2014) 2.
46  Specific companies noted are Microsoft, Google, Facebook, Pal Talk, YouTube, 
Skype, AOL, and Apple. Greenwald & MacAskill, “NSA PRISM Program Taps in to User 
Data of Apple, Google and Others” (2013); National Security Agency, “PRISM/
US-984XN Overview of the SIGAD Used Most in NSA Reporting Overview” (2013); 
Gellman & Poitras, “U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet 
Companies in Broad Secret Program” (2013); Greenwald et al, “Microsoft Handed the 
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telecommunication companies to send all communications related to a 
“selector,” such as an email address, to the NSA. PRISM constituted 91% of 
the “internet communications that the NSA acquired.”47 Similarly, the NSA 
engaged in “upstream collection” that relied on the “compelled assistance ... 
of the providers that control the telecommunications backbone over which 
communications transit.”48 The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 
(PCLOB) reports that “approximately 26.5 million Internet transactions a year” 
are collected through upstream collection.49 Both of these push intelligence 
collection away from the locus an individual inhabits and into the Cyberspace 
an individual inhabits.  Collected data is then retained in a database that can 
be queried by authorized NSA employees in order to find information on a 
target.50  
The historical context of this surveillance system is important to 
understanding what it reveals about the changes in political geography. The 
overall surveillance program was authorized immediately after the 9/11 
terrorist attacks via an executive order from George W. Bush.51 The post 9/11 
environment was such that “few foreign policy objectives have garnered as 
much support as the struggle against terrorism.”52 The Justice Department 
later determined that the President’s Surveillance Program (PSP) needed a 
court approval, so it sought authorization from the classified Foreign 
NSA Access to Encrypted Messages” (2013); and MacAskill, “NSA Paid Millions to 
Cover Prism Compliance Costs for Tech Companies” (2013).
47  Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), “Report on the Surveillance 
Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act” 
(2014) 33–34. See also Greenwald & MacAskill, “NSA PRISM Program Taps in to User 
Data of Apple, Google and Others” (2013). 
48  PCLOB, “Report on the Surveillance Program” (2014) 35; National Security Agency, 
“(TS//SI/NF) FAA Certification Renewals With Caveats” (2011).
49  PCLOB, “Report on the Surveillance Program” (2014) 37, 39.
50  Greenwald & MacAskill, “Boundless Informant” (2014) and National Security 
Agency, “BOUNDLESSINFORMANT – Frequently Asked Questions” (2012). See also 
Greenwald, “XKEYSCORE” (2013).
51  Executive Order 12333: United States Intelligence Activities (2001).  See National 
Security Agency Office of Inspector General, “Working Draft Report from March 24, 
2009 on Stellar Wind (PSP)” 1–3; PCLOB, “Report on the Surveillance Program” (2014) 
16–18; and Gallington, “Perspectives on Collection, Retention, and Dissemination of 
Intelligence” (2014) 2.
52  Nincic & Ramos, “Torture in the Public Mind” (2011) 231–49, 233.  See also Stewart 
& Mueller, “Cost-Benefit Analysis of Advanced Imaging Technology” (2011); Gallington, 
“Perspectives on Collection, Retention, and Dissemination of Intelligence” (2014) 10; 
Wittes, “The Intelligence Legitimacy Paradox” (2014); Princeton Project on National 
Security, “Report of the Working Group” (2008); and Greenwald, No Place to Hide 
(2014) 5.
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Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).53  The program itself went through 
several iterations as the government struggled to meet constitutional 
compliance behind closed doors, and it was eventually given statutory 
authority, albeit in vague terms, in §702 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA).54  At the center of the adjustments was ensuring that 
the surveillance methods were properly within the bounds of the search and 
seizure restrictions in the US Constitution’s 4th Amendment.55 Under the FISA 
– the same legislation that created the FISC – the US government does not 
need a warrant to gather “foreign intelligence” from individuals that are not US 
persons and are reasonably believed to be “located outside of the United 
States.”56 In other words, the 4th amendment does not apply to non-US 
citizens outside the borders of the US. As a result, the NSA’s surveillance was 
premised on the non-territorial-ness of the target.  Snowden argues that the 
use of “foreign” is a “rhetorical shift [that] is a tacit acknowledgement by 
governments that they recognize they have crossed beyond the boundaries of 
justifiable activities.”57  Snowden also revealed that the foreign surveillance 
sometimes bled back through the borders of the US58 “turn[ing] the U.S. into a 
53  NSA OIG, “Working Draft Report from March 24, 2009” 36–37; PCLOB, “Report on 
the Surveillance Program” (2014) 16–18, 42; and United States Department of Justice, 
“Exhibit A: Procedures Used by the National Security Agency for Targeting Non-United 
States Persons Reasonably Believed to Be Located Outside the United States to 
Acquire Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as Amended” (2009). See also Gallington, 
“Perspectives on Collection, Retention, and Dissemination of Intelligence” (2014) 5–6 
and PCLOB, “Report on the Surveillance Program” (2014) 26–27.
54  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 95 Pub.L. 511; Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, 110 Pub. L. 261; and PCLOB, 
“Report on the Surveillance Program” (2014) 19, 81–84.  See also Greenwald & 
MacAskill, “NSA PRISM Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google and Others” 
(2013). 
55  PCLOB, “Report on the Surveillance Program” (2014) 89–90.
56  PCLOB “Report on the Surveillance Program” (2014) 20–21. Foreign intelligence is 
“information that relates to the ability of the United States to protect against actual or 
potential attack by a foreign power; sabotage, international terrorism, or the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction by a foreign power; or clandestine activities by a 
foreign power.” Id.  at 22. See also Gallington, “Perspectives on Collection, Retention, 
and Dissemination of Intelligence” (2014) 5.
57  Snowden, “Testimony before the Parliament of the European Union” (2014). 
58  Gellman & Poitras, “U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet 
Companies in Broad Secret Program” (2013); Greenwald & Ackerman, “How the NSA Is 
Still Harvesting Your Online Data” (2013); Greenwald & Ball, “The Top Secret Rules 
That Allow NSA to Use US Data without a Warrant” (2014); Greenwald & Ackerman, 
“NSA Collected Americans’ Email Records in Bulk for Two Years under Obama” (2013); 
Ball & Ackerman, “NSA Loophole Allows Warrantless Search for US Citizens’ Emails 
and Phone Calls” (2013); Gellman, “NSA Broke Privacy Rules Thousands of Times per 
Year, Audit Finds” (2013); and National Security Agency, “(U//FOUO) NSAW SID 
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foreign nation electromagnetically.”59 The uses revealed by Snowden show 
that “[t]echnology is agnostic of nationality,” and the US only required a 
“reasonable belief” that the individual was outside of US territory to fulfill the 
“foreignness requirement.”60 Foreignness is important, because under the 
international governance system, the US surveillance of its own citizens is 
legal as a matter of sovereignty. It is foreign surveillance of individuals in 
territories outside of US jurisdiction that seems to be most problematic within 
international political geography.   
It is not exceptional that a portion of the Bill of Rights does not extend outside 
the borders of the US as it is a guarantee of rights in the US, and the 4th 
Amendment is one of the rights that is guaranteed only to citizens and to 
noncitizens within US borders.61 This presents a somewhat dichotomous 
position for the US. On one hand, former Secretary of State Clinton argued 
for the extension of First Amendment rights to Cyberspace, and on the other 
hand the government is secretly not extending Fourth Amendment rights.62 
The dichotomy exists because the freedom of speech that the government 
asserts should be extended is protected by the 4th Amendment impediment 
to government interference in one’s private life. So, the “universal” rights that 
Clinton offers are extended unevenly based on a political identity.
The hallmark of the activities exposed by Snowden is the replacement of 
individualized suspicion of criminality, critical to the U.S. Constitution 4th 
Amendment warrant requirement, with a permanently suspect political identity 
of “foreign.”63  As a result, FISC does not make determinations as to whether 
particular foreign individuals will be surveilled. Judicial review is instead 
limited to determining whether the procedures, which are adopted and 
authorized secretly, “are reasonably designed” to prevent surveillance of US 
persons or of individuals within the borders of the US.64  What is exceptional 
is the US government’s power to actively transform political space outside of 
Intelligence Oversight (IO) Quarterly Report – First Quarter Calendar Year 2012 (1 
January – 31 March 2012 – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY” (2012).
59  Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012) 223. See also Wittes, “The 
Intelligence Legitimacy Paradox” (2014). See also PCLOB, “Report on the Surveillance 
Program” (2014) 23, 42, 85. 
60  Snowden, “Testimony before the Parliament of the European Union” (2014) 5 and 
PCLOB, “Report on the Surveillance Program” (2014) 21, 43–52.
61  Id. at 86–7, 100–102.
62  Clinton, “Internet Rights and Wrongs” (2011)  See also US DoD, “Department of 
Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace” (2011).
63  PCLOB, “Report on the Surveillance Program” (2014) 18.
64  For example see United States Department of Justice, “Memorandum for the 
Attorney General” (2007); United States Department of Justice, “Exhibit A” (2009); and 
PCLOB, “Report on the Surveillance Program” (2014) 26–27. 
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its borders. It is able to do this because “much of the world’s communications 
flow through the US.”65  This means that it is able to leverage its territory into 
the territory of other states.66  
What Snowden revealed was not just a surveillance program, but a 
fundamental shift, from the state’s point of view, in the extent to which a state 
can shape the political geography outside its own borders. It has long been 
understood that surveillance reshapes space, and that “[p]rivacy has a spatial 
dimension.”67 This is the core idea in Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, and 
Cohen argues that modern rhizomatic surveillance systems dramatically 
change public and private space.68 Surveillance “alters the experience of 
places in ways that do not depend entirely on whether anyone is actually 
watching.”69 Lessig terms it a “burden” that is imposed on the individual,70 and 
Greenwald notes that a citizenry that is aware of always being watched 
quickly becomes a compliant and fearful one.”71 Transnational surveillance, 
then, exerts a new political geography on the individual by placing burdens on 
him or her that “alters the balance of powers and disabilities” within 
Cyberspace.72  As a result, despite the fact that this is a government action, it 
is one that erodes the borders of international geography, because borders 
historically inhibited extraterritorial surveillance of this scale and scope. This 
loss of “political independence” is exhibited in Snowden’s testimony before 
the European Parliament in which he states that “without getting out of my 
chair, I could have read the private communications of any member of this 
committee, as well as any ordinary citizen.”73 In fact, Snowden’s leaks confirm 
that the US engaged in just this sort of surveillance,74 which bears 
“implications for our assumptions of how international relations unfold.”75  The 
65  NSA, “PRISM/US-984XN” (2013).
66  Lam, “EXCLUSIVE: US Hacked Pacnet, Asia Pacific Fibre-Optic Network Operator, 
in 2009” (2013); Lam & Chen, “EXCLUSIVE: US Spies on Chinese Mobile Phone 
Companies, Steals SMS Data” (2013); Poitras, Rosenbach, & Stark, “NSA Spies on 
500 Million German Data Connections” (2013).
67  Cohen, “Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure” (2008) 181. See also Kirby, 
“Minding the Gap” (2013) 10–11.
68  Cohen, “Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure” (2008) 184–186
69  Id. at 192
70  Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 218.
71  Greenwald, No Place to Hide (2014) 3.
72  Cohen, “Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure” (2008) 193.
73  Snowden, “Testimony before the Parliament of the European Union” (2014) 2.
74  MacAskill et al., “GCHQ Intercepted Foreign Politicians’ Communications at G20 
Summits” (2013); Poitras et al., “NSA Spied on European Union Offices” (2013); 
MacAskill & Borger, “New NSA Leaks Show How US Is Bugging Its European Allies” 
(2013); “NSA Hacked UN Videocalls as Part of Surveillance Program, Claims Report” 
(2013).
75  Dittmer, “Everyday Diplomacy” (2015) 604–05.
147 Reprogramming the World
ability of the US to surveil the communications of foreign politicians indicates 
a change in their political geography, since “[s]paces exposed by surveillance 
function differently than spaces that are not so exposed.”76
It should also be emphasized that the state’s ability to transform political 
geography outside of its borders is based on its ceding of authority to 
corporate intermediaries as discussed in the previous chapter.77 The ability of 
these networks to expand their reach extends the reach of the state to data, 
and corporations incentivize individuals to enroll in the “surveillant 
assemblage” using “benefits and pleasures, including price discounts, social 
status, and voyeuristic entertainment.”78 The state benefits from the corporate 
goal “to harness raw power of data.”79 Indeed, the reliance on “private 
intermediaries has equipped states with new forms of sometimes 
unaccountable and nontransparent power over information flows.”80 It should 
also be noted that these activities are not limited to the US, and Snowden 
revealed a “surveillant assemblage” that includes the UK,81 France,82 
Australia,83 and Germany.84
The state’s ability to transform political geography should also be considered 
within the context of the ability to transform territorial geography discussed in 
Chapter 6. IoT allows states to control physical infrastructure in foreign 
domains as shown with Stuxnet.  It also enables digitized violence as found in 
the US use of drones. The Predator drone was first developed as a 
surveillance tool for the Air Force, a purpose it served until the 2000s when it 
was fitted with munitions to carry out targeted killings in foreign countries.85 
76  Cohen, “Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure” (2008) 194.  See also 
Dittmer, “Everyday Diplomacy” (2015) 604–19.
77  See Rushe, “Skype’s Secret Project Chess Reportedly Helped NSA Access 
Customers’ Data” (2013); Risen & Wingfield, “Web’s Reach Binds N.S.A. and Silicon 
Valley Leaders” (2013); Greenwald et al., “Microsoft Handed the NSA Access to 
Encrypted Messages” (2013); Timberg & Nakashima, “Agreements with Private 
Companies Protect U.S. Access to Cables’ Data for Surveillance” (2013); Ball, Harding, 
& Garside, “BT and Vodafone among Telecoms Companies Passing Details to GCHQ” 
(2013); and Greenet Ltd. et al v. GCHQ - Statement of Grounds (2014).
78  Cohen, “Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure” (2008) 187.
79  Id. at 186.
80  DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (2014) 15.
81  Hopkins & Borger, “Exclusive: NSA Pays £100m in Secret Funding for GCHQ” 
(2013); Hopkins, Borger, & Harding, “GCHQ: Inside the Top Secret World of Britain’s 
Biggest Spy Agency” (2013); and Dittmer, “Everyday Diplomacy” (2015) 604–19.
82  Chrisafis, “France ‘Runs Vast Electronic Spying Operation Using NSA-Style 
Methods’” (2013).
83  Dorling, “Snowden Reveals Australia’s Links to US Spy Web” (2013).
84  “German Intelligence Agencies Used NSA Spying Program” (2013).
85  Michel, “A History of Violence” (2015).
148Unbordered Rights
The Predator is connected to a user in the US via a communications link built 
on Internet technology and relayed by a commercial telecommunications 
satellite.86 If the drone is understood as a ‘thing’ on the IoT, then it is the 
embodiment of digitized violence. The political geography ascribed to the 
targets of drones by the international system is transformed dramatically 
through Cyberspace as the state mediates the right to fair trial and the right to 
life. 
Networked Global Politics
What has been described in the previous two sections is a cross reaching of 
power, and they both describe changes in the political geography at a 
localized perspective.  A further inquiry should be made into what this does to 
the political geography of international space. This inquiry will reveal borders 
are shifted when other entities are networked in at a power level that can 
directly contest states.  One of the implications of the previous two sections is 
that states have ceded authority in Internet governance, and that they rely on 
their ability to blend in with non-state actors online. This section will examine 
hacktivists as evidence of a world-scale political geography that networks in 
non-state actors.  The term itself invokes the idea of changing technology (i.e. 
hacking) for political change (i.e. activism). Hacktivists “use cryptography to 
effect political change,” as a means of giving power “to the people.”87 This 
section will trace a narrative of hacktivism that will illustrate this 
transformation in global political geography.
In November of 2010, the website WikiLeaks began to publish leaked US 
State Department Diplomatic cables onto the Internet, in an incident that 
came to be known as Cablegate. WikiLeaks is a website founded by Julian 
Assange that is, in its own words, a “multi-national media organization and 
associated library” that has a perfect record in “resistance to all censorship 
attempts.”88 The website “specializes in the analysis and publication of large 
datasets of censored or otherwise restricted official materials involving war, 
spying and corruption” (again in its own words).89 Assange has gone so far 
as to put this in diplomatic terms, stating “WikiLeaks is a giant library of the 
world’s most persecuted documents. We give asylum to these documents, we 
analyze them, we promote them and we obtain more.”90 According to 
Domscheit-Berg, Assange focused on the US specifically “seeking out 
86  Id. 
87  Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012) 131, 168.
88  WikiLeaks, “What is WikiLeaks” (2015). 
89  Id.
90  Id.
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the biggest possible adversary.”91
The Cablegate releases were the catalyst for WikiLeaks’ and Assange’s quick 
rise to global prominence. This led to Assange being characterized in the 
rhetoric of the state as a “terrorist” and “outrageous, reckless, and 
despicable.”92 The releases were unprecedented in nature and caused 
serious embarrassment for the US as well as security concerns globally, 
though WikiLeaks did attempt to minimize the exposure of human life. The 
251,287 documents gave an unparalleled glimpse into the international 
relations of the United States and exposed to the public eye government 
processes that in general remain closed.  They were leaked by a young army 
soldier named Chelsea Manning, who was later prosecuted in the United 
States for releasing the documents.93 The US began to mount a case against 
Assange, and began to apply diplomatic pressure in order to find a way to get 
to Assange.94 Then in August of 2010, a warrant for Assange’s arrest was 
issued in Sweden on the basis of rape allegations.95 The UK placed Assange 
under house arrest while it determined whether or not extradition was proper 
with the UK Supreme Court making an affirmative decision in May of 2012.96 
Assange then fled to the Ecuadorian Embassy in London where he was 
granted asylum. The UN Human Rights Council’s Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention released an opinion in February of 2016 that ruled the detention 
“arbitrary.”97 
As of this writing, Assange has been expelled from the Ecuadorian Embassy 
as the result of an internal change in leadership in Ecuador. The leadership 
accused Assange of using his refuge in the embassy to meddle in internal 
affairs of other states and revoked his asylum status for “the trangression of 
international treaties.”98 He is serving a short sentence for failing to surrender 
to court and is facing possible extradition to either Sweden or the United 
States.99  
Diplomatic pressure was not the only pressure that the United States 
91  Domscheit-Berg, Inside WikiLeaks (2011) 189, 160. 
92  Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012) 177.
93  Tate, “Bradley Manning Sentenced to 35 Years in WikiLeaks Case” (2013).
94  Greenwald & Gallagher, “Snowden Documents Reveal Covert Surveillance and 
Pressure Tactics Aimed at WikiLeaks and Its Supporters” (2014).
95  Domscheit-Berg, Inside WikiLeaks (2011) 203–215.
96  Bowcott, “Julian Assange Loses Appeal against Extradition” (2012).
97  UN Human Rights Council’s Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 
54/2015 concerning Julian Assange (2015) Para 99.
98  Dillet & Lomas, “Julian Assange arrested in London after Ecuador withdraws 
asylum” (2019).
99  Id.
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mounted.  It also attempted to get the corporations within their borders to put 
pressure on Assange by ceasing to allow their services to be used to support 
WikiLeaks. Several major companies, such as Amazon, PayPal, and 
Mastercard, succumbed to this pressure displaying their corporate authority 
over the Internet. There was no public legal action taken against these 
corporations, and the government denied such actions.100 This cued the 
entrance of the hacktivist group Anonymous.
Anonymous is a hacker collective that is geographically distributed and whose 
identities are as secret as code can keep them. In the group’s own words, 
“Anonymous is a loose collection of individual people around the world.  [...] 
Anonymous is notoriously associated with hacking and hacking operations, 
but over the years has evolved into a majority protest/civil activist 
movement.”101 Significantly, Anonymous has no leader and anyone can join.102 
The “nihilistic” group has been associated with a number of high profile hacks 
that generally have some variety of social justice motive.103  They have 
declared operations against groups like the CIA,104 Westboro Baptist 
Church,105 Mexican drug cartels,106 the Church of Scientology,107 the Islamic 
State,108 and even Kanye West.109 As Cablegate unfolded, Anonymous 
employed DDoS attacks against the corporations that they claimed were 
censoring WikiLeaks.110  In addition to corporations, Anonymous also attacked 
governments such as Zimbabwe and Tunisia that were censoring the 
documents.111 Anonymous’ actions were undergirded by a philosophy that 
“knowledge is free,” a phrase that resonates with the political geography 
described in Chapter 4.112
A third, but unlikely to be final, act in this leaking drama are the leaks of 
Edward Snowden. Snowden, it must be assumed, was to some extent 
100  Greenwald & Gallagher, “Snowden Documents Reveal Covert Surveillance” (2014) 
and Clinton, “Internet Rights and Wrongs” (2011).
101  AnonHQ, “The Most Frequently Asked Questions People Have About Anonymous” 
(2016).
102  Id.
103  Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012) 185.
104  Albanesius, “Anonymous Takes Down CIA Web Site” (2012).
105  Popkin, “Anonymous ‘Brandjacks’ Westboro Baptist Church on Facebook” (2013).
106  Associated Press, “‘Anonymous’ Hackers Threaten Drug Cartel” (2011).
107  See Daniel Domscheit-Berg, Inside WikiLeaks (2011) 35.
108  Brooking, “Anonymous vs. the Islamic State” (2015). 
109  “Kanye West Targeted by ‘Anonymous’ in Searing Video” (2015).
110  Mackey, “‘Operation Payback’ Attacks Target MasterCard and PayPal Sites to 
Avenge WikiLeaks” (2010).
111  “Anonymous Activists Target Tunisian Government Sites” (2014).
112  Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012) 185.
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inspired by this global drama over government transparency, and like 
Manning he released a trove of government documents to the press.  Several 
days after the first leak, the same journalists that broke the leaks also broke 
the identity of the leaker by publishing an interview with Snowden. In this 
interview he stated that he hoped his leaks “will trigger [debate] among 
citizens around the globe about what kind of world we want to live in.”113 
Snowden’s interview was from a hotel room in Hong Kong. While the United 
States scrambled to put in motion the legal process for getting to Snowden, 
he was quietly shuttled onto a plane that took him to the international terminal 
of the Moscow airport before the US could cancel his passport.114  He lived in 
the international zone of the airport, outside the legal and political borders of 
any state, for more than a month.115  During this time, it was rumored that he 
was going to be given asylum in Bolivia and that he was aboard a diplomatic 
flight transporting the president of Bolivia.116  The United States applied a 
great deal of diplomatic pressure, and as a result Portugal, France, Italy, and 
Spain denied access of this plane to their airspace.117 The plane was 
eventually rerouted to Vienna, where it was searched and the Austrian 
Foreign Minister confirmed that Snowden was not aboard.118 Snowden was 
granted temporary asylum for one year in Russia, which has since been 
renewed.119 He was represented by WikiLeaks attorneys in the negotiations 
with the Russian government. In fact, WikiLeaks contributed a great deal of 
resources to ensure that Snowden did not fall back within the jurisdiction of 
the US.120 From a legal and political enclave of Ecuador in the territory of the 
UK, Assange was able to wield global political power to subvert the 
international power of the US.  
This narrative is not intended to lionize Assange, Manning, Snowden, or the 
members of Anonymous. The facts surrounding each require particularized 
ethical reflection. Instead, this narrative is used to expose a new form of 
global networked power that is pushing up against the territorially ordered 
international political system. Three observations of this narrative illustrate 
113  Greenwald, MacAskill, & Poitras, “Edward Snowden” (2013) and Citizen Four (HBO 
Films 2014).
114  Branigan & Elder, “Edward Snowden Leaves Hong Kong for Moscow” (2013).
115  Luhn, “Edward Snowden Leaves Moscow Airport after Russia Grants Asylum” 
(2013).
116   Roberts, “Bolivian President’s Jet Rerouted amid Suspicions Edward Snowden on 
Board” (2013) and Lally & Forero, “Bolivian President’s Plane Forced to Land in Austria 
in Hunt for Snowden” (2013).
117  Id.
118  Id. 
119  Branigan & Elder, “Edward Snowden Leaves Hong Kong for Moscow” (2013).
120  Kelley, “Edward Snowden’s Relationship With WikiLeaks Should Concern 
Everyone” (2014) and Sledge, “Edward Snowden Gambles On Alliance With WikiLeaks” 
(2013).
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aspects of the new political geography formed as cybergeography comes into 
proximity with international geography. The first observation is the role of 
encryption technologies within this narrative. Greenberg notes that “the 
technology that enables the spillers of secrets has been accelerating with the 
dawn of the computer” and that the Internet caused a “Cambrian explosion” of 
tools to empower the individual.121 Encryption technologies are foundational to 
the WikiLeaks platform, critical to hiding the identity of Anonymous activists, 
and were the tool used by Snowden to transfer his leaks to the press.  In the 
Cablegate episode, Manning may never have been caught except that she 
revealed herself to a fellow hacker that turned her in,122 and Snowden revealed 
his own identity.  Encryption allows the leaker to transform politics within the 
global space by transforming their own identity, a function enabled within the 
communicative conditions of Cyberspace.
The second observation is the role of borders within this narrative.  Borders 
are freely deconstructed and reconstructed at will by states creating ripples in 
the construction of the international system.  Borders themselves are recoded 
to hold both traditional content as well as new fluid geographies. For instance, 
at numerous points we see borders serving traditional functions.  Assange 
was subject to the international process of extradition, but he claimed asylum 
within the diplomatic borders of Ecuador. Assange was thus protected through 
established international governance mechanisms, so long as Ecuador 
wanted to protect him (they eventually withdrew their protection and handed 
him over to the British police in April 2019).  Similarly, Hong Kong allowed 
Snowden to leave for Moscow claiming that “documents filed by the US did 
not fully comply with legal requirements.”123 In addition, we see a display of 
states flexing their territorial authority in denying their airspace to a plane that 
potentially carried Snowden. At the same time, borders are reinscribed in 
different ways that reveal their imaginariness. Assange’s exile reveals the 
legal fiction of territory, which gets highlighted when the same type of 
diplomatic territory is so easily violated in the case of the Austrian search of 
Bolivia’s diplomatic flight.  Similarly, Snowden’s existence in the nowhere of 
an airport displays the fictions in territory.  While Assange and Snowden are 
relying on international geography for protection, they at the same time reveal 
the imaginaries that surround the individual and hack together new spatial 
realities for themselves. The role of territorial, legal, and political borders 
across this narrative arc is indicative of geographic duality that Cyberspace 
enables. Individuals can exploit the geography of Cyberspace and remain 
unconfined in their ability to reach out and affect processes outside the 
territory in which they exist, so long as they have access to the network.124  
121  Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012) 6.
122  Id. at 31–32.
123  Branigan & Elder, “Edward Snowden Leaves Hong Kong for Moscow” (2013). 
124  Henley, “Ecuador cuts off Julian Assange’s internet access at London embassy” 
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Finally, the articulation of power within this narrative shows new patterns that 
reflect a new shape of world-scale political geography.  Within this narrative, 
states are engaged in international politics in order to resolve the issues 
caused by transnational actors. This power though is often inflected through 
corporate power structures as can be seen in the Cablegate episode and in 
the programs such as PRISM that Snowden unveiled.  The state’s power is 
now part of a, pardon the pun, diversified portfolio. Power is inflected back at 
the state through individuals that assert themselves as adversaries on equal 
footing with the state and become “global political player[s].”125  Though each 
has their own interesting spatial standing, each is able to leverage 
themselves in such a way that they challenge the political space of the state 
from outside its political geography. Interestingly, Assange is reported to have 
“adopted the language of the power mongers he claimed to be combatting,” 
which shows how he was positioning WikiLeaks as an adversary of equal 
standing to the state.126 These acts are beyond civil disobedience, which is “a 
public nonviolent conscientious yet political act contrary to law” with the goal 
of changing the status quo.127  These technologies remove the “price” of legal 
consequences through the use of encryption technologies.128  Instead, as an 
anonymous author stated in 2600: The Hacker Quarterly “[h]ackers are no 
longer anonymous independent operators or groups: We are now a known 
and calculated factor” in power structures.129 While this is easily read as 
boastful, it is hard to ignore the attention that cybersecurity is receiving at the 
top levels of governments and corporations, among others. Indeed, 
governments, corporations, and hacktivists must be examined together to 
reveal “the baroque workings of power” in global politics.130 These “baroque 
workings” are highlighted not just by attacks on corporations and states by 
groups like Anonymous, but also in cases of attacks on corporations by states 
such as with North Korea and Sony. 
Geographic duality is maybe the best way to describe the situation in which 
Cyberspace exists within international space and international space exists 
within Cyberspace creating a unified world-scale geography in which neither 
is dominant. While this rings like an attempt at empty metaphysics, we find it 
reflected in the architecture of Cyberspace. The physical layers of 
Cyberspace and the users in Cyberspace exist within the borders of the state 
and therefore within the borders of the international. But, the logical layer of 
the Internet is made of algorithms, and these are ideas operationalized 
(2018).
125  Domscheit-Berg, Inside WikiLeaks (2011) 270.
126  Id. at 200–201.
127  Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971) 364.
128  Id. at 367.
129  Prisoner #6, “The 21st Century Hacker Manifesto” (2014–2015) 50.
130  Dittmer, “Everyday Diplomacy” (2015) 616.
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through machinery.131 This means that the logical layer is a manifestation of 
human consciousness. Or in simpler terms, the logical layer is ideas, and 
ideas are notoriously hard to control.
---
This chapter has shown how world-scale political geography is shifting as 
new actors become mediums for power within the system and serves as a 
capstone for Part II, which highlights encounters where cybergeographies 
come into proximity of international geographies. The various cases and 
incidents addressed in this section are meant to reveal complexity within the 
system by layering the spatial, legal, and political geography of Cyberspace 
onto the spatial, legal, and political geography of international space. This 
layering shows the junctures and disjunctures of these two intermingled 
geographies. The following final chapter will pull these various threads 
together and posit that Cyberspace short circuits international governance 
processes and allows actors to reprogram the world. 
131  Berlinski, The Advent of the Algorithm (2000) xii. 
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Conclusion
“The algorithm has come to occupy a central place in our imagination.  It is 
the second great scientific idea of the West.  There is no third.”
David Berlinski
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In 1515, a live rhinoceros arrived in Portugal. It was a gift from Sultan 
Muzaffar II of Gujarat to King Manuel I of Portugal. The King then gifted the 
creature on to Pope Leo X, but the rhino died in transport.  The pope instead 
received the taxidermied corpse, and German artist Albrecht Dürer based a 
drawing, titled Rhinoceron, on a sketch and secondhand description of that 
corpse. This drawing was then turned into a woodcut that made it 
reproducible on the printing press. Dürer’s rhinoceros, though fairly 
inaccurate, was reproduced and became the dominant depiction of the 
rhinoceros for well over a hundred years. The medium introduced by 
Gutenberg, facilitated the spread of an idea that became tenaciously melded 
into the public understanding of what constituted the thing that was signified 
by “rhinoceros.”132
The “boilerplate rhino” is a function of “Gutenberg’s revolution,” and it 
illustrates the ability of ideas to entrench themselves through reproduction.133 
The power of the image is itself a function of its reach, and Dürer’s decision 
to make the image a woodcut shows his intent for mass market publication.134 
Similarly, Chapter 5 discussed the power of cartography in constructing 
imaginary cartographies. These images of the international system are the 
graphic conceptualization of the “Westphalian state.” This term itself is one 
that has been entrenched through repetition and reification and is still used to 
describe the international system despite the dramatic differences between 
the contemporary nation state and the nation state that emerged from the 
Peace of Westphalia.135 The resulting ‘boilerplate state’ is one that reifies its 
border through the projection of legal jurisdiction and political identity across 
a spatial geography denoted by solid black lines on a map. The Westphalian 
imaginary was repeatedly recast onto the developing international system as 
a descriptor and a depictor. 
132  Quammen, The Boilerplate Rhino (2000) 201–209.
133  Id. at 203.
134  Id. at 206.
135  See generally Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (2005) 51–70.
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This final chapter will examine how Cyberspace reprograms international 
governance. The first section of this chapter will use the metaphor of 
lawmaking as programming as an analytic lens to show how Cyberspace 
changes the processes of the international system.  The second section will 
then delve into some of the theoretical implications of a reprogrammed world. 
Specifically, this section will examine the connection between a global 
cybergeography and the project of Cosmopolitanism and global governance. 
The final section will identify challenges and questions that a reprogrammed 
world presents for future research.
Rule by Algorithm
Director Terry Gilliam’s film Brazil depicts a dystopian future governed by 
complexly bureaucratic government.  In the film, a farcical error in a printer 
causes the death of an innocent civilian by putting in motion a bureaucratic 
process that must run to completion.  The bureaucracy is such that a terrorist, 
played by Robert De Niro, is a renegade heating and air conditioning 
repairman who now fixes HVAC systems without filing the proper paperwork, 
much to the chagrin of the process-oriented government.  The film’s aesthetic 
is marked by the use of bizarre machines that personify the complex 
bureaucratic machinations of the governance system.  Indeed, De Niro’s 
character, Archibald Tuttle’s crime of terror is that of short-circuiting the 
governance system and bypassing established processes. In the world 
Gilliam creates, code is not law so much as law is code.  
What Gilliam portrays is a government that has become so process 
burdened, that its own existence and internal legitimacy are functions of its 
processing power – its ability to administer the state, which is distinct from 
governing the state. The metaphor Gilliam exploits is that of governance as a 
machine.  The reason this metaphor has such resonance is that the modern 
bureaucratic state emerged alongside the industrial age.  Bureaucracy is a 
form of government that is meant to work like a machine to some extent. 
Lawmakers make laws that are implemented and carried out by government 
officials.  In this model, lawmakers define the inputs and the outputs and the 
administrative branch of government devises procedures (i.e. regulation) for 
accomplishing these tasks. While administrators make decisions, the 
processes they must follow confine their actions in such a way as to ensure 
the legislated outcomes.  
If it is accepted that code is law, then programmers become lawmakers. 
Whether they are working to spec on a contract or working for their own 
personal purposes, programmers create rules by writing algorithms. 
Computer programs are made of algorithms, which are “effective procedure[s 
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or] a way of getting something done in a finite number of discrete steps.”1 
This is similar to the role of procedural legitimacy in governance systems, 
which seeks to set procedures that reproduce just outcomes consistently. 
Rawls, for instance, noted this metaphorical link between computing and 
governance, describing the “political process as a machine which makes 
social decisions when the views of representatives and their constituents are 
fed into it.”2 This observation points to the central metaphor employed by this 
section, which is understanding law as code. This metaphor will be used as 
an analytic tool to illustrate pragmatically how Cyberspace reprograms the 
world.  At the outset, it should be noted that this is a limited metaphor, but it is 
being used at a very high level of application in order to illustrate why the 
model presented herein matters to scholars of international governance.  
Computer code is esoteric to the average individual despite its ubiquity.  It is 
the magic in the machine that is often depicted in movies as a dizzying 
stream of green 1s and 0s whizzing past coders typing at lightning speed. 
While computer code can be quite complex, how it functions should not be 
esoteric. Code can be understood as a syntax for instructions to produce 
different results.  Code is a manifestation of formal logic in that it often occurs 
as if/then and x=y type statements.  Code is, quite simply, a set of instructions 
or procedures.
Code tells the computer (i.e. the machine itself) what to do through a set of 
logical arguments that come in a specific order. As an example, a 
microcontroller is a small computer that can be programmed to manipulate 
physical objects.  Beginners are often taught how to write code that uses the 
microcontroller to turn an LED light on and off with the press of a button.  This 
code functions in a series of steps (see Fig. 9.1). It will first assign the button 
to an input and the LED to an output.  Next, it will tell the computer to check 
the state of the input and store it. Then it instructs the machine that if the 
button is pushed, then the light should be turned on. Otherwise, the light 
should be off.  These procedures run over and over, constantly monitoring for 
the state of the button and adjusting the state of the LED as necessary.  Until 
the program is stopped these are the rules that govern the functions of the 
machine by instructing how to turn its inputs into outputs.
1  Berlinski, The Advent of the Algorithm (2000) xvi.
2  Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971) 196.
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#define LED 12            //assigns LED to output pin
#define BUTTON 7          //assigns button to input pen  
int val = 0;              //val is a variable used to 
                          //store the staof the input
int state = 0;            //state is a variable, 
                          //0=LED on & 1 =LED on 
void setup()              //portion of the program sets up            
                          //microcontroller
{
  pinMode(LED, OUTPUT);    //LED is an output
  pinMode(BUTTON, INPUT);  //BUTTON is an input
}
void loop()                  //the procedures that will be repeated
{
  val = digitalRead(BUTTON);  //read the input and store it as val
  
  if (val == HIGH){           //Check to see if the button is pressed
    state = 1 - state;        //Change state variable 
    
  }
  if  (state == 1) {          //if the button is pressed
    digitalWrite(LED, HIGH);  //turn on the LED 
  }
  else {                      //if the button is not pressed
    digitalWrite(LED, LOW);   //turn off the LED
  }}
Fig. 9.1: Simple Arduino microcontroller program from turning an LED light 
on and off with a button. The portions after the “//” are comments that tell 
what each line of code does. Adapted from Banzi.3
One of the unexplored areas of Lessig’s “code is law” principle is the use of it 
as a means to reflect back on law as code.  In a modern bureaucratic state, 
law can be explained in terms of code.4  In this model a state’s constitution is 
an operating system, its legislation becomes its programs, and regulations 
become the procedures that are performed over and over to produce results, 
such as justice, until the program is changed by users. The international 
system is akin to a network that connects the various operating systems and 
mediates the interactions between these autonomous computers.
3  Banzi, Getting Started With Arduino (2011).
4  Berlinski, The Advent of the Algorithm (2000) xiii.
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The first thing to note here is how this connects with legitimacy as discussed 
in Chapter 4. The legislature in this model sets outputs which include things 
such as practical outcomes (e.g. lowering of crime), efficiency outcomes (e.g. 
in procurement process), and political outcomes in terms of rights (e.g. 
justice). The procedure serves the purpose of maintaining consistency in 
these outcomes and as a verification mechanism that allows users to ensure 
that the system is properly programmed to produce the desired outcome. 
Procedures are used to compute or process outputs consistent with the 
requirements of substantive legitimacy within that operating system and are 
meant to be a limitation of choice by excluding the whims of individual 
government agents from the governance process.5 This is similar to a 
computer program, which is a set of processes that the computer goes 
through in order to create an output, the major difference being that the 
computer, without reprogramming, is unable to violate the rules it has been 
given, whereas the administrative official can violate those rules.
This difference aside, at a high level we can see that the metaphor of law as 
code reveals something interesting about the nature of governance. 
Programming is a skill that requires a coder to conceptualize and set the 
outputs of a program through a set of instructions written in a standardized 
language.  Importantly, different programmers accomplish tasks in different 
ways, and they must make decisions that balance between practical outputs, 
efficiency, and substantive outputs for the user of the program. The nature of 
the computer transforms the governance as machine metaphor into a 
governance as computation metaphor. The “abstract norms that obtain 
regularity and predictability” for programmers are written in algorithms.6  The 
algorithm itself emerged well before the computer and was posited as a way 
in which abstract mathematical formulas could be used to describe quite 
literally the entire cosmos.7 The algorithm found in the digital computer is a 
device that could make the algorithm’s output manifest.  It becomes the 
process through which programmers can manipulate and recreate the world. 
It allows for the creation of imagined spaces – and Cyberspace might best be 
understood as a multiverse of ideas.8
Law and regulation are similarly ideas that are given effect through the 
bureaucratic administrative machine. A simple government program for the 
disbursement of a government benefit functions analogously. Legislation 
defines the inputs and outputs and regulation then puts into place a series of 
5  Coicaud, Legitimacy and Politics (2002) 32.
6  Id.  at 20.
7  Berlinski, The Advent of the Algorithm (2002).
8  For example Tanz, “Playing for Time” (2016).  See also Lloyd, Programming the 
Universe (2006).
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procedures that government officials use to process public administration. A 
citizen seeking to claim a benefit would give inputs required by the program. 
These inputs would then be checked against a set of variables or criteria. If 
the individual meets those criteria the official disburses the benefit, else the 
government official does not disburse the benefit.  
In this metaphor, the international governance system becomes a networking 
protocol that allows the state operating systems to communicate by instituting 
transaction points for the different systems to communicate, such as the ITU. 
The protocol though is one that facilitates interconnection and not 
interoperability. As a result, it requires those it connects to have certain 
features in order to take part in the network. This allows us to probe why 
Cyberspace can be said to reprogram the world. As noted in Chapter I, 
international governance has historically been successful at deploying 
international law that governs world scale technology, but it has been unable 
to encompass Cyberspace technologies effectively within its regime. It is 
submitted here that this is a direct result of the materiality of international 
governance.  The territorial rootedness of the international system indicates a 
need for transnational physicality in order for it to effectively interconnect 
parties for solutions. As noted in Chapter 7, the ITU’s ability to successfully 
govern international telecommunications is a function of its ability to create 
law that governs the physical circumstances of the technology, but not the 
ideational content carried on that technology. This is a constant theme in 
international law.  A good example can be found in the Genocide Convention 
and the UDHR, which were both passed in December 1948.  The Genocide 
Convention did not include a provision on racist and discriminatory speech, 
because the United States opposed its inclusion on grounds that it violated 
the right of free speech.9 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, on the 
other hand, included the right to free speech, but was not adopted as a 
binding treaty and the Soviet States abstained from voting.
In international governance, the state is the only device that can connect to 
the network and take part as a full member of the political geography. 
International governance is only equipped with tools that ensure “territorial 
integrity” against physical incursions. Ideational incursions have always been 
outside the realm of the international network, and states have been left free 
to control these incursions in a best efforts system. The international network 
then is not interoperable because the operating systems are able to resist 
certain inputs. The physical layer components of the Internet are clearly 
technologies that the international system is equipped to regulate fueling 
realist interpretations of Cyberspace. The logical layer, though, subverts the 
physicality of that border crossing by freeing content from its analog barriers. 
9  Schabas, Genocide in International Law (2009) 320.
162Reprogramming the World
The protocols that function at the core of the Internet pushes code-making 
(i.e. regulatory) abilities to the user by making human interaction 
interoperable across borders. It breaks the strictures of the operating system 
allowing for geographic convergence and multiplying interaction points.
An example might better illustrate this. The operating system on a device 
limits the types of instructions that the device can run, which limits the 
programs it can run. In the early days of computing the operating system was 
a significant limitation on what programs one could run, and the operating 
system in use can still be very limiting.  Applications like Google Docs subvert 
the strictures of the operating system by allowing the user to run a program 
through their web browser, erasing the borders set by the operating system. 
This is analogous to what is happening in the international system. The 
logical layer of the Internet is at once content and medium; the medium is 
literally inseparable from the message.10 This allows interoperability not 
conceived of within international geography and gives entrance to hackers 
like Assange who are able to hack into the international network.  Cyberspace 
is a geography that enables individuals, corporations, and states to short-
circuit the international protocols and create interoperability across borders 
and among actors.
What this reveals is that law is code is just as important as code is law.  For 
instance, the mass surveillance discussed in Chapter 8 allows the state to 
extend its law and power over individuals outside its borders in contravention 
of the assumed materiality found in international governance. The state is 
clearly circumventing the coordinating process of the international system 
through Cyberspace. This hack cannot be patched by international 
governance, because it has never been vested with the ability to regulate 
ideas. The technology opens the possibility of global interoperability.
A Digital Cosmopolis 
Much of the juxtaposition in this research has been to pit Cyberspace in 
contrast to ‘realist’ readings that tend to imagine the state as pursuing its 
interests against other states using power, which is embodied by military 
might and economic wealth – that is: blood and treasure.11 While a 
reprogrammed world does not completely diminish realism’s explanatory 
power, it does remove the state from its dominance over a number of 
activities including war. For instance, while Stuxnet could be read in realist 
terms, such an analysis will likely gloss over some of the central problems 
that Cyberspace causes for realism.  The primary problem is in realism’s 
10  See Berlinski, The Advent of the Algorithm (2000) 309–310.
11  Caney, “Review Article” (2001) 986–87.
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conception of power.  Power in terms of military might is no longer something 
monopolized by the state.  The state still has access to and the ability to wield 
power in Cyberspace, but it is no longer the sole holder of that power.  Power 
itself has been reprogrammed so as to allow others to wield power on par 
with the state. Similarly, power in terms of treasure has changed as well. 
Technologies like Bitcoin have changed the nature of currency, removing the 
state’s ability to control the flow of funds. Digitized power is transferable 
outside of the zero-sum world of the realist.
This critique of realism might lead one to try and place the reprogrammed 
world within the context of cosmopolitan theory. Cosmopolitanism exists in 
various forms, but its theorists all converge on the idea of a world governance 
system that extends political and social rights to individuals as opposed to 
states.12 These theorists argue that the development of a world-scale 
governance order is the only way to overcome the various global injustices by 
extending “[p]rinciples of distributive justice ... [to] a global scope.”13 
Cosmopolitanism is different in scope from the “loose community of states” 
represented by the UN.  It is a project that seeks ways to form a “community 
of world citizens, who can legitimate their political decisions ... on the basis of 
democratic opinion.”14 Cosmopolitan theorists extend reciprocal rights and 
obligations from the sphere of the state, making a universalist claim giving 
individuals “moral personality.”15
At face value, cosmopolitanism seems like a theoretical outlook that could 
accommodate the alternative geographies of the reprogrammed world, since 
the Internet “has unleashed the extraordinary possibility for many to 
participate in the process of building and cultivating culture that reaches far 
beyond local boundaries.”16 Even Schmitt notes the power of a “global 
consciousness ... oriented to a common hope” in the shaping of world 
space.17 Cosmopolitanism embraces such respatializations as it itself pushes 
a global rather than international perspective abandoning the “state [as] the 
natural container of and vehicle for politics.18 Cosmopolitanism even shares 
rhetorical and discursive ties to cyber-utopians like John Perry Barlow.19  
12  See generally, Caney, “Review Article” (2001); Craig, “The Resurgent Idea of World 
Government” (2008) 133–42; and Dallmayr, “Cosmopolitanism” (2003) 421–42.
13  Caney, “Review Article” (2001) 975.
14  Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (2001) 105–106. See also Held, 
Democracy and Global Order (1995) 22–23.
15  Caney, “Review Article” (2001) 977.
16  Lessig, Free Culture (2004) 9.
17  Schmitt, Nomos of the Earth (2003) 50.
18  For instance Goodhart, “Human Rights and Global Democracy” (2008) 401.
19  See generally Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture (2006).
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Despite the decentralized nature of Cyberspace, its technology holds a hope 
for cosmopolitanism. Cyberspace displays the ability to reconceptualize 
global space and connect individuals without the interference of the state. 
Multistakeholder governance reflects core notions of cosmopolitanism in its 
deliberative approach that places governance in a “global context ... defined 
by multiple and overlapping networks.20 Cyberspace represents “global 
space,” and from the perspective of the cosmopolitan, it manifests the 
possibility of new global imaginations, and social movements using 
Cyberspace often employ “cosmopolitan repertoires.”21 Pragmatically, the 
technology could help to fill gaps in data that would be critical to any such 
enterprise,22 and it holds the most promise as a technology for facilitating 
world-scale deliberation. 
Despite the hope found in the technology, the reprogrammed world does not 
necessarily mesh with cosmopolitanism. Central to this is the authority 
structure discussed in Chapter 7. The Internet as part of its code bucks 
centralization. A core function of packet switching is to eliminate “global 
control.”23  So while cosmopolitanism seeks the “establishment of some sort 
of authoritative regime” to spread equality, Cyberspace only serves to unite 
the globe through an interoperable protocol which fragments the world into 
networks.24 Cyberspace does not seek equality in its users, only 
interoperability.  So, while Cyberspace opens global geographies, it cannot be 
said to have yet opened a cosmopolitan geography that could accommodate 
deliberative democracy of a global scale.
What this tells us is that while Cyberspace presents an unprecedented 
opportunity for the deployment of cosmopolitan or utopian visions, 
technological determinism is a mistake.  Technological solutions for building 
world-scale community were critiqued as early as the 1930s through 
“skepticism about the capacity of a global community of connectivity to 
transmute into a global community of responsibility.”25 The technology itself 
may be a necessary precursor to a cosmopolitan system, but is not sufficient 
by itself.26  Despite all the tools that Cyberspace presents, “society may lack 
the informational tools necessary to involve everyone in democratic decision-
making and to foster widespread economic and social flourishing.”27 As a 
20  Goodhart, “Human Rights and Global Democracy” (2008) 401–402.
21  Fielder, “The Internet and Dissent in Authoritarian States” (2013) 167.
22  See generally Coicaud & Tahri, “Nationally Based Data” (2014) 135–45.
23  Leiner et al., “A Brief History of the Internet” (2012).
24  Craig, “The Resurgent Idea of World Government” (2008) 135.
25  Critique by Reinhold Niebhur in Menon, “Pious Words, Puny Deeds” (2009) 236. 
See also Cooper, “What Is the Concept of Globalization Good For?” (2001) 193.
26  Streck, “Pulling the Plug on Electronic Town Meetings” (1998) 19.
27  Goodman & Chen, “Modeling Policy for New Public Service Media Networks” (2010) 
165 Reprogramming the World
result despite the increase in intercultural interchange “global democracy is 
nowhere in sight,”28 and “programmed utopias” should likely be met with 
skepticism.29 Technology is powerful, but cosmopolitanism is still at its core a 
problem of developing global knowledge.”30
It is easy to view Cyberspace as a tool with which to reprogram the world into 
a digital cosmopolis, but the capability of the technology to restructure global 
affairs along cosmopolitan values will be closely related to how Cyberspace 
itself is governed.  As Lessig reminds, the Cyberspace that currently exists is 
not the only Cyberspace possible.31 Whether or not cosmopolitan 
geographies are possible will depend in large part on the innovative capacity 
that is pushed to the edges of the networks.
Defragmenting the International
This research posits that the international system developed to coordinate 
world scale governance in the wake of WWII is being transformed by cyber-
technologies that are driving a reconceptualization of global order. The first 
section in this chapter used the metaphor of programming to show how 
Cyberspace allows borders to be hacked and recoded.  The second section 
used cosmopolitanism as a lens to show that though Cyberspace helps to 
conceptualize other global geographies, it has its own logics that these 
structures must also contend with as they seek to build global knowledge. 
These two discussions both point to uncertainty in the future that Cyberspace 
might enable. This is because the “mental consequences of the Internet ... 
are still very hard to assess.”32 One thing is certain though: Cyberspace will 
continue to shape the space in which global affairs unfold. This calls for 
tracking future encounters between Cyberspace and international geography 
to build a proper understanding of how geography is being reprogrammed. 
Outside of defining the nature and scope of systemic changes, there are a 
number of theoretical questions that are ripe to be evaluated in light of 
restructured world-scale geography.
The primary question that should be raised is how we can conceptualize 
legitimation within dual geographies. International legitimacy and Cyberspace 
legitimacy are based on different principles, but they both tap into similar 
114.
28  Rao, “Equity in A Global Public Goods Framework” (1999) 68.
29  Bearman, “The Untold Story of Silk Road” (2015). 
30  Featherstone & Venn, “Problematizing Global Knowledge and the New 
Encyclopaedia Project” (2006) 10–11.
31  Lessig, Code 2.0 (2006) 31–37.
32  Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (2001) 43.
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ideas of democracy and human rights.33 For instance, the Western liberal 
democratic state is premised on representative democracy in which voters 
are defined by territory.  Cyberspace as a spatial geography is everywhere, 
so Internet governance communities depend on democratic voting, but are 
open to participation by all interested individuals. Legitimacy is closely tied to 
consent, which is skewed as a result of Cyberspace. The state’s ability to 
legislate change in the Internet within its territory maintains the risk of 
changing the Internet in another state’s territory contrary to the consent of its 
citizens.  At the same time, a small group of elites that form IGCs can make 
decisions based on consent that can change how the Internet works without 
going through processes established within a state to ensure in part the 
administration of justice.34 This raises deep questions about the nature of 
legitimacy within the space of multiple dynamic regulatory systems.
A second, related question is what the nature of democracy is within 
Cyberspace. Cyber-utopians have long called for community governance 
arguing that such governance is more democratic, but the suggestion that 
“democracy in cyberspace means democracy in the real world ... is false.”35 
Democracy is not a static condition, and the democracy observed in IGCs is 
open and inclusive in thought, but participation is de facto limited by the high 
level of technical knowledge needed to meaningfully participate. This means 
that not only are most people unable to engage in these processes, the 
processes themselves are in potential danger of being co-opted by groups 
that flood the membership of IGCs. Corporations and states can send 
individual representatives to take part in the deliberations and are seemingly 
not limited to a single representative since membership is open. In other 
words, how do users reconcile their “multiple identities” and “plural 
affiliations,” and take part in multiple governance systems.36
Additionally, community governance can be seen to have undemocratic 
tendencies, and can come in “its form of lynch-mob” sanctions.37 Libertarian 
coders have even sought to use it as a marketplace for assassinations.38 
Thus, a second layer of questions on democracy in Cyberspace result from 
the fora of public discourse being privately owned social media platforms 
such as Facebook and Twitter.39 While a private fourth estate has been 
considered central to liberal democracy, the lines become blurred through the 
33  Id. at 119.
34  Alvestrand & Lie, “Development of Core Internet Standards” (2009) 129.
35  Streck, “Pulling the Plug on Electronic Town Meetings” (1998) 18–47, 40–41. 
36  Sen, “Global Justice” (1999) 120–121.
37  Tambini et al., Codifying Cyberspace (2008) 3.
38  Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets (2012) 69–70 and Bearman, “The Untold 
Story of Silk Road” (2005).
39  DeNardis & Hackl, “Internet Governance by Social Media Platforms” (2015).
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phenomenon of the “citizen reporter.” The WikiLeaks controversy is instructive 
as it shows how states can use diplomatic pressure to place burdens on 
expression through pressure on dominant corporations. This example shows 
that “the privatization of information flows offers possibilities for private 
monopoly and sub-optimal exclusion of social groups.”40 These technologies 
recode the public discursive space, and democracy under such conditions is 
insufficiently theorized.41 This is especially so in light of the widespread 
election interference by Russia in a number of other states.42 This 
interference took advantage of the way in which social media allows for echo 
chambers to emerge and shape public discourse.43 By flooding these systems 
with #fakenews, an external state was able to influence the public discourse 
occurring outside its borders. While these activities certainly affect the 
“political independence” of other states, there was no need for a prohibited 
use of force.
Third, and building upon the previous two questions, is what the nature of 
global multistakeholder governance will be as it unfolds as a new category 
within world-scale governance structure.44 This question is one of determining 
how such a governance structure, which removes the state from the dominant 
position, will interact with international government mechanisms. This new 
category of governance will create rules and norms that can be made 
effective within the territory of a state without the consent mechanisms found 
in traditional international organizations. Multistakeholder governance is still 
an emerging concept and it is still yet to be defined with much clarity.
Finally, a raft of ethical and philosophical questions arises in terms of how to 
best structure Cyberspace. Its design is currently foundational to the way in 
which it alters geography, and its architecture is highly contested in a number 
of fora.45 If we accept that “we can and we should make more use of 
technology for participatory democracy,” then there are critical issues to 
ensuring that Cyberspace governance maintains that possibility,46 so that it 
can “promote communicative opportunities.”47 Cyberspace, like other major 
technological advances, has already changed the world, but there is a 
challenge in ensuring that it impacts the world in a positive manner. As we 
see with incidents like Stuxnet and cybercrime, Cyberspace also has the 
potential to be used in a way that causes harm to humanity as a whole. As a 
40  Tambini et al., Codifying Cyberspace (2008) 10.
41  See generally Chadwick, “Bringing E-Democracy Back In” (2003) 443–55.
42  See generally Galante & Ee, Defining Russian Election Interference (2018).
43  See generally Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0 (2007).
44  Leiner et al., “A Brief History of the Internet” (2012). 
45  See generally DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (2014).
46  Noveck, “Designing Deliberative Democracy in Cyberspace” (2003) 5.
47  Goodman, “Media Policy and Free Speech” (2007) 1211.
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result, it should be expected that Cyberspace governance will become more 
contested as its uses and reach increase. Amidst policy circles there is a 
need for understanding the role of Cyberspace in the reprogrammed world, 
and the technical nature of its social imbrication. Cyberspace is an 
incomplete, and likely an incompletable, process. Based on the logic of the 
algorithm, Cyberspace grows at the rate of ideas. As a result, we can think of 
Cyberspace as a manifestation of the human consciousness. Cyberspace is 
more than just technical standards, and governance must contend with the 
age-old problem of constructing political space that allows freedom of ideas, 
but at the same time keeps the governance structure from collapsing on itself. 
The questions raised here are by no means ignored in the vast literature on 
Cyberspace, but they are most often engaged with at the level of particular 
technologies. These questions are raised here in relation to Cyberspace as 
an alternative geography to international geography. The international system 
is a legal and political settlement that defines territorial space, but 
Cyberspace is a technology that is pushing against this order by recoding the 
borders that flow from the international system. As such, these questions 
need to be addressed as the technology continues to reshape global social 
life.
---
Computer programs are ideas that are both medium and message. 
International governance has been effective at regulating conduits for 
information, but has had limited success in extending its regulatory net to 
include the content of the information in these conduits.  Digitization presents 
a unique challenge to international governance because it inseparably bonds 
the message and the medium.  As a result, states have shown a limited ability 
to exert a variety of controls over Cyberspace domestically, but they have 
been unable to address it as a transborder phenomenon that is a “composite 
of the space of flows and the space of places.”48
The convergence of medium and message creates a challenge for 
international governance that is premised on material territorial borders.  This 
is not the only reason that the international will be increasingly challenged by 
Cyberspace.  The message-medium convergence is also implicit in emerging 
social understandings of the space of consciousness.  The networking of the 
world means that individuals “can change [their] geography, and anything that 
happens there creates a change in someone’s physical geography.”49  It is 
48  Castells, “Communication, Power and Counter-Power in the Network Society” 
(2007) 249.
49  Hayden, “The Future of Things Cyber” (2013) 4.
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these innovative connections that are currently driving economics, politics, 
and a range of other social interactions. In much the same way that the 
dropping of Little Boy on Hiroshima and the first orbit of Sputnik did, 
Cyberspace is changing the shape of the world. The Cold War fear of distant 
powers raining fire from the sky has been replaced by a post 9/11 fear of the 
Internet radicalized neighbor. Similarly, the power and awe of strategic 
nuclear weapons and space exploration that has held so much sway over 
international politics is being replaced by the power of Cyberspace and the 
struggle to maintain and manage it in such a way as to enrich humanity. If the 
Internet and Cyberspace are to be effective tools of liberty, freedom, and 
justice then Cyberspace must be understood not just within domestic 
governance frameworks, but also within the international governance system, 
which defines the borders that enclose domestic systems.  In Schmitt’s words: 
The new nomos of our planet is growing irresistibly. [...] But 
what is coming is not therefore boundless or a nothingness 
hostile to nomos. Also in timorous rings of old and new forces, 
right measures and meaningful proportions can originate.50  
50  Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth (2003) 355.
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We live in a world of “fake news”, data breaches, election hacking, and 
cyberwarfare. We live in a world in which 280 characters can change everything. 
Our analog past has been replaced with digital realities. The world itself is being 
reprogrammed. This statement might seem like a quippy metaphor, but it actually 
reveals something much more concrete. The central claim of this book is that 
digital technologies are rewiring the way that society understands and thinks 
about global order as Cyberspace changes the content of international borders. 
Understanding these developments is critical to understanding the future of global 
society.
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